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In this Article, Professor Lazos examines initiatives and referendums in
which a majority is in a position to vote on the content of a minority's
democratic civic standing. Case law fails to set forth a single test for judicial
review; consequently, doctrinal and theoretical coherence in this area is
nonexistent. Professor Lazos proposes a test that takes into account social
dynamics and focuses on the impact of these measures. First, she examines
outcomes over the last three decades of approximately eighty such initiatives
and referendums, from the anti-integration movement of the sixties to today's
ideological and cultural versions, such as English-only and laws that exclude
gay men and lesbians from discrimination protections.
At an aggregate level, minorities "lose" roughly four out of five times.
However, on closer examination, the story is more complex. Although anti-
minority results easily can be triggered by "we-they " group thinking and reflect
more subtle expressions of prejudice, they also are vehicles for ideological
conflicts. Because the dynamics are complex, but yet can threaten the polity's
civic cohesion, Professor Lazos 's proposed test would focus on impacts, not on
motives. Under her proposal, courts would focus on how such initiatives impact
on a minority's ability to participate and continue to vie in the rough back and
forth of democratic politics. Courts would weigh three factors: (1) how such
initiatives and referendums impact on a minority's opportunity to participate
politically in the polity, (2) whether such laws stigmatize a minority, and (3)
whether they unduly burden a minority's participation in civic society. If a court
determines that an initiative or referendum severely and detrimentally impacts a
minority's participation in the polity, the court then would apply strict scrutiny
analysis, and the law would stand only if the state were able to show a
compelling state interest that supports the measure.
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America will continue to be divided .... If we want our laws and other
legal institutions to provide the ground rules within which these issues will be
contested then these ground rules must not be the conqueror's law that the
dominant class imposes on the weaker .... The institution of rights is therefore
crucial, because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities that their
dignity and equality will be respected. When the divisions among the groups are
most violent, then this gesture, if law is to work, must be most sincere.
Ronald Dworkin1
I. INTRODUCTION
A distinct new trend in democracy has emerged in the last decade. Direct
democracy measures, specifically initiatives and referendums,2 are increasingly
being used to address problematic and complex issues that affect the citizenship
rights and status of minorities. Thus, such powerful states as California,
Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and Florida have recently become
I RONALD DwoRsiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERiOusLY 204-05 (1977).
2 In the "initiative," voters directly shape legislation or constitutional provisions. Once:
minimum number of petition signatures have been procured, the proposed statutory c
constitutional language is placed directly before the electorate. By contrast, a "referendum"
placed before the electorate only after the legislature has voted in favor of the propos,
constitutional amendment, statute, tax, or proposed petition for statehood. The popular v
then either approves or disapproves the proposed action. See generally JOHN M. ALLS.VAT
CALFORNiA INrrATlEs AND REFERENDUMS, 1912-1990, at 1-15 (1991); REFERENDUMS
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACrICE AND THEORY 3-21 (David Butler & Austin Ranney e
1978); Eugene C. Lee, The American Experience, 1778-1978, in THE REFERENDUM Do
46 (Austin Ranney ed., 1981).
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battlegrounds for direct voter consideration of controversial issues including
proposed imposition of "English-only" requirements in the public workplace, 3
placement of sharp limitations on the use of affirmative action,4 restriction of
anti-discrimination protections afforded to gay men and lesbians,5 elimination of
benefits to illegal immigrants,6 and imposition of limits on bilingual education.7
These exercises in direct democracy have been subjected to constitutional
challenge on equal protection and other grounds and have sometimes been
defeated. The best known such case is Romer v. Evans,8 in which the Supreme
Court in 1996 used an equal protection analysis to strike down Colorado's anti-
gay rights initiative, Amendment 2. Several other federal and state courts have
also recently used a variety of federal constitutional arguments to strike down
anti-minority measures that had been adopted using initiatives or referendums. 9
However, attacks brought to bear against such exercises of direct democracy
have often failed as well. Even after the Supreme Court, in Romer, had struck
down Colorado's anti-gay rights initiative, the Sixth Circuit, in Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,10 refused to strike a
quite similar measure. Also, although a federal district court enjoined
California's controversial anti-affirmative action Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI,"
also known as Proposition 209) on the ground that it violated the federal Equal
Protection Clause,11 the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that under rational basis
3 See infra Part IM.B.2.c.
4 See infra Part I.B.2.e.
5 See infra Part II.B.2.a.
6 See infra Part mH.B.2.d.
7 See infira Part mI.B.2.c.
8 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see infra Part IV.C.6.
9 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1002-03 (Ariz. 1998) (en bane) (holding that the
English-only constitutional amendment by initiative violated the First Amendment by requiring
that all state and local government officials and employees "act" only in English during
performance of government business, and also holding that basic rights of non-English
speaking persons to participate in and have access to government were substantially impaired
by this amendment); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, Nos. 94-7569 MRP, 94-
7570 MRP, 94-7571 MRP, 94-7652, 95-0187 MRP, 1998 WL 141325 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-55671 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 1998) (striking California's
Proposition 187, which sought to deny both legal and illegal immigrants access to various
public welfare and health benefits, on the grounds of both federal preemption and
inconsistency with the Equal Protection Clause).
10 128 F.3d 289, 294-300 (6th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Romer on the basis that the
Cincinnati ordinance did not limit access to political process as did Colorado's Amendment 2),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
11 Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1499-1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
review the measure did "not violate the Equal Protection Clause in any
conventional sense"12 and also did not restrict minorities' political access. 13
When the results of ballot initiatives affecting minority14 rights are
challenged in court, the judiciary is placed in the midst of a highly charged
political contest. To resolve such disputes, courts must answer the question of
how the Constitution mediates relations between majorities and minorities. In
one sense, the judiciary is merely being called upon to perform its ordinary
constitutional task as a key democratic actor, reviewing majority actions that
might threaten the rights and political and social standing of a minority.
However, when courts review actions taken directly by the public, rather than by
their elected representatives, the judiciary's counter-majoritarian hubris is more
readily apparent. In these cases, a lone judge is placed in a position of having to
tell possibly millions of voters that the voters' will is inconsistent with that single
judge's understanding of fundamental constitutional values. This version of "I
am right and the rest of the world is wrong" represents a judicial challenge that
requires courage, vision, and understanding of the politics of a pluralist
democracy. When judges do take such actions they fall under intense scrutiny, 15
sometimes including threats to their own powers. For example, when United
States District Judge Thelton Henderson enjoined California's anti-affirmative
action Proposition 209, the resulting firestorm included a proposal to limit
12 Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
13 Cf. id. at 699 (observing that a single district court judge should not use improper legal
analysis to "thwart the will of the people').
14 For purposes of this Article, I define a "minority" as a social group that has been
constructed by society as different, which experiences a subordinate (relative to the majority)
social identity as well as social status, which frequently results in diminished economic
opportunities. Such groups frequently are the object of majority hostility, whether conscious
and blatant, or more subtle, as would be the case of actions motivated by social identity
stereotypes. See infra Part IlI.C.l.b. In this sense it is usually true but not essential that a
"minority" group will be comprised of less than 50% of the members of the population. I
exclude women from the analysis of anti-minority initiatives, infra Part m, because women
appear to be a special case, as borne out by the empirical data. See infra note 93. However,
women are a minority group as herein defined, and the formulation of the proposed test could
be applied to women as well. See infra Part V.B.I.b. I do not deal in this Article with the more
difficult question as to whether the poor are a minority.
15 Compare Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion.
on the Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1447, 1457, 1463 (1997) (lauding Judge
Henderson's decision enjoining enactment of Proposition 209 as precisely the kind of 'real
world" analysis that the Supreme Court has failed to undertake in recent equal protection cases
and calling his actions courageous), with H.R. REP. No. 105-478, at 18 (1998) (justifying
cutting back judicial power in initiative and referendum cases because "it is fundamentally
unfair and does not accord due process to allow one judge to thwart that collective wilr).
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individual federal judges' jurisdiction to void direct democracy enactments. 16
These controversies involve a great deal more than legal disputes that
uniquely challenge the judiciary. They are part of the ongoing fundamental
ideological disagreements that take place between majorities and minorities in a
pluralist democratic polity. Although it is true that these conflicts are often about
ideas and values, such ideological disagreements can also embody status
conflicts, racial attitudes, and majority discomfort regarding the changes that
inevitably occur within an increasingly diverse polity.17 Thus, seemingly
ideological disputes can also reflect the social conflicts that occur as a
democracy becomes increasingly heterogeneous.
Viewed with a pluralist democracy lens, direct democracy disputes are
critically important because they have a community dimension that goes to the
very foundation of a democratic polity and of majority-minority relations in that
polity. When a majority group succeeds in circumscribing the content of a
minority's civil rights and their citizenship status within the polity, it sounds a
loud and powerful message throughout the polity. At a communicative level, the
majority's vote can be interpreted as a message rejecting the minority group
from the polity. Thus, direct democracy influences the cohesion of the polity.18
Given all of these implications, the standards and methods courts used to
review direct democracy initiatives are critically important as a matter of both
constitutional law and of principles of democratic governance. Nonetheless, and
rather shockingly, the Supreme Court has failed to provide a coherent or even
internally consistent analysis of how courts ought to go about reviewing direct
democracy measures affecting minority interests and rights. The decisions fail
even to present themselves as a consistent body of law and fail dismally in the
elementary task of providing lower courts with a clear set of rules to follow in
reviewing initiatives and referendums. 19 They also fail to address the key
questions of judicial review: how and when courts should provide a check on
democratic processes, which are by their very nature impassioned; and when do
16 See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998).
17 Te prior two works of this project, Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing
Homo[genous] Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary
Effect, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1493 (1998) [hereinafter Lazos Vargas, Homo[genous] Americanus],
and Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the
Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MN. L. REV. 150 (1999) [hereinafter Lazos Vargas, Democracy
and Inclusion], work through the various challenges to equal protection law of an increasing
heterogeneous polity. A basic premise of this work is that majority-minority epistemological
conflict is an ongoing condition of our democracy, and equal protection doctrine can, and
should, develop better approaches to resolving this kind of conflict.
18 See infra Part 1.C.3, Part V.A.1.
19 See infra Part IV.
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majority political actions unduly circumscribe minority citizenship status and
rights within the democratic polity? Moreover, the case law, like many other
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, ignores a rich body of political and social
science literature. As a result, doctrine in this area, far more than any other
discrete area of equal protection, is in shambles. Courts must recognize that this
lack of doctrinal and theoretical coherence has a high cost. It delegitimizes
courts' decisions, whether they reaffirm the majority's ballot decision or reinstate
a minority civil right.
This Article attempts to fill this void without entirely condemning the
process of direct democracy. In this sense the proposal comports with pragmatic
political realities. Current political culture holds that direct democracy has a
legitimate place in the enterprise of democratic government. Particularly in states
that have originated and championed the practice of direct democracy, such
measures are politically and culturally entrenched.20 Further, while there is
reason to be skeptical of the merits of direct democracy,21 it overstates the case
and oversimplifies the complexities of majority-minority dynamics to condemn
as racially motivated all direct democracy voting outcomes that disfavor
minorities. 22 The dynamics of what motivates people to vote a particular way are
complex, 23 and what should and can be called "racially motivated" is subject to
deep controversy.24 Thus, this Article takes the position that direct democracy is
a legitimate form of democratic government and of deciding difficult issues
before the polity.25
Moreover, unlike Justice Hans Linde26 and Professor Julian Eule,27 wel
2 0 Over 57% of United States voters, in general, believe it appropriate for them to have
direct input in legislation and constitutional content. See infra note 45.
2 1 See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DiRECr DEMOCRACY: THE POLMCS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECr LEGIsLATION: VOTING ON
BALLOT PROPOsmONs IN THE UNrrED STATES (1984); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CnIzEN
LAWMAKERs: THE BALLOT INrTIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN,
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVIVED 89-95 (1986) (setting forth the arguments
for and against direct democracy).
22 See infra Part I.C.i.
23 See infra Part llI.C.1.d.
24 See infra Part Il.C.l.b.
2 5 See infra Part ll.
2 6 Justice Hans Linde argues that direct democracy violates the constitutional requirement
of republican form of government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting "all legislative powers"
in Congress); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEs. L. REV. 197 (1976); Hans
A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not "'Republican Government?," 17 HAsINGS
CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989); see also Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference on Constitutional Law:
Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994). This
Article does not address the many fine constitutional points that Justice Linde makes because it
[Val. 60:399
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known and courageous critics of direct democracy, I do not view direct
democracy as a unique structural democratic threat that therefore calls for
generalized judicial skepticism toward direct democracy efforts. Rather, the
controversies of direct democracy should be viewed within a larger framework
of the pervasive dynamics that divide majorities and minorities and affect all
forums of democratic deliberation. Constitutional law performs an important
function in channeling majority-minority conflicts into processes that will permit
and encourage greater mutual understanding.28 The judiciary, which can claim
neutrality and is the premier expositor of public reason, has a special
responsibility in these kinds of conflicts to craft decisions that reaffirm channels
of public discourse and encourage greater mutual tolerance and acceptance. 29
Initiatives and referendums are another iteration of the pervasive democratic
takes the pragmatic position, which Justice Linde justly criticizes, that direct democracy is
embedded in our civic democracy. See infra Part II.
27 Professor Eule argues that direct democracy deserves heightened review because of its
failure to "filter out" majority-minority hostility, which he argues representative democracy
does, in the lawmaking process. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99
YALE L.J. 1503, 1522-30 (1990). Professor Eule's work has generated, both directly and
indirectly, a great deal of academic controversy and commentary. See generally Sherman J.
Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REv. 434 (1998); Symposium,
From Gold Dust to Silicon Chips: The California Constitution in Transition, 17 HASTINGs
CONST. L.Q. 1 (1989); Symposium, Governing By Initiative, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1995);
Symposium on the California Initiative Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161 (1998);
Symposium, Panel One: Differential Standards ofJudicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 373 (1997); Symposium, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State
Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory
Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227 (1998); Symposium, The
Constitutionality of Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994); Symposium,
Voices of the People: Essays on Constitutional Democracy in Memory of Professor Julian N.
Eule, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537 (1998); see also infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. The
argument that I make in this Article is distinct from Eule's. I am not arguing for heightened
review based on a structural disadvantage that direct democracy suffers in comparison to
representative government. Instead, I argue that what I refer to as majority-minority initiatives,
see infra Appendices A-H, can violate equal protection norms given how such initiatives
function in the real world. The test that I propose conceivably could be applied to legislative
products that involve the kind of interests and values that majority-minority initiatives routinely
involve. See infra Part V.B.
28 1 articulate this theory in greater detail in Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 17,
where I draw John Rawls's view of the role of courts and the function of public reason in a
constitutional pluralist democracy and Martha Minow's "social relations" theory of equal
protection interpretation. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 110-20 (1990); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 237
(paperback ed. 1996); see also infra Part V.A.1.
29 See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 235.
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challenge in a pluralist polity-how to reconcile deep differences in political
views, philosophy, culture, and ways of knowing based on who we are and
where we happen to be socially situated.
Drawing on both the social science and political literature analyzing the
nature of the direct democracy process, as well as the theoretical literature
examining majority-minority relations in a pluralist democracy, this Article
articulates an equal protection test courts should employ in examining whether
particular direct democracy initiatives have unconstitutionally interfered with the
rights of a minority group. It argues that it is critical for courts to consider not
only doctrine and theory, but also to move beyond decontextualized formalism to
understand and account for the political and social context of initiatives and
referendums.30 The equal protection analysis advocated focuses on protecting
minority group members' access to the polity, and expressly rejects an analytical
approach that examines the motives of the voters. The alternative approach
advocated here-substantive review to ensure that fundamental citizenship rights
are preserved for minorities-will more easily allow courts to be consistent and
coherent in their review of direct democracy measures. It will be shown, as well,
that such an approach is consistent with the results of many of the Supreme
Court decisions in this area, although not necessarily with their reasoning.
Part II examines the politics of direct democracy, showing that such
measures have increasingly become an important, distinct political forum.
Initiatives and referendums are entrenched in the civic culture of many states.
With the rise of new politics, direct democracy has evolved from its grass roots
beginnings. Money has become all-important in gaining access to the ballot in
half of the initiative states, such as California, which have minimal substantive
screening requirements. This easy access to the ballot means that interests that
are well financed and well organized can heavily influence state and national
30 For recent work that critiques direct democracy applying political science principles
and social science literature, see DANiEL A. FARBER Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES
FOR THE CONsTrrUTION's THIRD CENTURY 387-89 (2d ed. 1998) (analyzing direct democracy);
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEmOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCrURES OF THE
PoLmCAL PRocEss 665-712 (1998) (analyzing direct democracy); Elizabeth Garrett, Who
Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. Cln. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17 (1997) (arguing that in direct
democracy interest group politics and the funding of it plays in a way that significantly
undermines public delibmeation); Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain,
50 VAND. L. REv. 361 (1997) [hereinafter Schacter, Romer and Democracy] (arguing that
Romer should be analyzed as a case in which a majority attempts to diminish a disfavored
minority's civic standing); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent". Interpretive
Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995) [hereinafter Schacter, Direct
Democracy and Intent] (criticizing state courts' approach to interpreting popular intent of
initiatives and referendums based on political behavioral literature showing that voters' "intent'




Part IT.A examines the empirical data summarized in Appendices A through
H. The data recompiles eighty-two initiatives and referendums from 1960 to
1998, in which the initiative or referendum dealt with a political-ideological
issue that enabled majorities to vote on the content of minorities' citizenship. At
an aggregated level, minorities "lost" over 80% of the time.
Part III.B then takes a closer look at the various majority-minority initiatives.
What are the political realities surrounding majority-minority initiatives? How
should the law interpret the consistent "anti-minority" results? By examining the
available social science and political science analyses of the various majority-
minority initiatives, one can draw some conclusions about the dynamics that take
place. The blanket accusation that anti-minority initiatives are racially motivated
is too simplistic. Majorities' motivations are mixed, and often the core of the
dispute is political and ideological. Yet the data consistently show that easy
access to the ballot, political competition, the power of media advertising, and
the lack of substantive screening encourage latent intergroup competitions, anti-
minority resentment, and "we-they" thinking. A judicial test that looks for
improper racial or other discriminatory animus or intent, and then strikes only
those initiatives that have been "proved" to stem from such animus, is essentially
an impossible taslc However, these majority-minority initiatives may often have
a serious detrimental impact on minorities' participation in the polity. By directly
blocking minorities' access to the system, by stigmatizing minorities, and by
limiting the democratic civic benefits provided to minorities relative to those
afforded to the majority, such measures may alienate minorities and
fundamentally decrease their civic participation. Such measures may also
encourage majorities in their efforts to exclude or limit minority participation.
Part IV analyzes the key U.S. Supreme Court and other cases in which the
judiciary has reviewed majority-minority initiatives. The approaches have been
disparate, in application of what constitutional provisions are relevant, in
describing the appropriate doctrinal test, and in applying a theoretical
framework. These diverse approaches reflect a failure to appreciate that these
cases deal with a common problem that involves both politics and majority-
minority dynamics. The total incoherence and inadequacy of the theoretical and
doctrinal frameworks both allow for excessive discretion and also inevitably
weaken the judiciary. The results appear so ad hoc that any decision made,
whether reinforcing an anti-minority result or "thwarting the will of the people,"
can be said to be unprincipled. There could be no worse outcome in this highly
critical area.
Part V presents a proposed coherent model of judicial review. Part V.A
examines various alternative theoretical foundations for equal protection analysis
and argues that the "relational approach" is the most helpful for analyzing
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majority-minority direct democracy measures. This model takes as its starting
point the idea that the Equal Protection Clause is premised on democratic
foundational concepts of co-equality and co-participation. 31 Part V.B puts forth
the test courts should apply in reviewing democratic initiatives and referendums.
It suggests that courts should not attempt to look for discriminatory intent, but
rather should focus on whether the initiative has unduly burdened a minority
group's civic participation. Where such a burden has been imposed, courts
should employ strict scrutiny. Part V.B demonstrates that the Supreme Court has,
in fact but not in words, taken an approach very close to that advocated in this
Article. Part V.C then applies the proposed test to five current and highly
controversial initiatives and referendums that impact minority citizenship:
measures limiting anti-gay discrimination; imposing "English-only"
requirements; restricting bilingual education; eliminating benefits to illegal
immigrants; and placing sharp limits on the use of affirmative action. The Article
concludes that the initiatives and referendums that are most damaging are those
that directly restrict a minority group's access to the political system, thereby
jeopardizing majority-minority civic relations in the polity.
II. THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
It's nice to be able to fix broken things, and there are a lot broken in
California.... I certainly fixed bilingual education. I fixed it but good.
Robert Unz32
This Part will trace the history of direct democracy as an independent form
of public deliberation and democratic lawmaking,3 3 focusing in particular on the
increasing reliance on initiatives and referendums to legislate complex social and
constitutional issues. Part II.A describes direct democracy as a mechanism with
firm roots in the culture and political structures of Western states. Part II.B
discusses and maps the upsurge in the use of direct democracy and describes the
modem political context in which direct democracy initiatives play out. Part I.C
31 See infra Part V.A.l. Professors Gunther and Sullivan divide the equal protection
"fundamental interest" cases into subcategories, which include access to voting, access to
judicial process, right to interstate migration, and fundamental interest in "necessities" such as
welfare benefits. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIvAN, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW
840-41 (13th ed. 1997). The "relational approach" fits into the "fundamental interesf' category
and has been developed by Martha Minow, Frank Michelman, and the prior project,
Democracy and Inclusion. See supra note 28.
32 Frank Bruni, The California Entrepreneur Who Beat Bilingual Teaching, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1998, atAl (quoting interview with Robert Unz).
33 See HARLAN HAHN & SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, REFERENDUM VOTING: SOCIAL STATUS
AND POLICY PREFERENCES 8-12 (1987) (providing a briefhistory of the referendum).
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describes the mix of "new politics," in which media and financing are all
important. This means that in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as for the foreseeable
future, direct democracy efforts have become more dependent on lucrative
financing and less dependent on grass roots efforts.
A. Direct Democracy as an American Political Tradition
Direct democracy is an integral part of the government structure of almost
half the states and is deeply entrenched in their civic and political traditions. A
total of twenty-three states and the District of Columbia afford voters direct
democracy access through the initiative process, and all but two of these also
permit citizens to force a referendum on any bill passed by the state legislature.34
Most states have provided direct citizen lawmaking since close to the beginning
of the century. The first state to adopt direct democracy measures was South
Dakota in 1898, and within the next four years, Utah and Oregon followed.35
Today, all but four of the states that rely on direct democracy are Western
states.36
Direct democracy is rooted in the Progressive politics of the turn of the
century. This movement, an intellectual predecessor of populism, was
preoccupied with the concentration of economic power in powerful institutions,
such as railroads, banks, lumber, and mining. Adherents of the Progressive
34 The states that provide for initiative are: South Dakota (1898), Utah (1900), Oregon
(1902), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Maine (1908), Missouri (1908), Arkansas (1910),
Colorado (1910), Arizona (1911), California (1911), Idaho (1911), Nebraska (1912), Nevada
(1912), Ohio (1912), Washington (1912), Michigan (1913), North Dakota (1914),
Massachusetts (1918), Alaska (1959), Florida (constitutional initiative) (1968), Wyoming
(1968), Illinois (constitutional initiative) (1970), District of Columbia (1977), and Mississippi
(1992). All of the foregoing states, except for Florida and Illinois, which only allow for
constitutional amendment initiatives, also permit referendums. The following states allow only
for statutory initiatives: Utah, Maine, Idaho, Washington, Alaska, Wyoming, and the District of
Columbia. See 31 THE BoOKOF STATES 209 tbl.5.15 (1996-1997 ed., 1997) [hereinafter BOOK
OF STATES]; CRONIN, supra note 21, at 47; PHILIP L. DUBOIs & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING
BY INIATIVE: IssuEs, OPTIONS AND COMPARIsONs 28 (1998); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, BALLOT
INrrIATIVES: HISTORY, RESEARCH, AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
CAMPAIGNS 3 (Initiative News Report Special Report, 1984). The governmental structure of
nine more states allows the legislature to place proposals on the ballot for the approval of
voters. See BOOK OF STATES, supra, at 153 tbl.5.2. This mechanism is an indirect initiative.
3 5 See DuBoIs & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 27-28.
3 6 See id. The exceptions are Maine, Florida, Mississippi, and the District of Columbia.
To be consistent with Elazar's ideas, infra, regarding general spheres of political culture, I use
his classification scheme as to which states are "Western" states. He considers Ohio, Michigan,
Illinois and Arkansas as Near Western states. See generally DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: A VIm FROM THE STATES (2d ed. 1972).
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movement believed that decisionmaking by the people could improve
government and counterbalance what they perceived to be the capture of state
legislatures by powerful economic interests.37
Various theories have been offered as to why direct democracy was and
continues to be particularly popular in the West. Charles Price suggests that
Western states were more likely to adopt such a radical democratic mechanism
because they were newly established as states, unlike Midwestern and Southern
states also influenced by the Progressives.38 Daniel Elazar, one of the first
political scientists to study seriously the political structure of states, 39 argues that
states have distinct cultures that influence their political structures.40 Elazar
developed a typology breaking down state political systems into three archetypal
political cultures: (1) individualistic, in which democracy is viewed as a
marketplace and political actors bargain in their self interest; (2) traditionalistic,
in which political actors seek to preserve the status quo and the holders of
political power tend to be the long standing elite; and (3) moralistic, in which a
monistic view of the polity dominates, and participants see as the goal of
37 See generally ZIMMERMAN, supra note 21, at 68-69; BarrY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA,
AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISsUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 12-14 (1987);
Charles M. Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Western
Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243 (1975). Cronin describes the movement as leftist, involving
labor federations, notably miners, as well as women suffragettes. See CRONIN, supra note 21, at
50-51. Eugene Lee describes Progressives as seeking to neutralize the power of special interest
groups, curtail political machines, provide education on civic issues, and prompt action on
difficult social issues. See Lee, supra note 2, at 48. They sought "to make every man his own
legislature." Id.
38 When the Progressive movement swept the West, these states more readily translated
Progressive politics into structural reform. See Price, supra note 37, at 248; see also Patrick L.
Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of Direct Democracy in Western State Constitutions, 28
N.M. L. REV. 343 (1998).
39 Elazar is still widely cited. See infra note 157.
40 See ELAZAR, supra note 36, at 5. He explains that states develop an independent civic
state culture shaped by its history, physical and economic environment, and the norms and
values of the people who settled and subsequently come to live in the state:
If the usage of the term "people" is understood to mean the particular complex of human
culture by which human beings individually and collectively invest particular
communities with character, then it becomes very likely, if not inevitable, that each state
will possess its own particular characteristics simply by virtue of its settled existence over
generations. In tum, its bundle of individual characteristics is what transforms each state
into a civil society, possessing a political system that is in some measure autonomous.
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political activity to achieve a common vision of the good.41 States, such as
California, with heavy emphasis on moralistic and individualistic values are most
likely to emphasize direct democracy.42
The Western states, which share this history of Progressivism and strong
individualistic and moralistic cultural and political traditions, continue to account
for the disproportionate usage of the initiative process. 43 Voters in the states that
have direct democracy as part of their governmental structure deem such access
to be a highly important and integral part of their system of governance.44
States that favor direct democracy have an important influence over the
development of opinions in the nation as a whole. For example, such states as
California, Oregon, Colorado, Arizona, Illinois, Missouri, Florida, and
Washington are not only key economic centers, but also have a far-reaching
influence in American politics. It is therefore not surprising that direct
democracy measures are now favored nationwide, as well as in the West.45
41 See id at 94-102.
42 See id at 114-18 (characterizing California as a state with a strong moralistic culture
and with secondary individualistic sentiment). This civic and political tradition can be seen in
the decentralized structure of government in California, as well as its constitutional and charter
provisions that allow and encourage direct democracy. See ALLSWANG, supra note 2, at 4-11.
San Francisco, in 1898, and California, in 1911, were among the first local and state entities to
incorporate the initiative mechanism into the structure of government. This was a response to
concerns that the Southern Pacific Railroad and other special interests had too much influence
over state government. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 3.
43 Elazar's more recent effort identifies the West as where "the national democratic ideals
of the nineteenth century were given concrete expression.... [p]rimarily the products of
Jacksonian democracy." DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN MOSAIC: THE IMPACT OF SPACE,
TIME, AND CULTURE ON AMERICAN POLITcs 140-41 (1994). In 1978, Oregon, California,
North Dakota, Colorado, Arizona, Washington, and Oklahoma accounted for three-quarters of
initiative measures proposed nationally. See Lee, supra note 2, at 48-49. California, along with
Oregon, another Western state with strong ties to the Progressive movement, accounted for
nearly one-third alone. See id. In Professors Dubois and Feeney's tally of the total number of
initiatives placed on the ballot nationwide since their inception, it is the Western states that take
the lion's share. Since the adoption of the initiative through 1996, Oregon has had 292,
California 257, North Dakota 170, Colorado 153, and Arizona 141. See DUBOIS & FEENEY,
supra note 34, at 30.
44 In California, for example, a recent opinion poll found that two-thirds of California
voters approve of the initiative process. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA's FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 19 (1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA INrTIATIVE FINANCING REPORT]. This recent
study reports that "Californians cherish the initiative process. They now turn to the initiative
almost instinctively--to address almost any problem-without first seeking a legislative
solution." Id. at 18.
45 A fairly recent national poll reflected that 57% of the American public would favor a
national statutory initiative process. See SCHMIDT, supra note 21, at 176 (reporting that the
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At the same time, direct democracy initiatives have been the subject of
substantial criticism by political scientists: complex issues are presented to the
voters on a yes or no basis without the benefits of deliberation and without the
check of representatives having to be accountable to the interests of others. Julian
Eule has persuasively argued that the agency obligations and accountability of
representative democracy militates against self interest and careless
decisionmaking, while direct democracy fails to "filter" out the passions evident
in direct democracy.46 Others, like David Magleby, have emphasized that the
analytical process surrounding initiatives is distinctly "bounded" in its rationality
in ways that representative bodies clearly are not.47 In direct democracy, voters
do not have the time or motivation to work through the implications of a
proposal. Studies show that voters often are confused or fail to understand the
full implications of their vote 8 Voting falls off as the ballot lengthens,
indicating that voters may not even be sufficiently motivated to read through the
ballot.4 9 Elites (high income, high education, interested in politics) are more
likely to vote on initiatives and referendums than are other citizens, including
those alienated from government-the group to which direct democracy is said
to be directed. 50
Even though theorists ably argue against direct democracy, direct democracy
appears to be firmly entrenched in the political imagination and in the political
culture of key Western states.
Gallup poll showed that citizens backed a national initiative by a 3-to-I margin, in that 57%
approved, 21% opposed, and 22% were undecided). Schmidt also provides a description of the
national movement. See id. at 174-81.
46 See Eule, supra note 27, at 1526-30 (describing the representation filter, divided power
filter, and the entrenched rights safety net).
47 See MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 128 (explaining that there is a relatively high
proportion of voters that drop off as ballots lengthen and positing that drop off occurs because
"many voters have not even heard of the ballot propositions before voting").
48 For example, in Magleby's survey of the California 1972 elections, over one-third of
voters had not heard of one proposition that did not enjoy wide publicity. See id On another
proposition in the 1976 elections, more than half had not heard of the proposition six weeks
prior to voting. See id.
49 See id. at 129 (reporting that 78% of Colorado voters report being either "somewhat
informed" or "not too informed" as to issues and that less educated voters report themselves as
being either "not too informed" or "not at all informed" on the issues presented in initiative
ballots).
50 But see id. at 160-65 (reporting on a study by Florida State University researchers that
found that alienated voters, those discontent with government, were not any less or more likely
to vote on initiatives).
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B. The Trend Favoring More Direct Democracy
Although direct democracy has become a potent force in national politics,
primarily in the last decade, its growth has been part of a multi-decade
phenomenon. This trend can be demonstrated using data collected both
nationwide and in California. According to David Magleby's national tally of
initiatives and referendums during the twentieth century, the number of
initiatives and referendums proposed during the 1960s totaled less than one
hundred and in the 1970s nudged over one hundred. 51 In each of those decades,
the number of initiatives approved was less than fifty.52 It was in the decade of
the 1980s that direct democracy made a spectacular leap, with the number
proposed at about two hundred, while the number successful was roughly one-
third of that.53 In the 1990s the growth rate of initiatives and referendums has
continued to be spectacular in terms of both proposal and approval. Magleby
projects over 350 initiatives and referendums for the decade with about 165
being approved by the voters.54 California data demonstrate an even more
dramatic growth, while following the same basic trend.55
The kinds of issues addressed by initiatives reflect the strong populist
component of direct democracy. From 1970 to 1985, initiatives addressed taxes
and other financial issues,56 procedural measures designed to curtail the power of
government and public officials, 57 and environmental and land use issues.
Professor Betty Zisk's national study of the initiative process in twelve states
from 1976 to 1980 shows a dispersal of statutory initiatives, with taxation and
51 See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 27-31 (1995) (presenting and analyzing data




55 In the two decades from 1950 to 1969, a total of 21 direct initiatives were placed on the
California ballot and only 24% of these passed. See ALLSWANG, supra note 2, at 12. During the
following decade, 1970 to 1979, the total number of initiatives (22) roughly approximated the
number of the prior two decades combined. See id. By comparison, in 1990 alone, California's
number of initiatives totaled eighteen. See id. The California data show that the number of
initiatives circulated for possible placement on the ballot also increased in the 1980s and 1990s.
However, the proportion that made it to the ballot has remained relatively consistent since the
1960s at between 13% and 21%. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 97.
56 Under this category, I include the typical efforts to limit bond financing and initiatives
aimed at permitting gambling. The latter are not strictly "grass roots." The experience in
Florida has been that corporate interests typically sponsor these.
5 7 Examples are term limits, forcing greater financial disclosures, and reconfiguring
districts.
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financial issues (14) gaining an edge over environmental (8) and structural
governmental measures (8).58 California data track these results.59
Of all the initiatives that made the ballot during this period, Proposition 13,
enacted in California in 1978 to limit the power of local government to increase
property taxes,60 ably demonstrates the populist politics of initiatives during this
period.61 Professor Scammon comments that Proposition 13 was not really an
attack on taxes as such. "It was an attack on... a group of men and women
referred to collectively as 'those clowns in Sacramento,' who had sat on a $5-
billion surplus in the state of California and, because of their disagreements
about how the money should be used, had never done a thing with it."' 62 The
voters said, "All right, if you cannot make a decision, we'll make it for you."63
58 See ZISK, supra note 37, at 17. The twelve states were Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. There is
also no discernible pattern as to whether taxation, structural, or regulatory initiatives were more
likely to succeed. All registered likelihoods of success between 25% and 33%. See id.
Professor Magleby's recent study makes a similar finding. See David B. Magleby, Ballot
Initiatives and Intergovernmental Relations in The United States, PUBLIUS, Jan. 1, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 25350912.
59 Of the 51 initiatives that gained access to the ballot in California from 1970 to 1986, a
total of twelve related to taxation and financial issues, six related to the environment, nine
attempted to reform the structure of government, three affected public workers, and fifteen
were general regulatory provisions. See MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INrTATIVE PROCESS 30 (1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA
INmATIVE PROCESS]. Similarly, in Florida from 1972 to 1986, the measures that gained access
to the ballot included proposals for authorization of gambling, limitations on taxes, greater
disclosure of finances by public officials, and limiting damages on malpractice suits. See
Memorandum of the Florida Secretary of State to the Florida Constitutional Revision
Commission (1998) (on file with the author).
60 The summary of Proposition 13 reads: "Limits ad valorem taxes on real property to one
percent of value... [based on] 1975-6 assessment rates .... Limits annual increase in value?'
Proposition No. 13 (June 6, 1978), reproduced in ALLSWANG, supra note 2, at 135-36. In
addition, Proposition 13 provided that valuation of property was to be frozen at the 1975
valuations, except when property was subsequently sold, at which point valuation would be set
at the sales price. See id.
61 Proposition 13 was the brainchild of two individuals, Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann,
who viewed "government [as] the biggest growth industry in this country." Howard Arnold
Jarvis & Paul Gann, Generals of a Rebellion by California Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMEs, June 8,
1978, at A25. Proposition 13 was not supported by big money interests, and no established
politician supported this movement.
62 THE REFERENDUM DEVICE, supra note 2, at 64.
63 Id. Professor Sears and Citrin also attribute Proposition 13's success to its incorporating
"important elements of a populist crusade against the established political and economic
institutions." DAviD 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN
CALIFORNIA 8 (1982). David Schimdt provides other grass roots initiative success stories to
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Proposition 13 provides ample fodder for the criticisms of direct democracy,
discussed earlier. California public officials are still dealing with the financing
fallout from Proposition 13.64 There are social issues as well. The measure has
been accused of creating greater gaps between the "haves" and the "have nots," 65
a consequence that many voters probably did not contemplate when they
approved the tax reform.
C. The Trend in the 80s and 90s: Citizen Lawmaking and the "New"
Politics ofMoney and Media
Beginning in the 1980s, the nature, dynamics, and political potential of direct
democracy shifted decidedly away from its grass roots base and toward a new
emphasis on money. First money was increasingly needed to get on the ballot.
Second, money was required to sell ideas to the electorate. Inevitably this new
emphasis on money would change the type of issues presented through the
initiative process, as only heavily supported groups could afford to pursue direct
democracy as a means of accomplishing political change.
Every state that provides for an initiative process also requires that to get on
the ballot proponents must collect a certain minimum amount of signatures,
generally a percentage of the last statewide vote. The required percentage
typically ranges anywhere from five to ten percent for statutory initiatives and
five to fifteen percent for constitutional initiatives. 66 In states with very large
populations, even relatively low percentage requirements Iranslate into a large
absolute number threshold.67
underscore his thesis that initiatives are mainly grass roots, populist mechanisms that help
ensure greater responsibility and accountability in govemment. See SCHMIDT, supra note 21, at
41-169.
64 See John S. Throckmorton, What is a Property-Related Fee? An Interpretation of
California's Proposition 218, 48 HASTINGS L.J 1059, 1059-76 (1997) (discussing the
ambiguities inherent in Proposition 13 and the volume of litigation it has created).
6 5 See William C. Peper, Proposition 13 Under an Updated Equal Protection Analysis:
Unlucky at Last? 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 433, 434-35 (1992) (concluding that
under Proposition 13, it is the wealthy who benefit "at the expense of the poor, the frequently
uprooted, and first-time homebuyers"); see also Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School Finance Rejorm, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 763, 813 (1995) (describing the impact of Proposition 13 on public school
education).
66 See BOOK OF STATES, supra note 34, at 211 tbl.5.17. In California, the number required
is 5% or 8% of those who voted in the last gubernatorial elections for statutory and
constitutional initiatives, respectively. See CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(b).
67 For example, the total required to qualify an initiative for the ballot in Califomia was
700,000 signatures in the 1996 elections. See CALIFORNIA INITIATIvE PROCESS, supra note 59,
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Signature requirements pose a significant barrier to ballot access,
particularly where the requisite signatures must be gathered in a very short time
period, such as three to four months. 68 Dubois and Feeney's recent study
observes that signature requirements tilt access to the ballot towards those who
have the resources necessary to organize petition efforts to gather large amounts
of signatures in a relatively short period.69 In California, data from 1986 to 1996
show that only 20% of the initiatives circulated qualified for the ballot.70
Whereas in the 1970s and mid-1980s relatively low-cost, grass roots
methods were used to secure the necessary signatures,71 recently signature
solicitation has become a more sophisticated and far more costly endeavor,
increasingly the domain of professionals who work in conjunction with paid
solicitors as well as volunteers. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled
at 10-13.
68 See BOOK OF STATES, supra note 34, at 211 tbl.5.17. In California, the proponent has
150 days to gather approximately 700,000 signatures. See ANN. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9013,
9040 (West 1996); CALIFORNIA INmATWE FINANCING REPORT, supra note 44, at 12-13;
CRONIN, supra note 21, at 62-64; DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 96-97.
Although the signature requirement is supposedly intended to filter unworthy proposals,
some have argued that it may be more of a financial hurdle than a substantive screen. See, e.g.,
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 94-112. Studies show that most who sign these petitions
do not understand their full import. See CRONIN, supra note 21, at 62; MAGLEBY, supra note
21, at 61-65. This also correlates with the problem that voters do not necessarily read the entire
ballot and are not well informed with respect to the propositions on which they are voting.
Rather, voters are likely to use "shortcue' informational methods as signals regarding the
content and the desirability of propositions. The social science data indicate that the behavior
and appearance of the solicitor, as opposed to the substance of the initiative, are highly
influential in the success of the solicitation. See John M. Dardley & Joel Cooper, The "Clean
for Gene" Phenomenon: The Effect of Students'Appearance on Political Campaigning, 2 J.
APPLIED SOC. PsYCHOL. 24, 26-27, 29-33 (1972) (reporting findings of study indicating that
the dress of political campaigners affected their acceptance rate); James B. Garrett & Benjamin
Wallace, Effect of Communicator-Communicatee Similarity in Political Affiliation Upon
Petition Signing Compliance, 90 1. PSYCHOL. 95, 97-98 (1975) (reporting findings of study
indicating that Republicans would be less likely to sign a petition sponsored by Democrats).
An added problem is that the method of payment for paid solicitors is on a per signature basis,
providing even more of an incentive to get the signature at all costs. See id. at 62-64; see also
Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Robert M. Stem, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition
Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 175, 188-94
(1989-1990).
69 See DuBoIS & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 96-97.
70 See id. at 98; CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS, supra note 59, at 10-13.
71 Journalist David Schmidt's case studies depict the initiative and referendum effort as
mainly fueled by volunteers who developed ingenious grass roots methodologies to garner
support, soliciting voters at shopping malls and setting up tables at the exits of grocery stores to
obtain signatures. See SCHMIDT, supra note 21, at 41-169.
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that state regulation of signature solicitors requiring initiative circulators to bear
identification badges and register their names and addresses violated the First
Amendment.72 Printed material and campaign literature must be produced that
makes the case clearly, persuasively, and concisely. Direct mail campaigns,
instead of face-to-face solicitation, are now used because of their efficiency.
Media exposure ensures that voters approached for signatures are receptive to the
solicitation.73 In states with only signature requirements to gain access to the
ballot like California, solid financing is a good predictor of success.74
Money is also useful at other stages of the initiative process. In those states
that impose extensive pre-screening provisions in addition to signature
requirements, ranging from ensuring that the wording of the provision not
contain any ambiguity to screening for its constitutionality, money can buy
expert legal help.75 In addition, of course, money is important in securing
ultimate voter support. In this era of increasing emphasis on television and other
expensive advertising, an ample campaign budget is crucial. In the 1990s, the
total tab for a successful initiative, including signature solicitation and
campaigning, has been estimated at around $1 milliony 6
72 See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999).
73 On the importance of the media, see generally ZISK, supra note 37.
74 The California Financing Commission reports that only two initiatives failed to qualify
where the proponents had spent more than $500,000. See CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE FINANCING
REPORT, supra note 44, at 13.
75 More than half of the initiative states require some form of substantive prescreening in
the form of court review for constitutionality (District of Columbia, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah), court review for single subject and clarity of subject
matter (Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
Oregon), and administrative review for such matters as subject matter and ambiguity (Alaska,
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah). See
BOOK OF STATES, supra note 34, at 211 tbl.5.17; DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 34, at 37-45.
When substantive prescreening requirements are in place, only a small number of the initiatives
circulated actually go before the voter. For example, in Florida, where the Florida Supreme
Court automatically must review constitutional initiatives to ensure that the subject matter
covers only a "single subject," see FLA. STAT. ch. 16.061 (1998) (implementing FLA. CONsT.,
art. IV, § 10 by requiring the Attorney General to "petition the [Florida] Supreme Court,
requesting an advisory opinion regarding the compliance of the text of the proposed
amendment or revision with the... State Constitution"), only 8% of the initiatives circulated
since the adoption of the initiative have made it to the ballot. See DUBOIs & FEENEY, supra
note 34, at 32 (reporting that only 15 initiatives have made it to the ballot in Florida through
1996). In 1996, during our era of greater electoral sophistication, 37 petitions were circulated,
only four made it to the ballot, and three out of those four were approved by the voters. See
Memorandum of the Florida Secretary of State, supra note 59.
76 See CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE FINANCING REPORT, supra note 44, at 12. This seems to be
a "rule of thumb" sum for initiatives in large states. California's Proposition 227, the bilingual
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This sum may seem large to most Americans, but it is within the reach of
wealthy individuals as well as politically oriented funds and related
organizations. In the case of Proposition 227, approximately 60% of the total
sum spent on the initiative qualification and campaign was donated by a single
individual, Robert Unz, a software entrepreneur. 77 Mr. Unz used his personal
funds to fund an initiative campaign that struck a chord with the electorate,
charging that bilingual education was fundamentally flawed in its conception and
implementation. Some commentators believe that Mr. Unz, a past unsuccessful
challenger to Governor Pete Wilson, has had more of an influence on state
politics through Proposition 227 than if he had run for office.78
This mix of (relatively) easy access to the ballot, money, and new politics
explains why certain states like California, with a highly decentralized political
structure, a sophisticated media industry, and a higher than usual population of
self-made millionaires interested in politics, have become staging grounds for
key controversial issues. Money and its interaction with the way that politics is
played out in a modem world has fundamentally changed initiatives from their
grass roots beginnings. As early as 1940, V.0. Key, a highly influential political
scientist, observed that the premise that the initiative was a democratic
expression of "The People" was a romantic notion, stating "Mnitiative measures
do not originate with 'The People.' The moving forces in politics are relatively
small groups of men animated by some 'interest." 7 9 Forty years later, Eugene
Lee, another influential political scientist, predicted that initiatives in the 1980s
and 1990s would become dominated by 'new politics'. . . with its emphasis on
professional campaign management, targeted direct mailings, and the
sophisticated sloganeering of the sixty-second television commercial." 80 In
1992, these forces pushed the California Commission on Campaign Financing to
initiative, is reputed to have cost around $1.2 million. See Bruni, supra note 32. The Florida
Civil Rights Initiative was Florida's counterpart to California's anti-affirmative action initiative
and was gearing up for a place on the 1998 Florida ballot. Mr. Barry estimated that his group
needed to raise $1 million in six months in order to qualify under the signature requirement in
Florida. See Telephone Interview with John Barry, Organizer of the Florida Civil Rights
Initiative (Nov. 15, 1997). The Florida Civil Rights Initiative effort was not pursued because
Republicans feared that the initiative would cause party losses in the 1998 elections.
77 See Bruni, supra note 32.
78 See id. Mr. Unz is reportedly contemplating "fixing," through the initiative process,
other areas of state politics that he perceives as flawed. See id. His new project is to reform
campaign financing. See Todd S. Purdum, California Republican Tries Altering Campaign
Finances, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1999, at A20.
79 V.O. KEY, JR. & WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN
CALIFORNIA 572 (1939).
80 Eugene C. Lee, California, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACrICE
AND THEORY 87, 118 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
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urge that the California initiative process be reformed, observing that
"[tioday ... petition circulation has become so professionalized and dependent
on financial resources that it is difficult to defend it as a true test of popular
support.,
81
II. "NEW" POLrTcs AND BALLOT Box VOTING ON MINORITIES' CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP STATUS: IS IT A DEADLY COCKTAIL?
[Direct democracy] reflects all too accurately the conservative, even intolerant
attitudes citizens display when given the chance to vote their fears and
prejudices, especially when exposed to expensive media campaigns. The
security of minority rights and the value of racial equality ... are endangered by
the possibility of popular repeal.
Derrick Bell82
Professor Derrick Bell's indictment of direct democracy has colored the
ongoing academic debate as to whether direct democracy is "good" or "bad." In
the late 1970s and early 1980s, initiatives and referendums increasingly became
a democratic device through which majorities opposed integration and anti-
discrimination laws. Bell, writing in 1978, argued that the courts should apply
heightened scrutiny to ballot box legislation.83 His argument fits in with his
"racism is permanent" thesis. 84 Bell contends that race shapes American society
more than any other factor and that whites endeavor to maintain their racial
superiority at the ballot box.85 He charges that the new politics of campaigns and
the media appeal to prejudice, 86 and that direct democracy is structurally flawed
because it undermines republican government and leaves complex racial
questions to an electorate that will oversimplify issues.87
In the mid-1980s, analysts responded to charges made by Bell and others.88
81 CALIFORNIA INrIATIVE FINANCING REPORT, supra note 44, at 12.
82 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1978-1979).
83 See id. at 23.
84 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUsIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JuSTICE (1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE AND RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992).
85 See Bell, supra note 82, at 12-13.
86 Seeid. at 18-19.
87 See id. at 23-24.
8 8 See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 199 (concluding, after a lengthy analysis of
direct democracy, that "[t]he practice of direct legislation has by and large fallen short of the
reformers' expectations and is prone to abuse"); Bruce Cain, The Contemporary Context of
Ethnic and Racial Politics in California, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA 9
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Political scientists Joseph Zimmerman89 and Thomas Cronin9" minimized the
impact of direct democracy on the democratic citizenship rights of minorities.
Both asserted that Americans' civic nature was to be fair-minded and implied
that Bell's critique was an overstatement of strife in America. Legal analyst
Clayton Gillette applied a rational choice model and argued that the threat of
direct democracy to minorities was overstated because majorities will encounter
collective action problems and transaction costs that will deter group voting.91
However, he conceded that if "motivations that lure voters to the voting booth
simultaneously and systematically induce other-regarding behavior...
[majorities] likely will turn out to record their narrowly self-interested
preferences. 92
The disagreement between Bell and his critics has several bases. At an
empirical level, Zimmerman's and Cronin's judgments may be explained, in
part, in that their conclusions were based on empirical data only through the mid-
1980s, which as detailed in Part II.B, did not reflect a clear picture that
minorities consistently lost civil rights battles. It is also a definitional
disagreement, because when women are included in the definition of
"minorities" the results are much better for minorities than if "minorities" are
limited to racial/ethnic minorities, cultural/language minorities, gay men and
lesbians, and illegal immigrants.93 It is only these latter groups that this Article
(Byran 0. Jackson & Michael B. Preston eds., 1991) (arguing that initiatives lend themselves
to racial and ethnic divisions); Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referenda: Direct Democracy
and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135 (1981) (same).
89 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 21, at 89-98 (listing as one of the myths regarding direct
democracy that initiatives target minorities).
90 Cronin concludes that "the overall record suggests that American voters have in most
cases approved measures protecting or promoting minority rights" and "occasionally used
these devices to express nativism, racism, and sexism." CRONIN, supra note 21, at 98. He
rebuts Bell's indictment of direct democracy as overbroad. First, he separates out initiatives that
seek to bar affordable housing, arguing that what might be at stake is not purely racial but also
concerns property values. See id. at 94. He then focuses on Californian's rejection of two
initiatives, both extreme-AIDS as a disease that must be quarantined and banning from public
schools any person who "advocated, solicited, encouraged, or promoted public or private
homosexual activity" to counterweigh against the stream of initiatives, many at the local
municipality level, that successfully proscribed or repealed anti-discrimination laws that would
have protected gay men and lesbians. See id. at 95-97.
91 See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 939-74 (1988).
92 Id. at 954.
93 Women are a "minority" if this term is defined as a politically vulnerable minority
group, which is socially constructed in normative terms as inferior relative to men, the group
that occupies a position of privilege. See supra note 14. However, women's position as a
minority is unique given their numerical superiority, diffuseness, and non-isolation. These
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defines as "minorities." 94 Lastly there is an implicit disagreement as to how
pervasive and entrenched racial prejudice is and how much it affects whites'
decisionmaldng. 95
In 1990, Professor Julian Eule augmented Bell's structural critique of direct
democracy. Eule argued that direct democracy deserves heightened review
because structurally it fails to "filter out" majority-minority hostility from
democratic lawmaking.9 6 In contrast, representative processes structure
legislative decisionmaking so that majorities are more accountable to minority
interests.97 Professor Eule's thesis, in turn, attracted critiques.9 8
characteristics could explain why their inclusion in the data on majority-minority initiatives
yields aggregated results that show minorities doing better. Professor Cronin reports that
women fared favorably on equal rights issues during the 1970s and early 1980s. See CRONIN,
supra note 21, at 97. Such a favorable trend was reversed by the national anti-ERA campaign
headed by Phyllis Schlafly, which refriamed ERA as an anti-family movement. This rhetoric
was successful in reversing what at one time had looked like sure victory for the women's
rights constitutional amendment. See id. In the area of initiatives and referendums attempting to
limit women's accessibility to abortions, anti-abortion initiatives and referendums have been
voted down 14 out of the 20 times that they have appeared on state election ballots. See The
Feminist Majority Foundation, The Abortion Issue in the Voting Booth: Analysis of 20 State
Referenda, 1970-1992 (Jan. 15, 1998) <http'//wwv.feminist.org/rrights/rwfact3.html>.
94 See supra note 14.
95 See infra Part I.C.l.b.
96 See Eule, supra note 27, at 1549 ("The judiciary must compensate for process defects.
It must serve as the first line of defense for minority interest; a backup is no longer adequate.
The absence of structural safeguards demands that the judge take a harder look.'). Eule argues
that representatives are more likely to engage in rational deliberation. See id. at 1525-30,
1550-56. Deliberation acts as a filter because "[p]ublic debate among those of equal status and
eloquence thus ultimately leads to realization of the common good." Id. at 1527; see also Julian
N. Eule, Checking California's Plebiscite, 17 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 151, 152 (1989) (arguing
that "the judicial role in this setting ought to be very different from its role in reviewing
ordinary legislation"); Julian N. Eule, Representative Government: The People's Choice, 67
CHI.-KENTL. REV. 777 (1991) (responding to Baker's critique); sources cited supra note 27.
97 See Eule, supra note 27, at 1527 (noting that "[i]solated decisions ... create few
opportunities for trade-offs and little need for the establishment of continuing relationships,"
while "[r]epresentative government engenders cooperation because winners and losers retum to
meet again").
98 The critics address Professor Eule's generalized structural attack of direct democracy.
Professor Mark Tushnet makes the case that Eule has failed to establish the need for such
skeptical review. See Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards ofJudicial Review
of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373 (1997). Professor Charlow rejects the
argument that plebiscitary processes deserve greater scrutiny because minority groups are
merely like other interest groups that lose out in the give and take of republican politics. She
concludes that the focus of inquiry should be in reconstructing equal protection doctrine. See
Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
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As this brief recompilation implies, policy formulations on direct democracy
would benefit from being more grounded in political science, behavioral, and
sociological data showing how direct democracy actually plays out in the real
world. Part HI introduces empirical data and behavioral analyses into this debate.
Part III.A addresses the basic empirical question: do the past thirty years of data
show that minorities consistently lose in direct democracy battles? Part IILB
describes in some detail several majority-minority civil rights conflicts to
provide an accurate picture of the political events surrounding some of the key
initiatives and referendums in which majorities and minorities have been pitted
against each other. Among the questions this Part seeks to answer is whether, as
Derrick Bell charges, direct democracy reflects majorities' "conservative, even
intolerant, attitudes."99 Finally, Part I.C sorts out what the political science and
social science behavioral literature state are the causes and effects of majority-
minority direct democracy conflicts. These analyses will then be incorporated
into Part V's discussion of what should be the judicial approach to this important
ongoing challenge.
A. Minority Civil Rights and Citizenship Status Initiatives and
Referendums from 1960-1998: Minorities Lose Most of the Time
To examine the question of whether direct democracy poses a threat or
undermines minorities' civil rights and citizenship status, this Part discusses and
analyzes the data presented in Appendices A through H on initiatives and
referendums from 1960 to 1998, in which majorities were in a position to vote on
the content of minorities' civil rights. The data presented in the Appendices take
as a starting point Professor Barbara Gamble's 1997 political science study of
initiatives and referendums from 1960 to 1993.100 For the 1960 to 1993 period,
the Appendices describe only those initiatives and referendums whose results
could be verified with the citation information provided by Gamble. Additional
data for the period 1993 to 1998 are included in the Appendices. Gamble does
not claim, nor do I, that this is an exhaustive survey.101 However, my own
CORNELL L. REv. 527 (1994). Professor Lynn Baker applies public choice theory to rebut the
argument, made principally by Eule, that representative government is superior in filtering out
irrational impulses in lawmaking. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination:
A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 707 (1991).
9 9 See Bell, supra note 82, at 20.
10 0 See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SC.
245 (1997).
101 See id. at 253. There is no database that aggregates all initiatives and referendums. But
see LISA OAKLEY & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CrITZEN
INmrATIvE PRoPosALs APPEARING ON STATE BALLOTS, 1976-1992 (CRS Report for Congress,
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research shows that Gamble's data accurately represent the most significant
majority-minority initiatives and referendums of the last three decades. Thus,
these data, even if not exhaustive, provide key information on the extent and
nature of "anti-minority" initiatives and referendums.
These data show that direct democracy, for the most part, has been an
important lawmaldng mechanism that has decreased the content of, or staved off
advances in, minority rights.102 As Gamble puts it, the data over this entire
period show that although minorities do not always lose in these ballots, they
almost always lose.10 3 In the eighty-two initiatives and referendums surveyed in
this Article, majorities voted to repeal, limit, or prevent any minority gains in
their civil rights over eighty percent of the time.104 These aggregated results
seem to validate the criticism of direct democracy leveled by Bell.
B. The Politics ofInitiatives That Target Minority Rights
Although the aggregated data support Bell's hypothesis that direct
democracy will inevitably put minorities at a disadvantage, once these results are
examined in detail, the relationship that emerges between majorities and
minorities is much more complex.
The data from 1959 to 1998 chart an ongoing and dynamic ebb and flow in
minority-oriented initiatives and referendums. The issues in which minorities'
civil rights have been contested correspond to two eras of political activism: (1)
during the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights activism spawned anti-integration
initiatives and referendums, and (2) during the 1980s and 1990s, the growing
visibility and acceptance of multiculturalism spawned several waves of
cultural/ideological initiatives and referendums. This Part will describe the
politics surrounding minority-oriented initiatives in terms of these two major
time periods, focusing particularly on several of the most recent sets of
initiatives.
1995) (containing useful national recompilations of state activity). Key states like Oregon,
California, and Arizona maintain websites with historical information. Florida's website
contains current information only. The key initiatives and referendums have been litigated. See
discussion infra Part III.B.1 and Part IV.C; infra Appendices A-H. As Gamble notes, local
ordinances in non-major cities and localities are most likely to be omitted. See Gamble, supra
note 100, at 252. For this reason, I believe that any omissions would not alter the conclusions
drawn here.
102 Professor Gamble's survey utilizes a definition of "minorities" that excludes women,
which, as she notes, yields different "anti-minority" results than if women were included. See
Gamble, supra note 100, at 252-53.
103 See id. at 253.
104 See infra Appendices A-H. Gamble's survey covers 74 initiatives and referendums
and her results show anti-minority results 78% of the time. See id. at 253.
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1. The Anti-Integration Initiatives: 1960-1982
When the civil rights struggle was at the fore of the national political agenda,
the counter-movement resulted in initiatives and referendums challenging anti-
discrimination in housing legislation and school desegregation decisions. As
shown in Appendices B and C, these anti-integration initiatives were
overwhelmingly victorious, resulting in an approval rate of close to 90%
whenever they appeared on the ballot.
a. Anti-Fair Housing Initiatives
From 1963 to 1968, a total of nine anti-fair housing initiatives and
referendums qualified for the ballot.105 In close to 90% of these cases, the anti-
fair housing initiatives or referendums won.10 6
In this wave of initiatives and referendums, courts played a key role in
resolving the conflict between citizens' rejection of anti-discrimination
legislation and representative governments' efforts to expand civil rights
initiatives. Two leading cases, which will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV
below, invalidated citizens' efforts to repeal or immunize their communities
against fair housing laws: (a) Reitman v. Mulkey I0 7 invalidated California's
Proposition 14, which had proscribed any state body from limiting a person's
ability to lease, rent, or sell real estate; and (b) Hunter v. Erickson10 8 defeated
citizens' repeal of Akron's fair housing ordinance, as well as an automatic
referendum-immunizing provision that required majority approval of any fair
housing ordinance.
An early study by Professors Wolfinger and Greenstein attempts to puzzle
through what motivated California's voters to enact Proposition 14, which was
ultimately invalidated in Reitman.10 9 The proponents of the measure framed
Proposition 14 in terms of protecting the "property rights" of owners to sell or
lease to any person without governmental interference. 110 The researchers
rejected the simplistic explanation that proponents of Proposition 14
10 5 See infra Appendix B.
10 6 See id. Seven out of the nine surveyed cases involved referendums that attempted to
repeal a representative body's decision to enact anti-discrimination housing legislation. See id.
107 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see discussion infra Part IV.
108 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see discussion infra Part IV.
10 9 See Raymond E. Wolfinger & Fred I. Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in
California: An Analysis ofReferendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 753 (1968).
I 10 Seeid. at 764.
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demonstrated racial prejudice;" 1 instead, they proposed a more nuanced
proposition. Wolfinger and Greenstein observed that residential integration was
an issue that deeply divided whites and racial minorities. 112 Wolfinger and
Greenstein also found data supporting the proposition that most white
Californians did not view residential segregation as an issue of racial
discrimination. 113 For these reasons, they concluded that while whites were not
seeking to harm racial minorities, appeals to white voters that Proposition 14
would damage racial minorities' civil rights did not find widespread support.1 14
This era of initiative and referendums activism ended when the United States
Congress enacted fair housing legislation. The Fair Housing Act115 pre-empted
localities' ability to legislate in this area, as well as citizens' ability to repeal and
immunize through the initiative and referendum process. 116
b. School Desegregation
In the wake of the courts' implementation of Brown, seven anti-busing
proposals were placed before the voters between 1960 and 1982. Only one failed.
In the early 1960s, federal court-mandated busing already had intruded into
established social patterns in the South. Many Southerners resisted and depicted
court-mandated busing as a struggle between states' rights and overbearing
federal authority. The first two initiatives placed on the Mississippi and Arkansas
ballots were radical. Each authorized local authorities to "close down public
schools threatened with desegregation." 1 7 The Mississippi initiative passed,
while the Arkansas measure was rejected.1 8
From 1970 through the 1980s, anti-school desegregation initiatives were
drafted in less radical fashion. Such measures attempted to use constitutional
amendments to limit the remedial power of state courts. One example provided
111 See id. at 764-65. The researchers rejected out of hand the "property rights"
ideological defense, stating that white Southern Jim Crow defenders had used these same
philosophical arguments. See id.
112 The attitudes of whites "toward residential integration... occupy a peculiar position
in 'the Tank order of discrimination' ... [serving] almost as a watershed between areas in which
resistance to accepting Negroes as equals is high enough to be virtually at the taboo level ......
Id. at 765.
113 See id. at 766 (citing national poll data).
114 See id.
115 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified
as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619).
116 See Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996).
117 Many LocalProposals are Decided by Voters, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1960, at A8.
'18 See id.; see also infra Appendix C.
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that 'no school board... shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend
a school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the
student's place of residence'" 119 on the basis of race. All of the five initiatives so
formulated and placed before the voters won.120
As will be discussed in Part IV below, court activism played an important
role in counteracting the development of anti-busing initiatives, as it had in the
housing area. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,121 the Supreme
Court ruled that the city of Seattle's initiative was a de facto racial classification
because "there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial
purposes."'122
2. Cultural/Ideological Initiatives
Initiatives that attempt to limit a minority group's push for greater
recognition of their civil rights and citizenship status again surged in the 1980s
and 1990s under the cultural/ideological banner. By far the most active category
were the nearly fifty initiatives and referendums aimed at limiting the civil rights
of gay men and lesbians, which were successful 83% of the time.123 Another
important cultural/ideological category includes the English-only initiatives and
bilingual education. Voters approved every language initiative reported, almost
all by overwhelming margins.12 4 Finally, the last wave of initiatives begun in
California, Proposition 187, aimed at illegal immigration, and Proposition 209,
aimed at affirmative action, complete this category.12 5 This Part will examine in
detail the politics surrounding these proposals.
a. Anti-Gay CivilRights
Close to four-fiftfis of the reported forty-eight anti-gay civil rights initiatives
have sought to repeal or prevent the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation
that would include gay men and lesbians as a protected category.126 These have
119 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 462 (1982) (quoting Initiative
350).
120 See infra Appendix C.
121 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
122 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 471.
123 See infra Appendix D.
124 See infra Appendix E.
125 See infra Appendices G, H.
126 See infra Appendix D. These large aggregated numbers may overstate activity
because they are influenced by an ongoing battle in one state, Oregon. See Dennis Famey,
Shaky Ground: Gay Rights Confront Determined Resistance from Some Moderates, WALL ST.
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been successful over 85% of the time.127 If we focus only on state-wide
initiatives, the number drops to eleven, and at this larger jurisdictional level, the
success rate drops to about 64%.128 Colorado's Amendment 2, overturned in
Romer v. Evans,129 is an example of this kind of initiative, which effectively
prevented any attempts by gay men and lesbians to petition local government for
anti-discrimination legislation.13 0
Exploring how the anti-gay civil rights initiative movement developed is a
good starting point in explaining why ideological/cultural conservatives have
found direct democracy electoral politics to be a favorable environment for their
causes. Is the electoral environment favorable, as Professor Bell charges, because
it allows for an appeal to prejudice and intolerance?
On the one hand, the hypothesis that more radical initiatives, although able
to strike a conservative chord within the electorate, are unable to garner citizen
support because they are viewed as overreaching also finds support here.131 In
Oregon, after Measure 9, labeling homosexuality as "pedophilia," lost by a
decisive 56% to 44% margin, Oregon Citizens Alliance, the initiative sponsor,
dropped this more radical language, and recalibrated its campaign around the
theme of"no special rights."'1 32 Such local initiatives were then proposed mainly
in rural and suburban municipalities that had supported the statewide initiative.
California's 1978 anti-gay rights Proposition 6 failed because it was more radical
than modem anti-"special rights" initiatives. Proposition 6 allowed public
schools to fire any employee who might be thought to be engaging in such
conduct, and barred any conduct "advocat[ing], solicit[ing], impos[ing] or
J., Oct. 7, 1994, at Al. Close to one-third of the initiatives reported are initiatives in Oregon's
rural localities sponsored by Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA). See id. There were a total of 37
anti-discrimination initiatives or referendums. See id. Other types reported include banning
state actors from "encouraging" homosexuality (4); extending domestic partnership benefits (5)
(of which 3 took place in San Francisco); and banning same-sex marriage (2). See id.
127 The numbers are 32 anti-minority results out of 37, or 86%. See id.
128 See hifra Appendix D. In California and Idaho, anti-gay rights initiatives failed in
1978 and 1994, respectively, while succeeding in Colorado. In Maine, voters once approved
anti-discrimination protections and then rejected it. Oregon's 1992 Measure 9, labeling
homosexuality as "pedophilia," did not fare well, and another 1994 measure was defeated.
However, in 1988, Oregon voters enacted a measure that would have authorized school
officials to ask employees about their sexual orientation. This measure was subsequently
invalidated in Merrick v. Board of Higher Education, 841 P.2d 646 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). The
latest wave of statewide initiatives that ban same-sex marriage have all been successful.
129 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see discussion infra Part IV.C.6.
130 See id. at 624; infra note 504 and accompanying text.
131 But see Oregon Measure 8 (1988), infra Appendix D.
132 See Famey, supra note 126.
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encourag[ing]" 133 homosexual activity. The propositions that purport to merely
prevent gay men and lesbians from gaining "special rights" almost always win.
Colorado's Amendment 2 and the ordinance contested in the Sixth Circuit's
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,134 both
approved by overwhelming margins, used this less radical concept. 135
On the other hand, a close look at the first anti-gay rights initiative, which
took place in 1977 in Dade County-home to the City of Miami, a community
that today lays claim to being multicultural and tolerant--shows that this
category of initiatives can reflect a mix of motivations that include anti-gay
sentiment. As with the anti-fair housing referendums, the first anti-gay rights
campaign was a direct response to a representative body enacting legislation
deemed too progressive and disrespectful toward established norms. Dade
County Ordinance 77-4 proscribed discrimination in "housing, public
,accommodations and employment against persons based on their affectional or
sexual preferences." 136 Although the ordinance passed, it proved controversial.
Specifically, it prompted outrage from the conservative community in Miami,
including from Anita Bryant, a fundamentalist Christian and an ex-promoter of
Florida orange juice, as well as a one-time supporter of the councilwoman who
had engineered the enactment of the ordinance. After unsuccessfully trying to
persuade the councilwoman to reverse her position, Bryant spearheaded a
campaign for repeal of the ordinance, which gave itself the name "Save Our
Children." In campaign literature, Anita Bryant described what motivated her:
"God had tapped me on the shoulder and given me direct marching orders. '137
She argued that the ordinance threatened "the moral environment for my
children" and undermined parents' rights to raise children in a moral
133 ALLSWANG, supra note 2, at 136-37; see also Michael Castleman, Proposition 6 and
the Rights ofAll of Us, THIE NATION, Oct. 21, 1978, at 403.
134 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998); see also infra Part
IV.C.6.
135 The "specials rights" argument became part of proponents' arguments as to why
Amendment 2 was not unconstitutional in Evans v. Romer (Romer I1), 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.
1995) (en banc).
136 Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 77-4 (1977), reprinted in D. Jason
Berggren, Responding to the Spirit of Stonewall: Righteous Referendums, Ecumenism and the
Anti-Gay Rights Politics of the Christian Right (1995) (unpublished MA. thesis, Florida State
University) (on file with the Florida State University Library). In 1998, the City Commission
re-enacted an ordinance proscribing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See
Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 98-170 (1998) [hereinafter Dade County
Ordinance No. 98-170] (summary and history available at the Equality Florida web site under
'Tuesday, Dec. 01, 1998 Minutes" (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http'//wvv.metro.co.dade.
fl.us/govaction/>).
137 ANITA BRYANT & BOB GREEN, RAISING GoD's CHILDREN 64 (1977).
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environment: "I would give my life, if necessary, to protect my children .... If
they are exposed to homosexuality, I might as well feed them garbage." 138 The
heavy religious and moral conservative overtone of Bryant's campaign appealed
to moral conservatives among Miami's Jewish population and its predominantly
socially conservative Catholic Cuban-Americans. Proponents were almost
militant in their conviction that the visibility and civil rights activism of gay men
and lesbians threatened the community's moral environment and undermined
parental efforts to raise their children properly. 139 This campaign rhetoric at
times was also undeniably homophobic. Bryant and other proponents intimated
that one of the dangers of legitimating homosexuality is that this would:
[U]surp their rights and life-long effort to raise spiritually sound God-fearing,
heterosexual children and provide homosexuals a green light to recruit and
molest their kids in schools, public bathrooms, and elsewhere, and force
religious schools, churches and synagogues to hire individuals who partake in
activities that they deem "as unnatural and deviant ' 140
The victory in Dade County signaled to religious and cultural conservative
groups that the American voter was receptive to a morality-driven message and
that coalitions could overturn civil rights gains made by an unpopular minority
group. In Dade County, Anita Bryant and her supporters had developed a grass
roots blueprint for a strategy that could and would be repeated by cultural
conservative groups elsewhere. Gay civil rights gains could be effectively
combated when cultural conservatives framed such gains in "family values"
terms, such as threatening children. Once this theme was established, the
campaign could appeal to latent homophobic ideology and cast gay men, in
particular, as a per se threat to children. The Dade County campaign showed that
groups, to which no political appeal had been made in the past, could be moved
into almost militant political activism if the issues were framed as involving
general societal decency. 141 Anita Bryant was credited with "awakening"
apolitical religious conservatives. 142
Two years following the defeat of the Dade County ordinance, gay men and
1 3 8 ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIvAL OF OuR NATIoN's
FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSExuALrrY 27-29 (1977) (citations omitted).
13 9 See RANDY SMLTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET 154-58 (1982); Berggren, supra
note 136, at 70-71.
14 0 Berggren, supra note 136, at 71.
141 See id. at 95-97. Jerry Falwell has argued that the Christian Right had to be
galvanized because the political sphere had become too corrupt, posing an attack upon the
family, and a religious order. See JERRY FALwELL, LISTEN, AMERICA! 130-37 (1980).
142 See Berggren, supra note 136, at 97.
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lesbians attempted to reinstate the Dade anti-discrimination rights measure. Gay
advocates again lost, by a less severe margin, 58% to 42%. The coalition that
Anita Bryant had forged, conservative Jews, Cuban Americans, and political
conservatives, held firm in their opposition to gay rights.143 It took almost
twenty years for the gay community in Miami to overturn the 1978 loss. On
December 1, 1998, the Dade County Commission re-enacted the anti-
discrimination ordinance, by a narrow seven to six vote, that prohibits
discrimination by race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender,
pregnancy, age disability, marital or familial status, and now sexual
orientation.144
b. AJDS
In contrast with the anti-gay civil rights initiatives, AIDS initiatives have
generally not been successful. Only two out of the five initiatives surveyed
passed.145 AIDS initiatives that would "quarantine" or otherwise exclude persons
with AIDS from normal social interaction and ban them from employment have
all failed.146 By contrast, Concord, California passed a referendum that repealed
anti-discrimination protections, which is a less radical proposition. 147
Why did these initiatives fail while anti-gay civil rights initiatives have had
almost uniform success? These results can be explained by one of the hypotheses
set forth in the previous Part-voters appear to have considered AIDS initiatives
too radical. These initiatives attempted to restrict the freedom and right of
association of an unpopular group, persons with AIDS. Although gay men are
among the most unpopular in the American electorate148 (over 70% of the
American public in the late 1980s disapproved of a gay life style),149 the
143 See id. at 79.
144 See Dade County Ordinance No. 98-170, supra note 136.
14 5 See infra Appendix F.
146 This describes three California initiatives proposed in 1986 and 1988. See id.
147 This describes the 1989 Concord, California referendum. See id.
14 8 See Frank P. Zinni, Jr. et al., The Structure and Dynamics of Group Politics:
1964-1992, 19 POL. BEHAV. 247 (1997). Researchers used data from the NES Presidential
Studies from 1964 to 1992 to study individuals' voting behavior in the context of attitudes
towards 58 identifiable groups. The groups scoring the highest negative scores on the affective
dimension were "urban rioters, radical students, black militants, gays, people who smoke
marijuana, Palestinians, Vietnam war protesters and illegal aliens." Id. at 262. The researchers
posited and demonstrated that group membership orients political opinion and attitudes. See id.
at 270.
149 A recent report on national public opinion toward gay men and lesbians show that
from 1986 to 1989, the years during which the AIDS initiatives were proposed, 71% to 75% of
those polled answered that they disapproved of same-sex relations. See ALAN S. YANG,
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invasive curtailment of civil rights was deemed too extreme to be palatable to
voters.
c. Language Initiatives: English-Only and Bilingual Education
The English-only initiatives have been successful almost every time they
have been placed before the voters, mostly garnering overwhelming voter
support. 150 Professor Jack Citrin's 1990 demographic analysis of California's
English-only initiative shows it was supported by almost every segment of the
electorate-liberals and conservatives, elites and non-elites. 151
English-only initiatives fall into three categories. Most merely declare
English as the official language of the jurisdiction and authorize the legislature to
implement this affirmation. 152 Such declarations have been described as
symbolic because these laws reaffirm the status quo of English as the dominant
language. The second genre of English-only laws, exemplified by the recently
invalidated Arizona English-only constitutional amendment 153 and the Dade
NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE, FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS:
PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY AND LESBIAN AMERICANS MOVES TOWARD EQUALrIY 22 (1998). The
data show that in 1996 disapproval had dropped to 56%. See id.
150 See infra Appendix E. Raymond Tatalovich reports only one instance in which an
English-only initiative was defeated, in Suffolk county. See Raymond Tatalovich, Official
Language: English-Only versus English-Plus, in MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN
POLrrICs: CASES IN SOCIAL REGULATORY POLICY 196, 199 (Raymond Tatalovich & Byron W.
Daynes eds., 1998). He reports that 41 counties and 15 cities have passed English-only laws, a
total larger than the 9 initiatives reported in Appendix E. See id.
151 See Jack Citrin et al., The "Official English" Movement and the Symbolic Politics of
Language in the United States, 43 W. POL. Q. 535, 544-48 (1990); see also Ana Celia
Zentella, Who Supports Official English, and Why?: The Influence of Social Variables and
Questionnaire Methodology, in PERSPECrIVES ON OFFICIAL ENGLISH 161, 166-67 (Karen L.
Adams & Daniel T. Brink eds., 1992).
152 The Florida and Colorado constitutional amendments declare English the official
language of the state and empower the legislature to enforce this provision. See FLA. CONST.,
art. 2, § 9 (1988); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a (1988). The California amendment is more
complex, on the one hand mandating that the legislature "shall make no law which diminishes
or ignores the role of English as the common language of the State of California," but, on the
other hand, reassuring that it "is intended to... not supersede any of the rights guaranteed to
the people by this Constitution." CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6 (1986).
153 See ARIZ. CONST. art. 28, § 1 (1988); see also Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 996 (Ariz.
1998) (en banc) (referring to the more restrictive Arizona constitutional amendment as
"unique" and holding that the amendment violated the First Amendment by requiring that all
state and local government officials and employees "act" only in English during performance
of government business).
The constitutionality of the amendment was considered in Yffliguez v. Arizonans for
Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacatedsub nom Arizonans for Official
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County (Miami) ordinance, 154 makes explicit the rejection of bilingual practices
in the public sphere by adopting specific mechanisms that mandate state
institutions and state actors to limit the use of language to only English. The third
iteration of English-only laws encompasses those directed at specific
governmental practices that accommodate languages other than English. In 1984,
California passed an initiative that obligated the Governor to request that the
federal government print voting instruments only in English.155 In addition, in
June 1998, California voters approved Proposition 227, an initiative that seeks to
limit how bilingual education is implemented in California's state public system
and mandates a one year transition period for non-English speaking children,
regardless of their level of English proficiency.156
This Part will apply available political science and sociological data to
analyze these issues: (i) the demographics of English-only, (ii) status and
intergroup conflicts, (iii) cultural and ideological motivations, (iv) the possible
existence of nativism and anti-Latino discriminatory bias, (v) cultural minority's
reactions, and (vi) the majority's purpose.
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). The plaintiff, Yfiiguez, a bilingual state official,
brought suit arguing that the English-only constitutional amendment would prevent her from
communicating with Arizona citizens who could not speak English well enough to
communicate complex issues and transactions. Yfiiguez relates that prior to English-only, as a
bilingual, she would frequently use both Spanish and English to help many state clients. A co-
plaintiff elected official argued that the constitutional amendment would prohibit him from
communicating with elderly Mexican-American and Navaho-Arizona citizens whose primary
or only language is not English. The Supreme Court remanded the dispute as moot because
Yfiiguez had quit public employment at the time of the Court's deliberation.
154 See Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 80-128 (1980), reprinted in
Yvonne Tamago, "Official Language" Legislation: Literal Silencing/Silenciando La Lengua,
13 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 107, 122 n.106 (1997). The Miami ordinance prohibits "the
expenditure of any county funds for the purpose of utilizing any language other than English or
any culture other than that of the United States" and mandates that "all county governmental
meetings, hearings, and publications shall be in the English language only." Max J. Castro, The
Politics of Language in Miami, in CHALLENGING FRONTERAS: STRUCTURING LATINA AND
LATINO LIvEs IN THE U.S. 279, 286 (Mary Romero et al. eds., 1997) (quoting section 2 of the
Dade County Ordinance). This ordinance was so broadly worded that it was interpreted to
foreclose the City of Miami from putting up warning signs for tourists and Spanish-speaking
employees. See JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YouR TONGUE: BIUNGUALISM AND THE POLMCS OF
"ENGLISH-ONLY" 92 (1992).
155 See California Proposition 38 (1984), reprinted in ALLSWANG, supra note 2, at 151.
156 See 1998 Cal. Leg. Serv. Prop. 227 (West). Proposition 227 is being challenged in
federal court by a coalition of citizen groups, among them Latinos and educators, under
arguments that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and is pre-empted by federal bilingual
education policies. The federal district court recently decided not to issue an injunction. See
Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (denying motion for injunction).
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i. Demographic Circumstances Giving Rise to English-Only
Today, English language measures have typically been adopted in two
different ways, in two different contexts. First, in several jurisdictions where
cultural and bilingual minorities possess significant electoral strength (California,
Florida, Arizona, and Colorado), the English-only measures would or would
likely fail in the state legislature. In this handful of states, direct democracy
instead has been used to adopt the provision into the state constitution. Second,
in multiple states containing very few bicultural and bilingual minorities, 157
legislatures have adopted English-only statutes.158 This Part concentrates on the
first phenomenon.
All but one of the major English-only initiatives surveyed in Appendix E
took place in jurisdictions with significant Latino, 159 Asian, 160 Native
15 7 Political scientists Rodney Hero and Caroline Tolbert hypothesize that both states
with racial/ethnic bifurcation (for example, California, Florida, Arizona, and Colorado) and
racial homogeneity (as per most of the states enacting English-only by representative
processes) result in anti-minority policy outcomes, such as English-only successes. They also
posit and show through regression analysis that racial/ethnic composition and racialization
dynamics are a more powerful predictor of policy outcomes than Elazar's civic culture
hypothesis. See Rodney E. Hero & Caroline J. Tolbert, A Racial/Ethnic Diversity
Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S., 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 851 (1996).
158 English-only measures have also been adopted by statute in 23 states.*See, e.g., ARK.
CODE. ANN. § 1-4-117 (Michie 1987); 1986 Ga. Laws 529; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 460/20
(West 1998); IND. CODEANN. § 1-2-10-1 (Bums 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Michie
1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1987); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 145-12 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696-98
(Law Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1-42 (Michie
1987). Citrin points out that among the states that adopted English-only legislation through a
representative process, rather than direct democracy, the Latino and Asian population was
small and the number of foreign born persons was well below the national average. See Citrin
et al., supra note 151, at 540; see also Hero & Tolbert, supra note 157, at 865; Tatalovich,
supra note 150, at 196-97. Tatalovich points out that these states are mostly white. Minorities
make up less than 3% of the population. See id. Under Hero and Tolbert's hypothesis, states
with a large homogenous and non-multicultural white population share common civic values,
which do not include minorities' perspectives. In these states, regression analysis shows that
policy outcomes are most consistently anti-minority. See Hero & Tolbert, supra note 157, at
868. In these states, such an affirmation can not be said to be part of an intergroup battle
between majority Euro-ethnic whites, who believe in "melting pot" assimilation, and those
minorities who predominantly believe in multiculturalism. Rather, such measures would seem
to represent an ideological affirmation, in the abstract, of that state's vision of what it means to
be an American.
159 According to population estimates projected from 1990 census data, in 1997 Latinos
made up, respectively, 30.4% of the population in California, 21.A% in Arizona, 14.0% in
Colorado, and 14.1% in Florida. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State
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American, 161 or foreign bom 162 populations: Arizona; California (four);
Colorado; and Florida (two). In each of these victories, Latinos and Native
Americans predominantly voted against the constitutional initiatives.1 63
Population Estimates and Demographic Components of Population Change: July 1, 1997 to
July 1, 1998 (Dec. 31, 1998) <http://www.census.gov/ populationfestimates/state/st-98-1.xtt>;
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, States Ranked by Hispanic Population in
1997 (Sept. 4, 1998) <http.//www.census.gov/population/estimates/staterank/sorh97.txt>.
1601 will not include Asian Americans in this discussion although this is a predominantly
bicultural minority. See infra note 163.
161 According to 1997 estimates based on the 1990 census, California has the largest and
Arizona ranks third in Native American population. Per the 1990 census, seven of the largest
ten reservations in terms of population are located in Arizona. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, States Ranked by American Indian Population in 1997 (Sept. 4, 1998)
<http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/staterank/sori97.txt>; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-23-189: 1995, at 50 (1995) [hereinafter CPRS P-23-189]. Both
of these states have adopted English-only amendments.
162 One-quarter of California's and one-half of Dade County's population is foreign bom.
See METRO-DADE COUNTY, MIAMI DEP'T HUMAN RESOURCES, DADE COUNTY
CHARACrERISTICS (1983); Abby Goodnough, New York Region Steps Up Efforts for Bilingual
Classes, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at Bl.
163 Latinos and Native Americans have been most consistently opposed to English-only
measures, and for this reason the discussion that follows concentrates mainly on Latinos and,
where applicable and data are available, Native Americans. Opposition by Asian Americans
has been more varied. Data show that Asian Americans voted for California's English-only
measure and for Proposition 227. See Citrin et al., supra note 151, at 545 (reporting that 61%
of Latinos opposed California's English-only measure, but 67% of Asian Americans supported
it). According to CNN-L.A. Times exit polls, 63% of Latinos opposed Proposition 227, while
57% of Asian Americans supported it. See Ethan Bronner, Defeat of Bilingual Education is
Challenged in Federal Court, N.Y. TMES, June 4, 1998, at A25; Amy Pyle et al., Latino Voter
Participation Doubled Since '94 Primary, LA. TIMES, June 4, 1998, at Al. However, in
Arizona, polls taken two weeks before the election showed opposition to English-only as
follows: Latinos (79%), Native Americans (75%), and Asian Americans (67%). See Karen L.
Adams, Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in the Southwest: An Overview, in PERSPECIVES ON
OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra note 151, at 183, 195. Eighty-five percent of Latinos opposed the
Dade County ordinance. There was no data for Asian Americans because they were not then
present in Miami in significant numberi. See Castro, supra note 154, at 287.
The polls indicate that opposition to Proposition 227 among Latinos varies according to
class and recent immigrant status. In Huntington Park, California, an area 92% Latino and a
new immigrant enclave, Proposition 227 was rejected by a 3-to-1 margin. By contrast, in
Montebello, California, with a 68% Latino population, mostly middle-class and second
generation immigrants, Proposition 227 was rejected by only a 58% to 41% margin. See Pyle
et al., supra. This result mirrors the stratification in the Latino community on immigration
issues, as evidenced by the differing levels of opposition to Proposition 187. See generally
DAVID G. GUIERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS
AND THE POLmCS OF ETHNICrTY (1995).
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Latinos are the largest growing minority group in the United States.164 They
already are, or will shortly be, the largest minority in California, Florida,
Colorado and Arizona, the four states that have enacted state constitutional
English-only amendments by initiative.165 In California, where there have been
three language initiatives, in 1986, 1988, and 1998, Latinos make up almost 30%
of the population. 166 English-only measures were also successful in two cities
with highly visible and active Latino and Asian-American communities: San
Francisco and Dade County. In Miami, the 1990 Census showed that Latinos
now constitute a majority of the population. 167 Yet, despite their growing
numbers, Latinos are particularly vulnerable to electorate politics because, due to
the low-level voter participation among these groups, their numbers are not
reflected in electorate strength.168
ii. Status and Intergroup Conflicts
The history of the English movement does not start in the Southwest with its
legacy of conquest and subsequent racialization of Spanish-speaking Mexican
Americans, 169 and where white Americans' colonization of Native Americans
Various researchers report support for English-only measures among African Americans.
See Adams, supra note 163, at 195 (reporting that 80% of Afi-ican Americans supported
Arizona's English-only initiative); Citrin et al., supra note 151, at 545 (reporting that 67% of
African Americans voted for California's English-only initiative, in relatively the same
proportion as whites); Zentella, supra note 151 (reporting that 66% of African Americans
voted for Florida's English-only initiative). But see Castro, supra note 154, at 287 (reporting
that the Dade County ordinance was only supported by 44% of African Americans).
16 4 Latinos are recording the largest gains in terms of aggregate numbers, while Asian
Americans are the fastest growing minority in terms of percentage increase. See CPRS P-23-
189, supra note 16 1, at 7, 9, 13.
165 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION ESTIMATES BY
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN FOR STATES, METROPOLITAN AREAS AND SELECrED COUNTIES:
1980-1985, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-25, NO. 1040-RD-1, at 15-16 (1989).
166 See id. at 69.
167 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS: DETAILED
POPULATION CHARACRSTICS, METROPOLITAN AREAS AND SELECrED COUNTIES, PC-90-1D1
(1993).
168 In the recent 1998 California primary, Latinos made up 12% of California voters,
twice their share in the 1994 election. See Pyle et al., supra note 163.
169 Sociologists like Tomds Almaguer and Rodolfo Alvares emphasize that in what used
to be Mexican territory--Colorado, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas-Mexican
Americans have been "racialized" into a subordinate group. Anglo-Americans have maintained
their political and social dominance by various means: (1) economic: occupational segregation
that limited accessibility to skilled jobs to white ethnics; (2) legal: interpretation of property
laws that dispossessed Mexican citizens and prevented Asian Americans from land ownership;
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involved a calculated program of annihilating Native-American languages.
Rather, English-only was born in 1980 in Dade County, a community in which
Cuban Americans "made good" and realized the American dream in large
numbers. In Miami, Spanish speakers exert economic power 170 and political
influence. 171 Popular commentators refer to Miami as a city that is civically,
economically, and culturally located in the Caribbean and not the United
States.172
The first wave of Cuban immigrants came to Miami in the 1950s as model
immigrants and soon became model minorities. This group did not assimilate
under the "melting pot" vision. Instead, as sociologist Max Castro observed,
Cuban Americans were political exiles, predominantly middle class, well
educated, mature in their cultural and political ideas, and intent on retaining their
national dreams. 173 As a result, they believed strongly in holding on to all of the
trappings of their cultural and national identity, including language. 174 In 1977,
almost 90% of Cuban Americans spoke Spanish at home,175 and their general
economic success, and increasing profile as employers, also led to the
exportation of Spanish outside the home for use in business and socially.' 76
and (3) ideology: belief systems and stereotypes that perpetuate a mythology that Mexican and
Hispanic culture is inferior to the Anglo-Saxon culture. See TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT
LINES: THm HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994); Rodolfo
Alvares, The Unique Psycho-Historical Experience of the Mexican-American People, 52 SOC.
SCI. Q. 15, 20-21 (1971).
170 Max Castro reports that business formation among Cuban Americans in Miami has
been spectacular, zooming from 3,447 in 1969 to 24,898 in 1982. See Castro, supra note 154,
at 283. Cuban Americans in Miami are more likely to be business owners than Mexican
Americans in Los Angeles. See id. at 290. This probably reflects the class and accumulated
wealth disparities between the two groups.
171 The South Florida Latino delegation is highly influential in the Florida state
legislature and is credited with ensuring that the Florida constitutional amendment remains law
on paper only.
172 See generally JOAN DIDION, MIAMI (1987).
173 See Castro, supra note 154, at 284-85.
174 See id.
175 Among Latinos in the United States, Spanish is predominantly a home language. A
1977 study (the closest available to the time of the ordinance) by the Cuban National Planning
Council found that 91.9% of all Cubans in Miami spoke only Spanish at home, while another
4% spoke both Spanish and English, but mostly Spanish. See CUBAN NATIONAL PLANNING
COUNCIL, EVALUATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY ISSUES IN THE CUBAN COMMUNITY
(Guarione Diaz ed., 1980). But see Elizabeth A. Brandt, The Official English Movement and
the Role of First Languages, in PERSPECrIVES ON OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra note 151, at 215,
216 (noting that research indicates that the Spanish language is not generally retained among
Latino communities in the Southwest).
17 6 See CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 95-97; Castro, supra note 154, at 281-83
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Max Castro and James Crawford, who have published comprehensive
studies on the English-only controversy, summarize the dynamics that caused the
overwhelming English-only victory in Dade County as "Anglo backlash"177 and
"Hispanophobia."' 178 Notwithstanding this catchy rhetoric, the picture that these
two authors paint of the politics of English-only is complex and multi-layered.
However, in both their versions, the concern of Euro-whites as to their declining
dominance was a key element of the success of the English-only movement.
By 1980, Euro-whites were pressed to acculturate to a new Miami, a de facto
bilingual city and a city in which Latino influence had become noticeable. In
1980, Spanish was heard in all public places and had become a constant
reminder to many Euro-whites that their dominance was declining.179 James
Crawford reports that from 1970 to 1975 Spanish speakers, many of whom were
"Marielitos," outnumbered English speakers twenty-six to one as newcomers to
Miami. 180 English was "under siege." Residents complained that "we were
treated like we were foreigners and they [Spanish speakers] were the legitimate
person that was born here."18 1 Others would cite the use of Spanish in public
spaces as "rude." 182 Some resented that Spanish increasingly was required to
qualify for jobs, even low-level jobs.183 Terry Robbins, one of the leaders of the
English-only movement, connected bilingualism to the United States becoming a
(reporting on a 1984 marketing study).
177 See Max J. Castro, On the Curious Question of Language in Miami, in LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONTROVERSY 178, 183
(James Crawford ed., 1992) [hereinafter LANGUAGE LOYALTIES] ("Miami-which has led the
country in bilingual education and bilingual government services-in 1980 led the backlash
against bilingualism.').
178 See CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 148-75.
179 Many of the supporters of English-only would point to their irritation at being
addressed first in Spanish and then in English by store clerks. One leader cited "[o]veruse of
Spanish" as "driving people up the wall." Id. at 99 (quoting interview with Enos Schera).
180 See id. at 94. In addition, from May to September of 1980 Miami was undergoing the
pains of incorporating 125,000 Cuban refugees from the Marielito boatlift all of whom were
Spanish speakers only. See David Card, The Impact of the Maiel Boatlifl on the Miami Labor
Market, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 2,245 (1990).
181 CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 99 (quoting interview with Enos Schera, a leader of
the Miami ordinance campaign).
182 See id. at 101 (recounting an incident where two Spanish speakers were standing in
line during a lunch break and were interrupted by a non-Hispanic white who said to them:
"This is America-speak English").
183 See id. at 104-05. Crawford recounts a publicized incident where two African-
American women were denied cleaning jobs because they failed to speak Spanish. The women
are reported to have said, "They came over here. I don't see why I have to go through
changes." See id. at 105; Celia W. Dugger, 2 Don't Know Spanish, Denied Jobs, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 25, 1983, at lB.
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"mongrel nation." 184 Finally, Emmy Shafer, a co-founder of the initiative
movement summed up what many were thinking: "I don't feel like I'm in
Miami anymore .... This is not Cuba, and we're not going to put up with it
anymore. I want to live in America again."185 Cuban Americans and other
Latino immigrants had turned the melting pot model on its head.
This range of sentiments, and the degree to which they were deeply personal
and strongly held, hint at the wide support that English-only enjoyed. English-
only was, and continues to be, unequivocally a grass roots movement. In 1980,
two women, Emmy Shafer and Marion Plunske, heard each other's comments on
a Miami radio talk show, called each other, and decided to organize a committee
for the enactment of the English-only ordinance. 186 Within one week, this
campaign had recruited many other like-minded people and had attracted funds,
mostly from small donations. The movement took on its own momentum.
Outside of Miami, the pattern often has been similar. English-only measures
have been employed, not primarily where merely Latinos or other non-English
speakers are politically vulnerable, but where their presence has become visible.
iii. Pro-English Cultural Motivations Reflected in Majority
Campaign Literature
Analysis of English-only campaigns helps to reveal why English-only
initiatives are so overwhelmingly supported. Far from being an affirmation of a
technical issue-what language is the polity to use in its official business-
English-only initiatives reject the bilingual model for a variety of deeply held
reasons touching upon self and group identity and the desire to re-assert a
dominant ideology in an environment in flux. Rejection does not necessarily
equate with racism or nativism, although, as discussed in the next Part, these
elements also exist within the English-only movement.
Proponents' campaign literature emphasizes that "English must be the
official language of the United States and the only official language."1 87 In doing
so, advocates celebrate the "melting pot" model of assimilation. 188 Official
184 See CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 102 (quoting interview with Terry Robbins).
185 Id. at 106 (quoting Emmy Shafer's remarks to a Miami call-in radio talk show that
were repeated as part of the ensuing campaign supporting the English-only ordinance).
186 See Castro, supra note 154, at 286.
187 Stanley Diamond, English-the Official Language of California, 1983-1988, in
PERsPECrivES ON OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra note 151, at 111, 119.
18 8 Heidi Tarver's analysis of the Official/U.S. English campaign literature reports that
proponents directly make the analogy to the melting pot. See Heidi Tarver, Language and
Politics in the 1980s: The Story of U.S. English, 17 POLmCS & Soc'Y 225, 237 (1989). Steve
Symms, a Senator pushing English-only legislation in Congress, has stated: 'The American
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English literature claims that English is at the core of American national
identity.189 California's official English campaign literature states: "Our English
language represents our history, our values, our loyalty to our State and Country.
In a fundamental sense, our language is US."'190 English-only proponents have
argued that a multi-language environment transforms America into a Tower of
Babel that would disunify American nationality and undermine what makes
America a successful country.191 One of the English-only pamphlets includes a
quote by Theodore Roosevelt: "We have room for but one language here.., for
we intend to see that the crucible turns our people out of Americans, of
American nationality, and not as dwellers in a polyglot boarding house."'' 92
To call these themes racist and nativist may be oversimplifying. These
themes have struck a chord in the American electorate. In a recent study, Jack
Citrin measures symbolic attitudes of what it means to be an American and finds
these to be empirically distinct from measures of intolerance and prejudice. 193
This ideology of what it means to be an American is the most important source
of opinions toward cultural minorities. 194 As the head of the English-only
movement aptly pointed out after the victory in California, the American people
had approved resoundingly an idea that to be an American involved a choice, a
people are impatient with us. All around them they see the results of the language policies
Congress has imposed, policies that challenge the uniqueness of English in our national life.
We have removed the heat from the 'melting pot,' and the melting seems to have very nearly
stopped." See id. at 232 (quoting "Fact Sheet: English Language Amendment" published by
U.S. English) (emphasis in original). However, the monistic model of assimilation has never
been a true sociological depiction of the integration of immigrant groups and is not the model
of assimilation followed or accepted by the newest immigrant groups, Latinos and Asian
Americans. An earlier work in this project provides an in-depth discussion of the melting pot
imagery and its ties to dominant American cultural ideology and cultural and civic hegemony.
See Lazos Vargas, Homo[geneous] Americanus, supra note 17.
189 See Diamond, supra note 187, at I 11.
190See Tarver, supra note 188, at 231-32 (quoting the U.S. English-Califomia policy
statement).
191 Even following the scandals that rocked U.S. English, see infra notes 200-203 and
accompanying text, U.S. English's identification of language as a "fundamental bond through
which a people [Americans] is held together" has been consistent and clear. Diamond, supra
note 187, at 11. The U.S. English California Policy Statement states: 'This bonding gives us
harmony and unity." Id. (quoting U.S. English-Califomia Policy Statement); see also
FERNANDO DE LA PERA, DEMOCRACY OR BABEL?: THE CASE FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH IN THE
UNTED STATES (1991) (U.S. English publication).
192 Senator S.I. Hayakawa, The Case for Official English, in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES,
supra note 177, at 94, 100 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt).
193 See Jack Citrin et al., American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change, 52 J.
PoLmcs 1124 (1990).




iv. Nativism and Anti-Latino Resentment
Unfortunately, the English-only movement also hosts an undeniable
component of nativism and anti-Latino feeling. In the Miami ordinance battle,
exit polls conducted by the Miami Herald showed that more than half of all
Euro-whites who voted for the initiative also hoped that the passage of English-
only "would make Miami a less attractive place to live for Cubans and other
Spanish speaking people."196 The same poll showed that 74% percent of all
voters agreed with the statement "the recent refugee influx has made Dade a less
desirable place to live." 197 In another poll, 54% of Floridians agreed with the
statement "[w]e are losing control of our state to foreigners." 198 These polls
reflect a mix of anti-immigrant, anti-foreign sentiments directed at Cuban
Americans and Latinos in reaction to their rapid influx.199
The anti-immigrant and anti-Latino element has been most visibly displayed
in events that caused the implosion of U.S. English, a nonprofit political action
group with an agenda to assist in the enactment of English-only statutes on both
a state-by-state and national basis. Senator Hayakawa from California, after
failing in the U.S. Congress to enact national English-only legislation, co-
founded U.S. English with John Tanton, a conservative with links to
conservative think tanks.200 Miami's success had demonstrated that this was a
political issue that could be exploited nationally. Polls conducted in the 1980s
showed that almost 96% of all Americans believed that Americans should speak
English. This group's first success was the enactment in California of
Proposition 63, the first of the "symbolic" English-only constitutional initiatives.
This proposition won convincingly by a three-to-one margin.20 1
195 Stanley Diamond explicitly makes this claim. He argues that the wide margins of
victory in California, Florida, and Colorado should be interpreted as a clear indication of the
will of our citizens, that English must be the "only official language of the United States."
Diamond, supra note 187, at 119.
196 Fredric Tasker, Anti-Bilingualism Measure Approved in Dade County, MIAIvI
HERALD, Nov. 5, 1980, at I IA.
197 Id.
198 CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 113.
199 See Castro, supra note 154, at 286-97 (describing in the anti-bilingualism movement
a hope for stemming the Hispanic tide).
2 00 Stanley Diamond, an official of U.S. English, explains that U.S. English was founded
in January 1983 by Senator Hayakawa with only 340 members. Four years later, membership
had jumped to 340,000. See Diamond, supra note 187, at 111.
201 See id. at 116-17; see also infra Appendix E.
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The national U.S. English organization came under attack, however, when a
memorandum by U.S. English's co-founder and behind the scenes leader, John
Tanton, was published by the Arizona Republic.20 2 This memorandum showed
that at least John Tanton's stand on English-only was linked to his belief that
Hispanics were "homo progenitiva [sic]," "a group that is simply more fertile,"
and that this group came in unimpeded at the border.203 This, he wrote,
threatened "Whites [and] their power and control over their lives."204
Subsequently, Linda Chavez, a conservative Mexican American appointed by
the Republican administration to head the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and who had became involved with U.S. English, made Tanton's
anti-Latino and anti-immigrant position more patent. She resigned from the
organization, believing her association with U.S. English to be a liability, and
later described Tanton's joining of population control, immigration control, and
language policy as giving the impression that U.S. English was biased against
Latinos.205 Subsequently, reports have linked monies received by U.S. English to
foundations interested in immigration reform and population control.206
Further, while nativism was not a patent force in Miami's civic politics prior
to English-only, the adoption of the ordinance proved that it was a latent
sentiment among many majority, long-time residents. 207 Sociologist Max Castro
remarked that the English ordinance was deeply divisive and fractured a
cooperative political structure that elite whites had sought to construct in
Miami.208 Initiatives of this kind fan smoldering intolerance and racial
resentment, and following inevitable landslide votes, they become symbolic
expressions of the majority's dominance that shatters the civic environment.
v. Cultural Minority's Reactions
Regardless of whether English-only measures are founded on pro-English
cultural sentiments or on nativist or anti-immigrant feelings, it is clear that such
202 See CRAVFORD, supra note 154, at 150-51 (quoting the Arizona Republic article
publishing excerpts of John Tanton's confidential memorandum); JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD
DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERvATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED
AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 11-12 (1996) (quoting same).
203 CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 151 (alteration in original).
204 Id.
205 See id. at 157.
206 See id. at 152-55; STEFANCiC & DELGADO, supra note 202, at 10-19 (tracing the
foundations that supported English-only with millions of dollars to groups that support
eugenics and stringent immigration controls).
207 This is Crawford's general point. See CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 90-120.
208 See Castro, supra note 154, at 287.
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affirmances have an intense and concrete impact on the affected minority groups.
When the dominant political group rejects-in this case resoundingly-the
ideology upon which minority groups base their membership in the polity, the
majority's vote becomes intensely personal. Minorities experience a rejection of
their belonging to the American polity and, therefore, a rejection of self.20 9
Latinos recognize the dominance of English in the polity and its importance
to their becoming well-established in the American community.210 Most
members of these groups not only speak English, but transact in English when in
public roles, whether doing business or discussing public affairs.211 Contrary to
public perception, these groups are generally assimilating into the American
mainstream and learning English quicldy.212 Like other immigrant groups, each
generation of Latinos is less likely to speak Spanish and, within a generation or
two, switch to English.213
2 09 In their studies of the relationship between language and ethnic conflict, both
Horowitz and Edwards have separately concluded that challenges to the status of one's
language triggers deeply held and emotional feelings regarding one's sense of national identity
and group worth. See JOHN R. EDWARDS, LANGUAGE, SOCIETY AND IDENTITY (1985); DONALD
L. HoRowrrz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 219-24 (1985).
210 In a 1985 survey, 98% of Latino parents in Dade County agreed that their children
should "speak and write English perfectly," compared to a 94% response rate for Anglo
parents. See Mary Combs & John Trasvina, Legal Implications of the English Language
Amendment, in THE "ENGLISH PLUS" PROJECT 30 (1986) (citing survey by Strategy Research
Corporation).
211 Veltman's study showed that 75% of all Latino immigrants speak English frequently
everyday. See CALVIN J. VELTMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE SPANISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1988).
212 Studies by Loo and Mar report that immigrants clearly recognize the importance of
learning English as a way of improving their economic and social standing. See Chalsa Loo
and Don Mar, Desired Residential Mobility in a Low Income Ethnic Community: A Case Study
of Chinatown, J. OF SOC. ISSUES, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1997, at 95, 101. For example, Chinese
immigrants are reported as saying that life is hard "[s]ince I can't speak and write English."
Chalsa M. Loo, The 'Biliterate'Ballot Controversy: Language Acquisition and Cultural Shift
Among Immigrants, 19 INT'LMIGRATIONREV. 493,499 (1987).
2 13 See 1 DAVID E. LOPEZ, LANGUAGE MAINTENANCE AND SHIFT IN THE UNITED STATES
TODAY: THE BASIC PATTERNS AND THEIR SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS (1982). The rates at which
immigrants shift to English depends on their age at the time they arrive in the United States (the
younger, the more likely to switch to English) and length of residence in the United States (the
longer here, the more likely the switch). See Calvin J. Veltman, Modeling the Language Shift
Process of Hispanic Immigrants, 22 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 545, 556-61 (1988). Holding
constant new influxes of immigrant populations, demographer Calvin Veltman projects that by
the year 2031, few Latinos will speak Spanish. See Calvin Veltman, The Status of the Spanish
Language in the United States at the Beginning of the 2 1st Century, 24 INT'L MIGRATION REv.
108, 121 tbl.5 (1990). Crawford's analysis of ethnolinguists studies is that all languages other
than English, with the possible exception of Navaho, would die out within three to four
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Navaho, which is spoken mostly in Arizona, is a language which tribes must
struggle to preserve, as young children are growing up as predominant English
speakers. The preservation of Navaho is central to the preservation of Navaho
culture, as it is the main repository of Navaho culture and religion. One cannot
exist without the other.214
Given these realities, language minorities understand English-only initiatives
as targeted at them and interpret the campaigns surrounding English-only as a
rejection of their full membership in the community. For most members of these
groups, language is a symbol of heritage and identity, rather than a barrier
preventing their assimilation into the American polity.215 For Latinos, even those
who lose their ability to speak Spanish as they become more and more
assimilated, Spanish is predominantly a home language216 and is related with
affective attitudes of self-identity and self-worth. Thus, language symbolizes
deeply held feelings about identity and is deeply embedded in how individuals
place themselves within society.
English-only laws are perceived as an affront to cultural and language
minorities' status within the polity. In Miami, for example, the strength of the
majority vote, the expression of an American ideology that left no room for
Latinos' own sense of what it meant to be themselves and also to be an
American, and nativism were perceived as a rejection of Latinos' membership in
the civic community of Miami. For many Cuban Americans, the English-only
enactment was the first inkling that they had that they were not welcomed as
civic co-equal co-participants. Sociologist Max Castro reports that many in the
Cuban-American community were hurt and bewildered: "I didn't realize how
much our neighbors or coworkers disliked us and how much they resented us. Is
that what they've been feeling all along?" 217
vi. Majority 's Purpose
As has already been discussed, support for English-only measures can be
traced to a complex and interwoven set of motivations. These include support for
a common and unified culture, resentment of the success of other groups, and
generations were it not for immigration. See JAMBS CRAWFORD, BILINGUAL EDUCATION:
HISTORY, POLmCs, THEORY, AND PRACrICE 60 (1989).
214 See Adams, supra note 163, at 191-93; see also Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 998
(Ariz. 1998) (taking special note that English is not a primary language for many Navaho).
215 See Citrin et al., supra note 151, at 537 n.1; Citrin et al., supra note 193, at 1128-29;
Tarver, supra note 188, at 232-33.
216 See Jon Amastae, Official English and the Learning of English, in PERSPECTIVES ON
OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra note 151, at 199,203-05.
217 CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 115.
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
discomfort with feeling like an outsider. Poll data analyzed by Professor Ana
Celia Zentella reflect two additional related aspects of majorities' support for
English-only measures.218 First, how the question is framed is critical to eliciting
majorities' response. In the poll data and subsequent survey Zentella devised, she
shows that when questions are framed to draw attention to the implications of the
majorities' vote on minorities, majorities become less supportive of English-
only.219 What was overwhelming support for the measure became a virtual tie
when respondents were made to realize the impact of English-only on non-
English speakers (slipping from 60/40 to 47/47) -20 Another survey tracked
similar results in how the bilingual education issue is posed to the voters.221
This evidence demonstrates, once again, the empirical difficulty of using
2 18 See Zentella, supra note 151, at 162-66.
2 19 See id. Two different New York Times-CBS News national polls, which questioned
1,618 and 1,254 respondents, respectively, were conducted within ten months of each other, in
June of 1986 and in May of 1987. In the 1986 poll, respondents were asked, "should state and
local governments conduct business ... in English?" Results tracked the same overvhelming
majority numbers supporting English-only at the voting booth, with 60% of respondents
approving the measure. See id. at 163. In the 1987 poll, the question asked was, "[w]ould you
favor or oppose an amendment to the Constitution that requires federal, state, and local
governments to conduct business in English and not use other languages, even in places where
many people don't speak English?" Id. The 1987 poll shows a tie at 47% among those
approving and disapproving the measure. See id. Zentella observes that what is at play is that
the 1986 version frames the language as Official English has-as an appeal to ideology that
English should be the language of the government of the American people. See id. at 164. The
1987 version, however, spells out the consequences of an English-only proposition and how it
would affect bicultural and bilingual citizens. See id.
Zentella followed up this analysis with a poll in which a total of 417 respondents in New
York City were asked two questions. See id. at 166-67. One question asked if the respondent
favored or opposed the constitutional amendment to make English the official language of the
state of New York (the "English-only question"). See id. at 166. The other question spelled out
the consequences and stated that it would eliminate bilingual education, bilingual ballots, and
bilingual emergency operators (the "consequences question"). See id. Two questionnaires were
used, with the questions presented in different order. See id. The results show that the
questionnaires beginning with the English-only question again tracked voting results, with
60% supporting it. See id. at 166-67. The questionnaires beginning with the consequences
question garnered significantly less support, with only 52% supporting it. See id.
2 20 See id. at 162-64.
221 A poll of 251 respondents conducted by researchers of the University of Southern
California showed similar results with respect to Proposition 227. When pollsters asked
whether the respondent would support a bilingual education program that would limit special
help to children who had limited English proficiency to one year, support for Proposition 227
(57%) switched to opposition (71%). See Stephen Krashen et al., Bias in Polls on Bilingual
Education: A Demonstration (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http-//ourworld.compuserve.
com/homepagesjwcrawford/USCpoll.htm>.
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intent analysis to judge the propriety of direct democracy measures.
d. fIlegal Immigration
In November 1994, California voters decidedly approved Proposition 187 by
a margin of 59% to 41%.222 This measure, now enjoined under federal court
order and currently under appeal,2 2 3 aims to prevent persons lacking proper
citizenship or residency status from obtaining public social services and health
benefits, and their children from enrolling in public schools.224 It also requires
public officials and school teachers to report individuals who they suspect of
having no documentation.2 25
Proposition 187 has remained largely a California phenomenon.226 While
similar initiatives have circulated in other states, including Florida, which has
struggled with large immigrant inflows, none have yet made it onto the ballot.227
The politics and the social science surrounding its passage offer additional
insights as to direct democracy efforts.
222 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (LULACI) (memorandum of law).
223 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, Nos. 94-7569 MRP, 94-7570
MRP, 94-7571 MRP, 94-7652 MRP, 95-0187 MRP, 1998 WL 141325 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
1998) (enjoining implementation and enforcement of Proposition 187, §§ 1, 4-9), appeal
docketed, No. 98-55671 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 1998). Latino groups lobbied heavily the new
Democratic California Governor Jim Davis to withdraw the State's appeal before the Ninth
Circuit, urging him to "close this chapter of the culture wars." The Govemor has decided to put
the appeal on hold and instead has asked the Ninth Circuit's mediation service to handle the
dispute. The Ninth Circuit still needs to respond to this novel task. See David S. Broder, A
Wedge that Keeps Splitting, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at A25; Dan Morain, Debate Rises on
Mediation ofProposition 187, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at Al.
2 24 See California Proposition 187, §§ 5(b), 6(b), 7 (1988), reprinted in LULAC I, 908 F.
Supp at 787-90 (App. A).
22 5 See id. at § 5(c) ("If any public entity in this state to whom a person has applied for
social services determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the information provided to it,
that the person is an alien in the United States in violation of federal law... [t]he entity
shall ... notify ... Immigration and Naturalization Servies... .'); see also id. at § 7(e)
(providing similar provision covering public elementary and secondary schools).
226 It is also significant that a California initiative, once again, has sparked a policy debate
at the national level. Following the political discussions which enveloped California's
Proposition 187, the U.S. Congress embarked on a national reform of immigration laws.
227 In Florida, the measure failed to secure enough petition signatures to be placed upon
the ballot. See Memorandum of the Florida Secretary of State, supra note 59.
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i. Social Group Dynamics
Academic work has tried to explain why the anti-illegal immigrant measure
proved more successful in California than elsewhere. A key point is made by a
recent empirical study. Illegal immigrants are among the most unpopular groups
in the American electorate, sharing this dubious distinction with gay men and
lesbians, black militants, urban rioters, radical students, and Palestinians. 22
8
However, unpopularity is only one component of three necessary requirements
to trigger group prejudice ("an attitude toward a category of people'.
Psychologist Fred Pincus states that there also must be a belief/ideology about
that group, a triggering of emotional feelings, and a motivation to behave a
certain way toward that group.229
Social group theorists have traditionally provided two hypotheses that
account for the motivations that trigger majority animosity towards immigrants,
which would help to explain why Proposition 187 emerged in California. The
most dominant hypothesis has been intergroup conflict theory, which posits that
long-time residents and legal and illegal immigrants vie for limited resources,
such as jobs. This competition leads to conflict,230 which then gives rise to
negative stereotypes regarding the outgroup.231 The second explanation is a
contact hypothesis. The isolation of immigrant groups and the pre-existing,
generally negative, attitudes towards them perpetrate and foster hostility between
the two groups.232
22 8 See Zinni et al., supra note 148, at 262. The researchers posited and demonstrated that
group membership orients political opinion and attitudes. See id. at 270.
2 2 9 See RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICr: CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE,
DiSCRDMINATION AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 49-50 (Fred L. Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich eds., 1994)
[hereinafter CONTENDING VIEWS].
230 The theory posits that, in certain social and market circumstances, competition exists,
or groups perceive that competition exists, for limited resources. For example, African
Americans and whites may compete for low-wage, low-skill jobs in rural locations where there
is only one factory; or immigrant groups and African Americans may compete for a limited
number of unskilled jobs in inner city areas. In these cases, each group constitutes areal threat
to the other because they are directly competing in a zero-sum game. One group's gains will
result in the other group's losses. See JOHN DUCKrnT, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE
96-109 (1992); SUSAN OLZAK, THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC COMPETIION AND CONFLICT 109-
33 (1992); Fredrik Barth, Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: TiHE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE DIFFERENCE 9,15-20 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1969).
231 See DUCKITT, supra note 230, at 96-109; OLZAK, supra note 230 (reporting study
premised on this theory and finding correlation between lynchings of African Americans and
tight labor market conditions); Lazos Vargas, Homo[geneosr] Americanus, supra note 17, at
1570-71 (providing summary of this theory of group formation).
232 Rothbart & John describe contact hypothesis as follows:
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Both theories seem to have some validity as applied to the relationships
between Latinos and white non-Hispanics. Political scientists Hero and Tolbert
used these alternative theories in an attempt to explain California's Proposition
187 result by analyzing to what extent there is a cleavage in the voting
population between non-Hispanic whites and Latinos. 233 They found that in
counties in California with a significant bifurcated population, a high
concentration of Latinos, and a high number of non-Hispanic whites, Proposition
187 was most strongly supported, even though Latinos voted against the measure
in large numbers.234 Hero and Tolbert also found that there was strong support
for Proposition 187 in homogenous counties.2 35
These findings support both the competition and contact hypotheses.236
Hero and Tolbert conclude that in a state like California, with a high racial/ethnic
cleavage, results that disadvantage the minority group are more likely to
Occur.2 37
[Ihe basic idea is that antagonistic groups generate unrealistically negative expectations
of one another and simultaneously avoid contact To the extent that contact occurs, the
unrealistically negative perception of the group members are modified by experience. In
other words, hostility is reduced as a result of increasingly favorable attitudes toward
individual group members, which then generalize to the group as a whole.
Myron Rothbart & Oliver P. John, Intergroup Relations and Stereotype Change: A Social-
Cognitive Analysis and Some Longitudinal Findings, in PREJUDICE, POLrHCS, AND THE
AMERiCAN DLEMMA 32,42 (Paul M. Snidernan et al. eds., 1993) (citations omitted).
233 See Hero & Tolbert, supra note 157, at 850-51.
234 See id. at 866.
235 See id.
236 While Hero and Tolbert admit that, on its face, Proposition 187 is not an anti-Latino
measure per se, they nonetheless view immigration and English-only issues as closely
associated with non-Hispanic whites' racial attitudes toward Latinos, which are heightened by
inter-race/ethnic group political competition. Where there is a large presence of Latinos and
other racial/ethnic minorities, there is increased political and civic competition. See Hero &
Tolbert, supra note 157, at 868 & n.12. Hood and Morris concluded that non-Hispanic whites
are more hostile to illegal immigration as the relative size of the illegal immigrant population in
their area increases. See M.V. Hood III & Irwin L. Morris, Give Us Your Tired, Your
Poor,... But Make Sure They Have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and
Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion Toward Immigration, 20 POL. BEHAVIOR
1, 7-10 (March 1998). This finding supports the intergroup conflict theory. At the same time,
non-Hispanic whites support legal immigration more as the relative size of the legal immigrant
population increases. See id The latter proposition supports the contact theory.
237 See Hero & Tolbert, supra note 157, at 867 ("[S]ocial pluralism tends to increase
political competition. This is why many political concerns, dismissed by some scholars
(including Elazar) as (mere) 'patronage' politics and not 'policy relevant,' take on the flavor of
salient issues in the heterogeneous context.").
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ii. Racial Formation and "Nativism"
Multiple commentators have argued that Proposition 187 has a racial basis.
Specifically, Professors Kevin Johnson and Joe Feagin have called Proposition
187 a form of "modem' or "new" nativism.2 38 Feagin frames his argument
historically and views Proposition 187 as the resurgence of a "100%"
Americanization ideology prevalent from 1900 to the 1930s.239
Critical race theorists have argued that with respect to Asian Americans and
Latinos the dominant methodology of racial formation centers around cultural
dominance over and the foreignization of these groups. 240 These cultures have
been viewed as so different from the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture that they
have been racialized as unassimilable, inferior, and incapable of fealty to the
dominant Anglo-Saxon culture.2 41
2 38 See Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism,
in IMMIGRANTS Our!: THE NEW NATISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) [hereinafter IMMIGRANTS OUT!]; Kevin R. Johnson, The
New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra, at 169, 177-81.
239 See Feagin, supra note 238, at 37. Higham's Strangers in the Land traces the
intellectual roots and historical events that gave rise to the Americanization movement of the
1920s known as the "100%." This group believed that to be an American required tracking
Anglo-Saxon lineage. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 204-17 (1963). Higham believes that this movement could not have
occurred without pre-existing stereotypes and attitudes held by the dominant Anglo-Saxon
majority that cast foreigners as inferior morally, intellectually, and culturally. World War I
reframed these ethnocentrist attitudes into nationalistic and patriotic tenrms. During the War
effort, ensuring that the "aliens" outside the Anglo-Saxon Protestant norm would become
Americanized became a patriotic "service." See id. The version of English-only legislation at
issue in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1927), is an example of"100%"-influenced, anti-
German culture laws. See also Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 329-30
(1992).
240 See generally RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: TH REMAKING OF SOCIAL
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1993); Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A
Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1985); George A. Martinez, Legal
Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience,
1930-80, 27 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 555 (1994); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My
Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law. The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History,
34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990).
241 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). In Chae Chan Ping, the
Court stated:
[T]he presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the material interests of the
State, and upon public morals; that their immigration was in numbers approaching the
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To show that Proposition 187 involved racialization dynamics, there must be
a link between such racial ideology and the seemingly neutral and legitimate
criticism of a federal policy-failing to control U.S. borders. Commentators have
found the link in their analysis of how Proposition 187 came to be formed,
examining the campaign imagery and its sources of financing. The preamble of
Proposition 187 asserts that illegal aliens have caused "suffering [and] economic
hardship" and "personal injury... by... criminal conduct" to the people of
California.242 These utilitarian assertions are controversial. Linda Bosniak points
out that these arguments are acceptable anti-immigration arguments in a modem
context where race-based allusions are too extreme to be supported.243
Because the facial language of Proposition 187 is arguably neutral, Professor
Kevin Johnson examines the rhetoric of the Proposition 187 campaign as well as
the ideological credentials of its leaders.244 Based on this evidence, he links
Proposition 187 to racial nativism. For example, the campaign literature makes
clear allusions to a bunker mentality, a fear that an invasion of brown hordes
from third world countries would destabilize existing patterns of social structure
and dominance.245 Similarly, Barbara Coe, one of the Proposition 187 drafters,
warned that 'he undocumented 'invasion' would culminate in 'a Mexico-
controlled California [that] could vote to establish Spanish as the sole language
character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civilization; ... that they
retained the habits and customs of their own country, and in fact constituted a Chinese
settlement within the State, without any interest in our country or its institutions ....
Id. at 595-96. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court expressed a
similar belief that the Chinese were an unassimilable race:
Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing
apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own country,
unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people,
might endanger good order, and be injurious to the public interests ....
Id at 717; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96-97 (1943) (finding that state
action applying curfew restrictions to Japanese Americans was reasonable and noting that
Japanese Americans had remained isolated and unassimilable).
242 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187, § 1 (West).
243 See Linda S. Bosniak, "Nativism" the Concept: Some Reflections, in IMMIGRANTS
OUT!, supra note 238, at 279, 290.
244 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70
WASH. L. REv. 629,650-61 (1995); Johnson, supra note 238, at 177-81.
24 5 See Johnson, supra note 238, at 178. Johnson reports that the moniker for the
campaign was "Save Our State," or "SOS." See idL at 177. Pamphlets claimed that Proposition
187 would stop the "ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion." See id. at 178.
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of California, 10 million more English-speaking Californians could flee, and
there would be a statewide vote to leave the union and annex California to
Mexico."' 246 Johnson explains that this invasion imagery implies a loss of
control over borders that calls to mind the invasion of the dominant Anglo-Saxon
culture by inferior peoples.247
iii. Money and Nativist Ideas
Several commentators have attempted to demonstrate the racial and nativist
motives underlying support for Proposition 187 by demonstrating that key
supporters of the measure support other related measures and hold nativist
beliefs. For example, Jean Stefancic constructs a link between funding, the key
actors, and the anti-"third world" racial beliefs that infected both English-only
and Proposition 187.248 James Crawford also traced a link of campaign funding
between the English-only movement and the immigration reform movement.
249
In addition, the John Tanton memorandum, already referenced, caused the
implosion of the English-only movement to a coalition group that included U.S.
English and Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform, and expresses
concerns with the safety of U.S. borders. It adds that "Latin American migrants
[could bring] the tradition of the mordida (bribe) [and] the lack of involvement in
public affairs." 250
246 Id. at 179 (quoting Pemela J. Podger & Michael Doyle, War of Words, FRESNO BEE,
Jan. 9, 1994, at Al). Another mover of Proposition 187, Harold Ezell, an INS official, justified
Proposition 187 because 'the people are tired of watching their state run wild and become a
third world country."' Id. at 178 (quoting Daniel B. Wood, Ballot Vote on Illegal Immigrants
Setfor Fall in California, CHISTiAN ScI. MoNrroR, June 1, 1994, at 1).
247 See id. at 179.
248 See Jean Stefancic, Funding the Nativist Agenda, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note
238, at 119, 119-20, 131-33 [hereinafter Funding the Nativist Agenda]; see also STEFANCIC &
DELGADO, supra note 202, at 142-57. For Stefancic and Delgado, conservative money and
brains have been key to the success of the English-only and immigration reform movement.
These movements focus on a single issue and know how to get their messages across. See id.
249 See CRAWFORD, supra note 154, at 157-58. Crawford traced significant contributions
of almost $6 million to both English-only and anti-immigration efforts by a single large donor.
See id. This donor supports causes concerned with the explosion of population among third
world countries and how this potentially threatens Anglo-dominant culture. See id. Pioneer
Fund, a group that sponsors projects that promote eugenics, has also been connected with the
Proposition 187 campaign. See Stefancic, Funding the Nativist Agenda, supra note 248, at
129-30.
250 Crawford, supra note 154, at 154-55 (quoting the John Tanton memorandum); see




Whatever their source, intergroup conflicts can easily be heightened through
the use of the media.251 Political candidates often find it effective to define their
position in an electorate by proclaiming what they are against, rather than what
they are for.2 52 Illegal immigrants, a highly unpopular group, are an easy target
for politicians who perceive that they can gain an electoral advantage by
positioning themselves as being "against" such groups. Pete Wilson has been
accused of doing just that in his campaign for governor of California when he
showered the airwaves with television ads showing pictures of Mexicans
physically overrunning and swarming around the U.S.-Mexico border. These ads
framed Wilson's campaign in intergroup terms, and, Johnson suggests, nativist
terms as well.2 53 A vote for Wilson was a vote against illegal immigrants. Thus,
Wilson encouraged the California electorate to vote on Proposition 187 based on
a hostile intergroup dynamic, rather than on policy analysis. The media can
frame complex issues in powerful, single-dimension terms. Images like those
used in Wilson's ads can "stir up" fears, hostile feelings, and racial resentment
among certain members of the majority groups.
The opponents of Proposition 187, a wide coalition of liberal interests,
attracted almost $2 million in national funding in an attempt to counter these
media messages.2 54 But the funding proved to be too little too late. The messages
that Wilson and the Proposition 187 proponents had succeeded in
communicating to whites were too powerful to be counteracted with single
sound bites. A key moment, according to one observer, was when Mexican
Americans were seen on television carrying the United Farm Workers flag and
the Mexican flag in a protest march, further fueling anti-foreign sentiments.255
2 5 1 See generally DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL
POLmCs AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 229-60 (1996); DARRELL M. WEST, Am WARS:
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECrION CAMPAIGNS, 1952-1996, at 151-83 (1993); Julie M.
Duck et al., Perceptions of a Media Campaign: The Role of Social Identity and the Changing
Intergroup Context, 24 PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 3 (1998) (measuring the dynamic
of intergroup conflict with respect to media); V. Price, Social Identification and Public
Opinion: Effects of Communicating Group Conflict, 53 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 197 (1989)
(observing that media coverage in campaigns can encourage intergroup dynamics rather than
individual responses).
252 See RICHARD K. SCHER, THE MODERN POLmCAL CAMPAIGN: MUDSLINGING,
BOMBAST, AND ThE VrrALrrY OF AMERICAN PoLrrIcs 99-115 (1998).
253 See Johnson, supra note 238, at 177-81.
254 See LYDIA CHAVEz, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATLE TO END AFFRMATVE
ACrION 179 (1998).
255 See id. at 80.
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v. Racial Spillover Effects
Measures that focus on illegal immigrants may stir anti-foreign resentment
that can spill over to harm Latino and Asian-American citizens who, as stated
earlier, are racialized in the popular imagination as part of an un-American
foreign element.256 A recent report from the Los Angeles County Commission of
Human Relations (CHIRLA) indicated an increase of 23.5% in hate crimes
against Latinos since the enactment of Proposition 187. An analysis examining
complaints filed with the CHIRIA in the Los Angeles Mexican-American
community post-Proposition 187 concludes that:
[Proposition] 187 has transformed everyday life for Latinos of every status,
including those born here and those whose ancestors have lived in the U.S. for
generations. The climate of hostility [engendered by Proposition 187] resulted in
discrimination in business establishments, increased police abuse, heightened
conflict among neighbors, and an increase in hate crimes and hate speech against
Latinos .... There is abundant evidence of anti-Asian hate activity.257
In other ways, too, the divisiveness caused by Proposition 187 is still
visible.258 As you drive into California on the interstate highway, a large
billboard proclaims: "Welcome to California, the illegal immigrant state. Don't
let this happen to your state."259
e. Affirmative Action
The final class of majority-minority conflict initiatives to be discussed are
anti-affirmative action or so-called "civil rights" initiatives. California's Civil
Rights Initiative (CCRI), also known as Proposition 209, is the prototype. In the
wake of the Supreme Coirt's decisions in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson260
256 Hood and Morris's data show that the politics affecting an identifiable, unpopular
group-illegal immigrants-can spill over onto a closely associated racial/ethnic group-legal
migrants. See Hood & Morris, supra note 236, at 12.
257 Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath ofProposition
187, 17 CHICANo-LA-TNO L. REv. 1, 9 (1995).
258 Politicians as well report that the California electorate has come to believe that
Proposition 187 was too divisive. See CHAVE2, supra note 254, at 251-53.
259 Ruben Navarrette, Immigrants Threaten Complacent Arizonans, THE ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7791374; Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Sign
Company Cuts Off Immigration Message, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 24, 1998, available in
1998 WL 7780299.
260 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peha,261 affirmative action programs are now
on rocky ground. The Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to allow
for the establishment of affirmative action programs, but has required that they
be able to pass strict scrutiny in order to ensure that such programs do not unduly
burden whites' individual rights.262 Commentators have criticized Adarand on
the ground that the Court intruded into a clearly political matter that divides the
polity, racially and also by gender. 263 Because the judiciary improperly weighed
in on a political controversy, it is arguably no coincidence that Proposition 209
became politically feasible only afterAdarand.
In November 1996, California voters approved this controversial measure by
a decided margin of 54% to 46% percent.2 64 Under the CCRI, it is impermissible
to "discriminate against or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin."265 In
December 1996, federal district court Judge Henderson issued an injunction
preventing the implementation of CCRI on the grounds that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause.266 In February 1997, the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge
Henderson, 267 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 268
In November 1997, Houston voters defeated a measure that asked whether
the city charter should be amended "'to end the use of affirmative action for
women and minorities' in employment and contracting." 269 A measure using the
same preference language as Proposition 209 appeared on the November 1998
ballot in the state of Washington and was approved by a margin of 58% to 42%
of voters, in spite of a contested campaign. 270
261 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
262 See id. at 237; see also JA. Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-506.
263 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209,47 DuKEL.J. 187,247-48,287,293-
98 (1997). In Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 17, I argue that affirmative action
exemplifies the epistemological gap between racial majorities and minorities that reflects how
each group understands racial discrimination, and that the Court in deciding JA. Croson and
Adarandprivileged as part of constitutional law whites' understanding of racial discrimination.
2 64 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
265 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 209(a) (West).
26 6 See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1496.
267 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
26 8 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
26 9 Sam Howe Verhovek, Houston to Vote on Repeal ofAffirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1997, at A28 (quoting Proposition A).
270 See Steven A. Holmes, Washington State is Stage for Fight Over Preferences, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1998, at A1; Sam Howe Verhovek, From Same Sex Marriages to Gambling,
Voters Speak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B1.
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i. Ideology, Epistemological Divide, or Racial Resentment?
Views on affirmative action divide along racial lines, with Americans
generally holding strong opinions.271 Whites oppose affirmative action by a two-
to-one margin, while a much larger proportion of African Americans, three-to-
one, believe that it is necessary.272 Voting on Proposition 209 reflects this racial
divide: 63% of whites supported it, while 74% of African Americans, 76% of
Latinos, and 61% of Asian Americans opposed it.273 Women opposed
Proposition 209 by a small margin (52% to 48%).274
The racial division on affirmative action, in part, reflects ideological
differences. People will reasonably differ as to what equality of opportunity
should mean in order for racial minorities and women, who have been subject to
past discrimination, to have an equal, or at least fair, chance to succeed in today's
modem world.275 Supporters, as well as opponents, of affirmative action claim to
271 See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 251, at 33 (analyzing 1986-1992 National
Election Studies (NES) data and concluding that "[o]n racial matters, Americans, both black
and white, are in possession of real opinions'). There is also increasing evidence that views on
affirmative action are complex and multi-layered. See generally Symposium, Twenty Years
After Bakke: The Law and Social Science of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 663 (1998).
272 The Gallup Poll's report on black and white relations in the United States showed that
82% of African Americans believed that govemment should increase or keep affirmative action
programs while only 51% of whites were likely to say the same. See THE GALLUP POLL SOCIAL
AUDIT, BLACKIWHITE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATS 14-15 (Executive Summary, June
1997). Seventy percent of whites believed that African Americans, instead, should focus on
improving themselves. See id. at 15. In another poll, close to 80% of whites did not believe that
"qualified minorities should receive preference over equally qualified Whites." Cathleen
Decker, The Times Poll: Most Back Anti-Bias Policy but Spurn Racial Preferences, LA.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at Al. The 1986-1992 NES survey reflects a greater gap: 90% of blacks
versus 46% of whites believe that government has a role in ensuring equal employment
opportunity; 68% of blacks versus 15% of whites support preferential hiring by race; 80% of
blacks versus 30% of whites support college quotas. See KINDER & SANDES, supra note 251,
at 30.
273 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 n.12 (N.D. Cal.
1996), rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
274 See id. In Washington, where the campaign targeted this sector of the electorate, the
vote was virtually split among white women at 51% to 49%. See Sam Howe Verhovek, In a
Battle Over Preferences Race and Gender are at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at Al;
Verhovek, supra note 270.
275 Popular commentary cites the violation of meritocratic values as the reason for erosion
of popular support. See DINEsH D'SOUzA, THE END OF RACISM 289-336 (1995) (arguing that
affirmative action is equivalent to group quotas); Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the
Economy are Reshaping American Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 29-33 (Henry
J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (advocating that because Americans view individualism and
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favor a system in which all should receive rewards according to merit and not on
the basis of racial preferences, whether white or black.
This portrayal of merit and opportunity also reflects diverging beliefs
regarding the existence and persistence of discrimination. 276 Many whites and
men do not perceive the constant incipient and structural discrimination that
many minorities, particularly racial minorities, experience.277 Thus, the
"privilege" of not experiencing discrimination makes its existence, and the
necessity to address it less apparent to many whites and men.278 This transparent
meritocracy as very high values, policymakers reconsider affirmative action policies).
2 76 See John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IoWAL. REV. 313, 323, 333 (1994) (arguing that white
American's narrative of "neutral standards" serves to distance them from advantages received);
Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 308-15 (1990)
(explaining that the affirmative action debate is framed in the rhetoric of white innocence and
that this avoids dealing with problems of unconscious racism).
277 Racial minority's experience with racism leads them to know that racism is a systemic
and pervasive phenomenon. The following percentages of African Americans, Latinos, and
Asian Americans, respectively, perceive prejudice towards their group: 84%, 90%, 95%. See
HARRY H.L. KITANo & ROGER DANIELs, ASIAN AMERICAN: EMERGING MINORmES 195 (2d
ed. 1995). Psychologists report that African Americans who have made it socially and
economically still feel rage at the constant prejudice, discrimination, and concomitant loss of
dignity they experience episodically and sometimes daily. See generally ELLIS COSE, THE
RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993); WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. CoBBS, BLACK RAGE
(1992 ed.). Professor Davis has used the term daily racial "microaggressions." See Peggy C.
Davis, Law as Microagression, 98 YALE L.L 1559 (1989); see also JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN
P. SIKEs, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 15 (1994) ("When
our respondents talk about being black in a country dominated by whites, they do not speak in
abstract concepts of discrimination or racism learned only from books, but tell of mistreatment
encountered as they traverse traditionally white places."). Hochschild finds that the ability or
willingness to recognize racist treatment varies according to class. See JENNIFER L.
HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE
NATION 72-75 (1995) (recompiling and analyzing attitudinal data showing the various ways in
which African Americans are conscious of ongoing systemic discrimination against them and
yet continue to strive for and pursue the "American Dream" and finding that more well-off
African Americans see racial discrimination than do poor African Americans).
2 7 8 See RUrH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: T-HE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS 35-70 (1993) (reporting the great social distance between white
women and race groups); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN Er AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How
INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7-24 (1996); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind,
But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement ofDiscriminatory Intent, 91
MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 969-71 (1993); see also Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism
Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinctions Between Color-
Blind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1030-36,
1057-59 (1997) (critiquing the Court's approach in affirmative action cases on the basis that it
permits and encourages transactional discrimination).
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"privilege" also includes social and business norms that assume the white and
male perspective as the norm.27 9 The perspective of whites and men with respect
to the existence of discrimination reflects a way of looking at the world that is
markedly different, arguably irreconcilable, from what racial minorities and
women report they experience. Thus, this gap is not only ideological; it is
epistemological, reflecting a knowledge gap of the social world that is reflective
of occupying a different social position, one of privilege and freedom from
discrimination.280
Recent extensive work based on the 1986 to 1992 National Election Survey
(NES)281 by Professors Kinder and Sanders provides evidence that the opinion
divide on affirmative action captures white "racial resentment."2 82 Kinder and
Sanders describe racial resentment as:
a contemporary expression of racial discord, distinguishable from the biological
27 9 Martha Minow writes:
[A]ttribution of difference... locates the problem in the person who does not fit in rather
than in relationships between people and social institutions. The attribution of difference
hides the power of those who classify and of the institutional arrangements that enshrine
one type of person as the norm, and then treat classification of difference as inherent and
natural while debasing those defined as different... [W]hen public or private actors label
any groups as different[, it] disguises the power of the namers, who simultaneously assign
names and deny their relationships with and power over the named. Naming another as
different seems natural and obvious when.., social practice, and communal attitudes
reinforce that view....
MINOW, supra note 28, at 11.
280 By referring to a "white epistemology" in this context, I do not mean to imply that all
whites oppose affirmative action or that all whites would hold on to meritocratic and
individualistic mythologies to deny the past and present suffering of racial minorities. What I
mean to convey is that opposition to affirmative action can be understood as a cognitive issue
regarding the existence and extent of racial discrimination, as well as an ideological issue that
supports white "racial innocence." See supra notes 275-76.
281 The NES sample of 2,176 respondents included extensive questions designed to
measure the relationship between two current political issues that Kinder and Sanders believed
to be indicative of modem "subtle" prejudice-affirmative action and aid to welfare recipients.
They designed questions that attempted to measure: (1) self-interest versus group interest, (2)
racial resentment, and (3) ideological beliefs. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 251, at 14-
16.
282 Kinder and Sanders formulated this term in response to criticism of their earlier
formulation of "symbolic' racism. See i at 293-94. Their analysis found little correlation
between attitudes on affirmative action and socio-economic status or education. See id. at 90-
91. The study also did not find significant correlation between whites' position on affirmative
action and indicia of self-interest. See id. at 89.
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racism that once dominated American institutions and white
opinion... [R]acial resentment features indignation as a central emotional
theme, one provoked by the sense that black Americans are getting and taking
more than their fair share. Finally... racial resentment is thought to be the
conjunction of whites' feelings toward blacks and their support for American
values, especially secularized version of the Protestant ethic. Today... racial
resentment takes primarily one form, a combination of racial anger and
indignation, on the one hand, and secularized versions of the Protestant ethic, on
the other.2 83
Kinder and Sanders found opinions on affirmative action to be significantly
influenced by what whites as a group perceived to be the impact on the group of
affirmative action policies.284 The single most significant correlate was Kinder
and Sanders's measure of whites' "racial resentment." This measure sought to
capture subtle hostility based on general beliefs that reflect stereotypes and
unsympathetic positions towards blacks.2 85 Kinder and Sanders conclude that
283 MaE at 293-94.
284 More than 40% of whites thought that affirmative action had a negative impact on
whites by reducing job chances or promotions. See id. at 54. A slightly higher percentage of
whites believe that affirmative action policies operate to disadvantage them, relative to blacks,
in entry into elite schools for their children. See id. Kinder and Sanders examine the data and
conclude that such perceptions are not realistic. See id. at 64-68.
285 The full complement of questions reads as follows:
(1) Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if
they tried.
(2) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
(3) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black
person than from a white person.
(4) Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
(5) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
(6) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
Id. at 107.
Kinder and Sanders's analysis leads them to conclude that this positive correlate for racial
resentment, which captures racial attitudes based on stereotypes, plays not the only, "but by a
fair margin... the most important" role in forming white public opinion on racial issues, like
affirmative action. See id. at 124. Fred Pincus highlights that these questions include questions
that indicate the continuing significance of traditional prejudice, such as: "Over the past two
years, blacks have got more than they deserve' and "Negroes/blacks shouldn't push where
they're not wanted." Fred L. Pincus, Does Modem Prejudice Exist?: A Comment on Pettigrew
and Roth, in CONTENDING VIEWS, supra note 229, at 69, 72. Responses demonstrate low but
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their racial resentment measure is a coherent and stable measure of prejudicial
attitudes. They also found that white respondents were more likely to curtail
responses when the interviewer was African American, which they cited as
further demonstrating white respondents' consciousness that their answers
demonstrated prejudicial attitudes.2 86 Jennifer Hochschild presents a more
complex and ambivalent view.287 In her Proposition 209 analysis, data show
white discomfort with the way in which affirmative action was applied, with
one-fourth who voted for the referendum preferring a "mend it, don't end if'
option.288 For the vast majority of whites, affirmative action is not a top political
issue affecting the choice of candidates.289 Hochschild concludes that affirmative
action opinions among whites are "malleable" and hold instead symbolic
value.290
ii. Exploiting the Racial Divide by Framing the Issue
Lydia ChAvez's study of Proposition 209 documents that, as with previous
measures, the precise framing of the issue was critical to its success.2 91 Women
and racial minorities made up 70% of the California electorate,292 and
affirmative action programs are designed to benefit this large group. Thus, the
politics of self-interest favored the opponents. The ad campaign was evenly
matched---civil rights groups opposing Proposition 209 put together a $3.1
million campaign kitty, amply funded from the beginning of the campaign.293
Yet, the electorate approved Proposition 209.
California poll data showed that voters would respond very differently to
affirmative action measures, depending on how they were worded. When voters
were asked whether they favored a ban on "preferential treatment," more than
78% agreed.294 However, when voters were asked if they would support a ban
on affirmative action programs, only 31% supported it.295 Using these data,
positive correlations with opinions on affirmative action and other social welfare issues. See ia
2 86 See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 251, at 113.
2 87 See Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Strange Career of Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 997 (1998).
2 88 See id. at 1001.
2 89 See id. at 1001-02.
2 90 See id. at 1004.
291 See CHAVEZ, supra note 254, at 251-53.
292 See id. at 88.
293 See id. at 252.
2 94 See id. at 99 (reporting results from April 1995 Louis Harris poll).
2 95 See id. Kinder and Sanders's 1990 experiment captured this effect as well. They
showed that if affirmative action poll questions were framed in the language of "preferences"
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drafters consciously phrased Proposition 209 in language that would provoke the
greatest support among whites, as a ban on preference and quotas.296
The summary to the ballot is the key cue among voters. Studies have shown
that voters routinely fail to inform themselves fully on the issues, and that cues,
such as the ballot summary, are informational shortcuts relied on heavily to
determine a vote.29 7 In California, the attorney general formulates the summary
for direct democracy initiatives. Daniel Lungren, the Attorney General at the
time of Proposition 209, publicly supported Proposition 209. It is therefore not
surprising that the summary his office prepared used the language of
preferences. 298 Although Lungren's actions were challenged in court, the
appellate court allowed Lungren's formulation to stand.299
Cldvez reports that many minorities were confused not only by the
language, but also by the media messages of the proponents of Proposition
209.300 Proponents appropriated the language of "civil rights" in the title of the
proposition.301 Advertising for Proposition 209 used images of Martin Luther
King.302 Ads stated that Proposition 209 would unify Californians and mostly
used voices of female narrators.303 One ad in particular was aimed at white
women. It portrayed the story of Janice Camarena, a white woman who was
denied admission into a remedial English class because the program had been
designed for Latino and African-American students.304 Camarena appeared
opposing quotas and saying that her children were not part of any race, just the
and "quotas," this phrasing would trigger "racial sentiments powerfully, calling up the
sympathies and resentments whites feel toward affirmative action's intended beneficiaries.
[With such phrasing] public opinion on affirmative action becomes a kind of referendum on
the moral character of black citizens." See Donald Kinder & Linda Sanders, Mimicking
Political Debate with Survey Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for
Blacks, 8 Soc. COGNrTiON 73, 96 (1990).
296 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
297 See MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 122-44.
298 See CHAVEZ, supra note 254, at 145-46; Tom Desslar, AG's Role in Ballot Process is
Criticized, 109 L.A. DAILY J. 168, atAl (1996).
299 The appellate court found it "immaterial whether the attorney general supports or
opposes Proposition 209." Lungren v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (3d Dist. 1996).
300 See CHAvE7, supra note 254, at 187-88, 217-19 (describing several Proposition 209
advertisements).
301 See id. at 20 (discussing the "California Civil Rights Initiative").
3 02 See id. at 217-19 (describing use of footage of Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I have a
dream" speech before the Lincoln Memorial). Connerly fired the individual responsible for
these ads. See id. at 220-22.
303 See id. at 217 (The last line in one announcement states: "Equal opportunity without
quotas. Yes! Proposition 209. Bring us together.").
304 See id. at 216-17.
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human race.305 Finally, Ward Connerly's role as main spokesperson and leader
of Proposition 209 diffused anti-black charges and served to reassure voters that
Proposition 209 was in fact a pro "civil rights" law.306
C. Sorting Out the Causes and Effects ofAnti-Minority Results in
Initiatives and Referendums
After examining the narratives of Part B and the work of social and political
scientists presented in Part A above, this section re-addresses the question posed
by Professor Bell: do anti-minority initiatives succeed because majorities "vote
their fears and prejudices, especially when exposed to expensive media
campaigns"? 307 It then assesses the impact of these initiatives on minorities. As
will be seen, neither issue is susceptible to a simple analysis.
1. The Dynamics ofAnti-Minority Initiatives and Referendums
Social scientists have repeatedly used three sets of concepts in seeking to
describe and explain majorities' actions towards minority groups: racial
prejudice/racial resentment, ideology, and intergroup conflicts. It is virtually
impossible to untangle these sets of motivations. Each is complex, and each
plays a role in anti-minority direct democracy measures.
a. Reconciling a Civic Culture ofFairness and Consistent Anti-
Minority Results
The discussion of initiatives in Part M.B supports Cronin's and
Zimmerman's contentions that Americans resist radical movements that
disadvantage minorities. The AIDS quarantine initiatives were defeated in
California.308 Similarly, the more radical form of initiatives resisting school
desegregation was defeated in Arkansas.309 In addition, the more extreme
versions of anti-gay initiatives, such as Oregon's equating homosexuality with
pedophiles, went down in defeat.310 Arizona's more extreme English-only
constitutional amendment initiative, recently struck down in Ruiz v. Hull,311
3 05 See id. at 217-18.
306 See id. at 74-75.
307 Bell, supra note 82, at 20-21.
308 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix F.
309 Seesupra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
310 Seesupra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
311 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998).
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passed by a narrow margin, compared to the three-to-one margin that
California's more moderate English-only initiative enjoyed.312 Finally, polling
showed much greater support for anti-affirmative action measures when they
were framed in terms of denying groups special rights than when presented in a
more radical fashion as a prohibition on affirmative action.313 Based on this
evidence, it can be asserted that Americans tend to vote against initiatives that
are patently unfair toward a minority group.
At the same time, the evidence also suggests a strong core cultural
conservatism. Americans overwhelmingly believe in certain ideologies: that
individual property rights imply an autonomy of decisionmaking regarding
persons with whom we are permitted to associate; 314 that traditional families are
our social foundation;315 that English holds a primary place in our political
life;316 that merit and hard work should be the primary ways that rewards are
meted out in our society; and that the government has a limited role in
facilitating fair treatment.317 These cultural ideologies are closely tied to an
American civic culture.3 18
These two observations are not contradictory. Rather, they help explain a
central feature of initiatives and referendums. A key piece of American ideology
is fair play and a belief that all persons are created equal. Thus, it would be
considered anti-American to deprive a member of another group of a benefit out
of animus or spite. The results of initiatives show that Americans will vote on a
fairly consistent basis to arrest the advancement of minority's civil rights and
status. However, most Americans will so vote only where the distinction
disadvantaging the minority can seemingly be drawn on a principled and fair
basis. That is, an electorate that might resist an initiative explicitly legitimizing
the deprivation of jobs to gay men on the basis of their sexual orientation might
quickly adopt an initiative accomplishing the same end through the use of
language denying gay men "special privileges." 319 Similarly, the majority that
voted to protect the property rights of persons to lease to any person of their
choosing, without government interference, was unwilling to concede that this
312 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix E.
313 See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
3 14 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
318 In my previous work, I make the argument that American civic culture is inextricably
linked with racial formation. See Lazos Vargas, Homo[geneous] Americanus, supra note 17.
319 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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ideology could harm racial minorities. 320 Thus, while the American electorate
resists radical formulations that explicitly threaten minorities' status, this concern
for the quality of minorities' citizenship is counterbalanced by a core
conservative civic culture.
b. Prejudice, Racial Resentment, or Ideological Battles?
In the last two decades, social science has shown that prejudice as we once
knew it-blatant, violent, close, and direct-is no longer the norm in how whites
express what social scientists still call "prejudice" or "racism. '321 Nonetheless,
prejudice of various kinds continues to exist and plays a role in the anti-minority
initiatives. Professor Young-Bruehl's recent exhaustive study instructs that we
should think and speak of prejudice in the plural, as prejudices, because attitudes
and ideologies that create prejudice differ with respect to each unpopular
group.32
2
Some of the evidence lies in isolated events. Tanton's "population
explosion" memorandum worrying over the Latino physical invasion, "homo
progenitivus," and civic corruption by the takeover of la mordida is jarring.323
Also, the founders of Proposition 187 appeared to be motivated by raw
nativism. 324 To some, these are evidence of isolated prejudiced statements that
motivated some but not all.325 To others, these are brief glimpses of a way of
thinking that infected the entire process.326
There is evidence of more sustained and blatant prejudice in two cases with
respect to illegal immigrants and gay men and lesbians, two of the most
unpopular groups in the polity.327 Prejudice against illegal aliens, particularly
320 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
321 See generally John B. McConahay & J. Hough, Symbolic Racism, 32 J. Soc. IssuEs
23, 23-46 (1976); Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Prejudice: The Different Worlds of
1984 and 1964, in CONTENDING VIEWS, supra note 229, at 53; David 0. Sears, Symbolic
Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROvERSY 53, 55-56 (Phyllis Katz &
Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988); see also supranotes 280-84 and accompanying text.
3 2 2 See ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 1-23 (1996).
323 See supra notes 202-06, 250 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
325 There are also counter-examples of politicians attempting to inject a more reasoned
tone into controversial debates. For example, in contrast to Pete Wilson's opportunistic
positioning, Governor Gary Locke, in the Washington affirmative action debate, cast the
affirmative action debate as not one involving racial conflict, but rather as one of "progress
women have made in getting equal pay for equal work." Verhovek, supra note 274, at Al.
326 The position of some race theorists could be so interpreted.
327 See supra note 148 and accompanying text (citing study based on NES survey data).
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Mexican nationals, and prejudice against gay men can be expressed freely. Overt
appeals to prejudices against these two groups figured prominently in mobilizing
the vote on Proposition 187 and the Dade County ordinance. Pete Wilson's
"brown horde" imagery in ads was effective in positioning him as the anti-illegal
immigrant candidate.328 Anita Bryant's appeals to Miami's religious community
centered on the theme that children could not be safe around gay men.329 Hers
was an explicitly homophobic appeal. Finally, the polls in Miami captured
nativist resentment when a majority of Anglo voters expressed their desire that
after English-only they hoped Miami would be less hospitable for Cubans and
other Latinos.3 30
Following Proposition 187, there was evidence that once prejudice is
unleashed it cannot be easily contained. Post-Proposition 187, Mexican-
American and Asian-American citizens have experienced greater hate crime.331
Post-English-only, Florida's Latinos experienced a similar hostile
environment.332
Finally, in the case of Proposition 209, Kinder and Sanders have found
consistent evidence that anti-black "racial resentment," a measure that captures
whites' racial stereotypes in constructing their political-ideological positions,
correlates with whites' opposition to affirmative action.333 This theory, as
applied to majority-minority initiatives described in Part III.B, posits that
minorities are rejected because whites have engaged in group-based (what these
researchers would call "racial") ideological thinking around which majorities
have structured, in ways that are acceptable and masked, inchoate racial/ethnic
fears and prejudices. These ideologies are expressions of racial resentments, and
not just ideas, because such ideologies support continued stereotypical thinking
about these unpopular groups. For example, in the case of gay men and lesbians,
coherent ideologies of social morality and propriety can also mask ideologies
that gay men and lesbians are deviants who corrupt children; in the case of
cultural and language minorities, the white ethnic narrative of assimilation can
mask Anglo attitudes of superiority and intolerance for Latino and Asian
cultures; with respect to blacks, the Protestant work ethic can mask assumptions
that this group does not want to play by the rules of meritocracy; in the case of
California's Proposition 187, valid concerns about national borders can mask
32 8 See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
32 9 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
332 See Designation of Official Language Already Generating Problems, ORLANDO SUN-
SENTINEL, Dec. 11, 1988, at 4F (reporting and describing incidents of verbal and physical
aggression towards Spanish speakers).
333 See supranotes 281-86 and accompanying text.
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nativist prejudices.
Kinder and Sanders's work has been controversial. Other social scientists
argue that the assumptions made as to the significance of white responses
rejecting positions that favor minorities are not necessarily explained by latent
racism. 334 Rather, it could be suggested, these responses are products of deep
ideological differences. Virtually all of the direct democracy measures can be
described in such terms: the protection of owners' property rights and autonomy
from government interference; the need to prevent homosexuals from tarnishing
our moral community; the need to ensure that all Americans share a common
language; the need to protect U.S. borders and prevent illegal aliens from
bankrupting public services; the need to prevent minority group members from
securing unfair and undeserved advantages; and others. Such ideologies are
principled, and some form an integral part of the American ethos.
c. The Role ofldeology in Constructing Divisions and "We-They"
Thinking
As stated above, whether direct democracy is a vehicle for prejudice centers
around the very difficult proposition posed by Kinder and Sanders. Does
ideology serve to cohere racial resentments, or are they battling over ideas? The
data and narratives examined in Part II.B appear to have components of both.
In addition, ideology serves as a vehicle for the formation of group identity.
This function explains why all of the direct democracy initiatives discussed in
Part Ill.B evolved into "we-they" group thinking that has pitted majorities
against minorities. Also, some of the issues that majority-minority initiatives
address, even in absence of racial feelings, construct racial and social hierarchies
that exclude "others," those with differing, minority perspectives, from the
polity.
i. Ideology and the Formation of "We-They" Thinking
Kathryn Woolard provides an explanation of how ideology becomes the
vehicle for coalescing collective action. 335 Direct democracy campaigns are
3 34 See Byron M. Roth, Social Psychology's "Racism," in CONTENDING VIErS, supra
note 229, at 60. Criticizing Kinder and Sanders, Roth observes: "In truth, the hard data that
supposedly buttress the analyses of whites' racial attitudes are susceptible to a wide variety of
interpretations. By no means do the data justify social scientists in their competing and
demeaning explanations of Americans' "resistance to racial equality." Id. at 68; see also
Hochschild, supra note 287 (ascribing the racial divide on affirmative action to differing group
symbolic ideologies).
3 35 See Kathryn A. Woolard, Sentences in the Language Prison: The Rhetorical
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"grass roots" because they elaborate a theme that strikes a chord in the electorate.
The spontaneity of Miami's anti-gay civil rights and the English-only campaigns
demonstrate how saying the right thing at the right time mobilizes a majority.
Woolard observes that majorities are not static or given, rather they are changing
and dynamic.336 Thus, campaign themes are the catalysts in building groups337
out of these disparate interests. These themes create rather than merely reflect
conflicts.338 These themes have appeal because there is some latent anxiety
about change and status.339 Such widely shared concerns "vent" through the
campaign rhetoric, and it is this function that recruits a broad spectrum of
supporters.
Woolard builds on Joseph Gusfield's concept of status conflicts.340
Professor Rachel Moran, who applied this idea to describe the majority-minority
conflict in the context of bilingual education, describes status conflicts as
intergroup clashes in the political or electoral arena over "approval, respect,
admiration, or deference." 341 In the electoral arena, groups attempt to assert their
dominance, or defend if they perceive a threat to their own way of life or cultural
ideological viewpoint.342 Because status conflicts are frequently framed in terms
of morality or cultural and civic ideology, they are not necessarily conscious or
clearly visible. At the same time, the tensions are deeply emotional because the
conflict has come to represent deeply held notions of self.
The narratives in Part II.B seem to bear out this hypothesis. Miami's twin
initiatives, anti-gay civil rights and English-only, were spontaneous and grass
roots. With an idea, "we want Miami back for us," two women talking on a radio
show struck a chord. In one week, radio talk show banter became an organized
funded political initiative. The themes tapped into latent anxieties among the
Anglo majority about Cuban Americans' increased numbers, higher status, and
Structuring of an American Language Policy Debate, 16 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 268 (1989).
336 See id. at 269.
337 See id.
338 See id.
339 Woolard adds that these rhetorical themes allow majorities to "assuage doubts [about
norms and institutions] by projecting suspected negative aspects of social life onto outsiders."
Id.
340 Joseph Gusfield derived this status conflicts framework from his attempts to
understand the Temperance movement. See JOSEPH GusFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 17-19,
180 (1963).
341 Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321,
341-42 (1987). Professor Ballin, more generally, has applied sociologist Joseph Gusfield's
concept of "status conflicts" to a category of challenges distinct from the anti-discrimination
and anti-subordination challenges currently facing the Equal Protection Clause. See J.M.
Balldn, The Constitution ofStatus, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321-23,2373 (1997).
342 See Moran, supra note 341, at 341-42.
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higher profile.343 Anita Bryant's anti-gay "blueprint" tells a similar story. She
was jolted into action when the Dade County council enacted an anti-
discrimination ordinance that included gay men and lesbians. Her appeals found
a home among Miami's moral conservatives.344
Woolard's theory can be applied as well to themes that strike a chord of
anxiety and cause racial tension to be manufactured, rather than to rise
spontaneously. The animosity directed towards illegal immigrants (and foreign-
looking citizens) during and after Proposition 187 was latent prior to Proposition
187, but it was mobilized through campaign rhetoric, advertisements, and media
images.345 The drafters of Proposition 209 purposefully exploited racial
anxiety/resentment by choosing wording for the proposition that was most likely
to excite racial tension---"preferences" and "quotas."346 Proponents then built a
campaign around these themes.347
ii. Monistic Ideologies and the Construction ofHierarchy
As Americans, we have constructed concepts and narratives of who we are,
where we come from, and what makes us unique as a people.348 Within that
framework, social groups-white Americans, African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latinos-as well as individuals compose narratives as to who
they are and how they belong and fit within the polity.349
The central function of political discourse is to deliberate over civic
ideology, discussing what are our values and what is our cultural civic identity.
This is a legitimate discourse and one that takes a central place in a liberal
democratic polity. Although minority group members share many of the core
American civic values, they of course do not always share the majority's view on
all issues. For example, in the case of English-only, minorities contest the
343 See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
345 See discussion supra Parts llI.B.2.d.iii, iv.
346 See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
347 See supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
348 In Homo[geneous] Americanus, I describe this concept as follows:
The hold of ethnocentrism is directly related to the important role that culture plays in
how societies think about themselves. Cultural character endures over time, forms the
psychological and sociological anchor of a society, and becomes the traditions and norms
that capture the essence of what a people are and understand themselves to be.
Lazos Vargas, Homo[geneous] Americanus, supra note 17, at 1511 (citations omitted).
349 See generally HOCHSCH-ILD, supra note 277 (reviewing a comprehensive collection
and analysis of attitudinal data by race on the "American Dream").
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majority's vision of the civic ideology of Americanization. The majority's vote
for English-only reaffirms an ideology of how they view what it means to be an
American: assimilation and Anglo-Saxon cultural monism. Cultural minority
group members, on the other hand, often contest that ideology and hold a
different view of what it means to be an American. Many cultural minorities
accept multiculturalism and would allow persons from multiple backgrounds to
join together in a polity without giving up their individual cultural differences.
Ideologies construct social and racial hierarchies. A monocultural vision of
who is an American can be the means, intentionally or unintentionally, to
exclude those who do not fit within this monocultural vision. In a prior work, I
argued that the American ideology of assimilation that is embodied in the Euro-
white ethnic immigrant narrative is the modem way in which Americans
construct race.350 Such narratives or ideologies need not be linked to racial
feelings. 351 When cultural minorities wish to assert rights to retain and continue
to express their own distinct culture, majorities' rejection of that statement may
not necessarily be expressing prejudice, but a dominant idea of what it means to
be an American. However, culture and language are closely linked to how we
think of ourselves, how we identify ourselves, and how we position ourselves
within the polity. By rejecting multiple ways of being, the dominant majority
also forecloses the possibility of a cultural minority's inclusion and co-existence
on terms that recognize their full humanity.
d. Intertwining ofldeology, Status, and Subtle Racism
Let us now again reconsider Bell's challenge. Multiple hypotheses supported
by credible social research support his charge that majorities vote against
minorities because of some form of prejudice. However, hypotheses and data
also support the conclusions that the process is complex and that it is difficult to
ascertain clearly how much "prejudice" (whether conscious or unconscious) and
how much principled ideological contestation is involved in anti-minority results.
Nonetheless, we can draw from the data some important conclusions
demonstrating that the actual phenomenon of majority-minority initiatives is far
350 See Lazos Vargas, Homo[geneous] Americanus, supra note 17, at 1505-39.
351 Jack Citrin concludes, "Without denying the role played by anti-minority
sentiments ... the positive attachment to the symbols of nationhood, whether self-conscious or
just reflexive-contributed significantly to the pervasive approval for 'official English."' Citrin
et al., supra note 193, at 549. This is Tarver's interpretation as well: "English-language ability
is tied to and becomes a symbol for the 'commitment to being American' [quoting U.S.
English literature] and is thus portrayed as being intimately connected with both individual
identity and national unity. An assimilated English speaker is by definition a patriot and a
member of the body politic... ." Tarver, supra note 188, at 234.
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more complex than a mere reflection of overt prejudice.
First, majorities will not tolerate extreme expressions against minorities.
Any anti-minority initiative or referendum must be phrased within parameters
that permit majorities to articulate that the reasons they voted against minority's
interests cohere around acceptable ideological frameworks.
Second, the studies show that group thinking is key and is triggered by these
direct democracy initiatives and referendums. Group thinking surfaces because
of the way politicians and the media have framed issues. Once group thinking is
triggered, minorities become vulnerable to majority "backlash." When the
majority perceives a direct challenge to the "normal" order of things, to ideas
deeply embedded in American civic culture, the reaction is "grass roots" and
resolute. Whenever a minority's actions, as for example gaining greater anti-
discrimination rights, trigger group thinking, they are vulnerable to a swift
resolute, and unequivocal majority reaction, which has taken the form of
initiatives and referendums.352 This may not be a conscious majority reaction,
but, even if unconscious, the end result is the same, which is to stave off any
minority advances.353
Third, certain intergroup confrontational contexts invite voters in effect to
react emotionally.354 Majority-minority initiatives address cultural-ideological
issues that are intimately tied to group identity. Accordingly, these issues evoke
strong emotions, both from minorities and majorities. The dominant group's
reaction is in part based in what its members believe it means to be a member of
the polity. Whenever group identity dynamics are triggered, the results are
352 This is Bruce Cain's general point. See Cain, supra note 88, at 23-24.
353 See Benjamin Radcliff & Martin Saiz, Race, Turnout, and Public Policy in the
American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 775 (1995). In what may be one of the most depressing
studies of the correlation between minority political participation and political results, these
researchers conclude that "[b]lack political participation is unlikely to produce the policy
outcomes that blacks collectively tend to favor." Id. at 790. Their regression results are
consistent with the hypothesis that "heavy black turnout, compared to whites, tends to produce
a measurable 'backlash,' such that public policies become more conservative as blacks vote at
higher rates." Id. at 788-89.
354 Political scientists make this point most powerfully in the context of racial and ethnic
group divisions. The classic is V.0. Key's study of Southern whites' voting patterns in the face
of civil rights movement and African Americans' attempts to gain the vote and civic equality.
See V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN PoLIICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949). Radcliff and Saiz's
study of voting results in which increased black electoral participation proved to correlate
highly with results that disadvantaged them as a group also supports this hypothesis. See
Radcliff & Saiz, supra note 353. Finally, the major point of Citrin's study is that such group
thinking is also aligned with how the majority symbolically identifies "Americanism." In the
case of English-only, challenges by ethnic minorities to the primacy of this powerful symbol of
national identity are likely to "inevitably arouse hostility among the majority." Citrin et al.,




Fourth, many initiatives are formulated as abstract propositions which appeal
to majority ideologies. Should English be the language of schools and
government? Should we do away with preferences? Should gay men and
lesbians obtain "special rights"? These are direct appeals to key ideologies that
most Americans share. Would majorities continue to vote anti-minority results
consistently if they were to recognize that their vote can and is interpreted as a
rejection of minority's self and their sense of belonging in the polity? For those
like Bell, who believe that the data show that majorities vote on the basis of
racial/homophobic/ethnocentrist feelings, the answer would be that anti-minority
results would continue. For those who see more mixed and unclear results, there
would be hope that such appeals would curb latent racial/homophobic/
ethnocentrist resentments.
Finally, "prejudice" can color the electoral contest. For this to occur, a group
must be an acceptable target of the majority's ire. Politicians can then build
campaigns that encourage these kind of sentiments.
Part V will argue that the judicial approach to majority-minority initiatives
should eschew intent analysis because majority-minority dynamics are so
complex, intertwined, and nuanced in whatever is identified as hostility towards
minorities. Nonetheless, Part V will also argue that, because the empirical data
convincingly show that these majority-minority initiatives trigger "we-they"
dynamics that fairly consistently result in a reduction in the context of
minorities' democratic citizenship in the polity, the Court should not apply the
highly deferential rational basis review to these cases.
2. "New" Politics and Anti-Minority Initiatives
Because direct democracy lends itself to alienating politics, Bell is right in
pointing out that the "new" politics aggravates existing majority-minority
tensions. Majority-minority initiatives are not inherently antithetical to
minorities' interests, but they suffer from many of the faults of modem politics.
The new emphasis on money and media has created a civic environment in
which complex political issues are resolved by packaging and framing the issue.
Campaigns amplify messages that are potentially divisive. Direct democracy
states that do not have any substantive screening processes, like California, allow
such open access to the ballot that a well-funded, well-managed campaign can
almost always succeed in getting its issues to the voters. Mr. Unz's success with
Proposition 227 shows that those with an ideological ax to grind, if they have the
money and if they have honed in on the right issue, can gain a national forum for
their ideas.
Media is all-important. Media can frame issues around ideologies that
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provoke latent anti-minority sentiments, or evoke monistic ideologies.
Sometimes the approach is not at all subtle, as exemplified by Wilson's ads.
Sometimes ads confuse the issues. Proposition 209 campaigns succeeded in
misleading some minorities as to the effects of Proposition 209.3 55
New politics put a premium on drafting propositions in a way that will
maximize "gut" reactions and minimize a voter's consideration of the impacts of
her vote on minorities. Data on framing and phrasing show that on three divisive
issues-affirmative action, English-only, and bilingual education-voters can
become more conscious of the impact of their vote on minorities, and when they
do, their vote may be altered to favor the position of minorities.356
3. Effects ofAnti-Minority Initiatives
Majority-minority initiatives are more than "just politics" because they can
substantially change the legal and civic terrain, fashion wholesale changes in the
state's constitutions, and reconfigure minorities' civic standing within the polity.
a. Minorities Lose Consistently
The data regarding direct democracy initiatives set out in Part lll.A shows an
empirical result that has been consistent over three decades and over a range of
civil rights issues. Minorities lose fairly consistently whenever majorities use this




Direct democracy is not problematic merely because mathematics dictates
that minorities will lose on many issues, including those issues about which they
care the most. Rather, in all the cases that we have reviewed, issues that trigger
majority group thinking are issues directly related to a minority group's status in
the polity. Thus, majorities vote on the content of minorities' democratic
citizenship standing. Does citizenship entail for minorities, as well as majorities,
the privilege and benefit not to be discriminated against in housing, employment
and public restaurants? Should unpopular minorities, such as illegal immigrants,
be denied access to benefits of government and education, which other citizens
enjoy? Should language minorities accept that American citizenship means that
all public discourse must be conducted only in English, the language of the
355 See supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
356 See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
357 See infra Appendix A.
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dominant majority, to the exclusion of their own language? Should equal
opportunity mean that governments cannot take into account minorities' pre-
existing and existing unequal status? Majority-minority initiatives, as we
currently know them, constantly put to a test what are to be those minimum
rights of co-participants that we believe that all citizens should enjoy, both
majorities and minorities. For these reasons, Part V below will argue that this
should be a core part of the Court's judicial review.
c. Alienation
Something happens to the fabric of the polity, the civic relationship between
majorities and minorities, when anti-minority initiatives succeed. Business does
not go on as usual. These initiatives are structured as yes/no propositions that in
the voting booth become referendums on minority's membership in the polity.3
58
In Miami, in the aftermath of English-only, Cuban Americans felt rejected from
civic life because in fact they had been rejected. In Colorado, after Amendment
2, gay men and lesbians called for a national boycott of their state. In California,
in the aftermath of Proposition 187, Mexican Americans, in particular, have been
further racialized by the heightened hostility to "foreigners" and those who look
and act foreign.359 In the proposed test articulated in Part V, I will argue that it is
appropriate for the Court to consider these alienation and stigmatization effects.
There is irony in these results. A case can be made that even when majorities
vote for anti-minority initiatives or referendums, it is not the majorities' intention
to alienate or reject minorities, or even to undercut their rights and status.
However, the effect of these votes, particularly when it affects a state
constitutional amendment, is irrevocable.
In addition, successful initiatives spur congressional and other representative
bodies to action. This is precisely what direct democracy is designed to do-
break through the logjams of representative processes to initiate action in areas
that representatives are loath to address. However, majority-minority initiatives
highlight the electoral weakness of minorities. Politicians, in whatever forum
they may be, take advantage of those they believe to be weak and can be
exploited by populist politics. For example, a spin-off of the Dade County anti-
gay civil rights campaign was that the Florida state legislature enacted legislation
barring gay men and lesbians from adopting children.360 With respect to
immigration, congressional actions following the enactment of Proposition 187
initially targeted both illegal and legal immigrants, again showing spillover of
358 See generally Clark, supra note 27.
359 Seesupra note 256 and accompanying text
360 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
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anti-illegal immigrant animosity to other groups that in the majority's
imagination are "foreignized" as well.361 Likewise, the success of Proposition
227 triggered reconsideration of federal funding of bilingual education and
makes it more likely that support for bilingual education both in the U.S.
Congress and in other states with high numbers of Latinos will be cut back.362
In sum, regardless of the motivations that inspire majority-minority
initiatives, it appears that these have a very powerful impact on both majorities
and minorities, as well as the civic life of the polity. As Dworkin admonishes,3 63
it reflects badly on a polity when its politics target its weakest members: the
racialized, the unpopular, the different. The issue is not that there are majority-
minority conflicts, but how they get resolved in this particular democratic forum.
The effect is to lengthen the social and civic distance, already significant,
between those who somehow must learn to co-exist.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DiRECT DEMOCRACY: DOCTRiNAL AND
THEORETICAL INCOHERENCE
Thankfully, the absence of any specific findings by the district
court... relieves us from having to reconcile... Hunter[ ] .... Our task in this
case is merely to determine whether the district court relied on an erroneous
legal premise.364
Majority-minority direct democracy cases became part of the Supreme
Court's equal protection portfolio as the political struggle for civil rights spilled
over into popular democracy forums. Anti-integration initiatives and
referendums described in Part II.B.1 formed the first group of cases that the
Court had to resolve. Within the last four terms, the Court has had on its docket
two cases, Romer v. Evans365 and Yiiguez v. Arizonans for Official English,366
that brought before the Court the constitutionality of ideological initiatives and
referendums described in Part lI.B.2.
361 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 210S, 2260-77 (1996) (as amended at Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251,597 (1997)) (restricting aliens' access to welfare and other public
benefits).
362 See, e.g., The English Language Fluency Act, H.R. 3892, 105th Cong. (1998); see
also 144 CONG. REC. H7521-52 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (consideration of H.R 3892, the
English Language Fluency Act); id. at H7527 (discussion by Rep. Torres regarding Proposition
227 and anti-immigrant sentiments).
363 See supra note I and accompanying text.
364 Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
365 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
366 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997) (vacated as moot).
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A. The Supreme Court's Failure to Come to Terms with Judicial
Review ofDirect Democracy
How has the Supreme Court reacted to these complex cases? Not well. First,
the Supreme Court has failed to see these cases as a sui generis equal protection
problem that demands a strong, clear, and coherent doctrine founded in equal
protection principles. Second, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a
consistent or coherent approach. Of the seven primary Supreme Court decisions
that address these issues, four-Reitman v. Mulkey,367 Hunter v. Erickson,368
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,3 69 and Romer v. Evans370-
invalidate the legislative and constitutional outcome. In doing so, the Court's
opinions acknowledge that the initiatives or referendums being challenged are a
product of majority-minority conflict in which majority group hostility has
played a role. Three other prominent initiative cases-James v. Valtierra,37 1 City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,372 and Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of
Education373-- did not invalidate the initiatives. In these cases, popular
sovereignty lawmaking is lauded as an expression of the people to which courts
must defer. The Court does not acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, that these
cases involve a majority-minority conflict, or that the results of these initiatives
and referendums will negatively impact on some minority's citizenship rights
and status. Finally, Romer v. Evans,374 the most recent Supreme Court
pronouncement, does not cite any of these predecessor cases and does not set out
a clear standard for judicial review. Not surprisingly, lower federal and state
courts have also struggled, without success, to come to terms with direct
367 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down California constitutional amendment proscribing
fair housing legislation).
368 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating City of Akron automatic referendum requirements
applicable only to fair housing ordinances).
369 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down initiative that would have restricted busing).
370 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down initiative that would have precluded legislative
bodies from enacting legislation designed to protect gay men and lesbians against
discrimination).
371 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding ordinance that required referendum for any change in
zoning that would allow low income housing).
372 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding super-majority automatic referendum requirement
applicable to any change in the land use code).
373 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding California constitutional amendment limiting state
court-ordered busing to situations in which federal court had found remedy necessary under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
374 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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democracy in the majority-minority context.375
The direct democracy cases are very difficult for courts because they require
judges to address majority-minority conflicts in highly politicized contexts and
therefore have great potential to undermine the interconnectedness of the polity.
These cases also highlight what some might view as an extreme act of judicial
hubris, in that judicial review allows one lone judge to assert that her judgement
is superior to that of millions of voters.376 Unfortunately, courts have not come
to terms with how to defer to popular sovereignty while still safeguarding
minority's basic minimum rights and status. In an attempt to protect the minority
from the majority, while still respecting popular sovereignty, courts have created
a variety of unworkable doctrinal devices.
The Parts that follow will examine courts' various failed attempts to
reconcile these concerns. In an effort to systematically examine the incoherence
of these attempts, this Article will divide the judicial approaches into six
categories.377 These categories are not intended to be exclusive, but rather to
focus on some of the key differences among the cases.378 This Part will show
that these attempts have largely been both inconsistent and conclusory. Cases
that appear virtually identical are treated quite differently, and the placement of a
case in one category rather than another proves critically important in terms of
whether the initiative is allowed to stand. That is, courts have proved infinitely
able to manipulate the concepts and categories to exercise what appears to be
boundless discretion in reviewing democratic initiatives. Furthermore, the courts
never make precisely clear just what a plaintiff must show in order to defeat an
375 Some of these recent decisions have struck down the democratic initiatives. See, e.g.,
Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1002 (Ariz. 1998) (invalidating Arizona English-only measure);
Romer v. Evans, 854 P.2d 1270, 1278-82 (Colo. 1993) (striking initiative preventing gay men
and lesbians from securing protective legislation). Others have allowed them to stand. See, eg.,
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir. 1997)
(concluding, notwithstanding Romer, that anti-gay referendum was constitutional); Coalition
for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 397
(1997) (reversing district court's decision enjoining enactment of Proposition 209, the
California Civil Rights initiative).
376 The anti-majoritarian hubris, and courts' at times schizophrenic reaction to it, are
highlighted by the recent public discourse in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson. 122
F.3d at 692. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
377 Because all of the Court's decisions are subject to multiple interpretations, they will be
discussed in several different categories.
378 Professor Seeley's early analysis of this doctrinal area formulated five categories. See
James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to
Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881, 896-97 n.66 (1969-1970) (providing chart to
try to "keep track" of the Court's multiple theories and approaches). Since Professor Seeley's
very helpful analysis, courts have expanded rather than shrunk their alternative approaches.
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initiative under any of the analyses. In sum, this area of equal protection is a
mess.
B. The View That Judicial Review ofDirect Democracy Violates the
"People's Will"
Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias,
discrimination, or prejudice.
Justice Black379
Under one interpretation of the key cases, judicial review of direct
democracy violates democratic principles. Although the Supreme Court, in
Marbury v. Madison,380 articulated that courts are required to strike down
legislation that is unconstitutional, the Court's rhetoric would seem to imply that
direct action by the populace should never be thwarted.3 81 Pursuant to this view,
"we the people" should have ultimate control over our polity.3 82 Two of the
Supreme Court's direct democracy decisions, Valtierra and City of Eastlake, are
filled with similar rhetoric, such as the quote from Justice Black that begins this
section.383 These decisions, refusing to strike citizen initiatives that restructured
379 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (Black, J.).
380 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See generally GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 3
(emphasizing that understanding how Marbury affects this issue is "essential to thinking about
Court power today"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-66 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing multiple approaches to judicial review); see also FARBER ET AL., supra note
30, at 63-76 (focusing the function of constitutional adjudication on both Marbury and
Brown).
381 But see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The Court stated that referendums
and initiatives are like results of other lawmaking bodies, and, as such, are subject to the
Court's judicial review: "The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional
limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed." Id. at 392.
382 Although Professor Bruce Ackerman has emphasized this phrase, he does not go so
far as to argue that all judicial review of direct democracy is inappropriate. Rather, Ackerman
contends that the United States' constitutional scheme is a deliberative one in which ultimate
authority resides with "we the people," and the Court, which should reflect this popular will, is
engaged in the process of formulating constitutional law principles. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). Ackerman is concerned that "we the people' express
our values in what are rational and deliberative ways. See id; see also RAWVLS, supra note 28,
at 232 ("Ultimate power is held by the three branches in a duly specified relation with one
another with each responsible to the people."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICr 53-54 (1996) (arguing legitimacy resides in achieving the polity's assent
to controversial judicial decisions).
383 See infra Part IV.C.3. Valtierra's and City of Eastlake's distinctions of Hunter are
unsatisfactory. In Valderra, Justice Black punctuates an unconvincing exercise in public
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local land use decisions, seemingly endorsed popular sovereignty as fundamental
to democratic governance-without qualification. 384 The Ninth Circuit's
Coalition for Economic Equity seemingly endorsed such a view when, in
reversing the district court's issuance of an injunction opposing an anti-
affirmative action referendum, it stated: "[J]udges apply the law; they do not sua
sponte thwart wills .... If... the court relies on an erroneous legal premise, the
decision operates to thwart the will of the people.... [W]hat the
people.., willed to do is frustrated on the basis of principles that the people of
the United States neither ordained nor established."385 Similarly the Sixth
Circuit's Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati cited to direct democracy
rhetoric when, after an unconvincing effort to distinguish Romer v. Evans, it held
that the Cincinnati anti-gay civil rights referendum did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.386
Although the Court does not make the point, both Valtierra and City of
Eastlake involved majority-minority conflict. Specifically, they involved citizen
initiatives that restructured local land use decisionmaking to require an automatic
citizen referendum whenever land use decisions were likely to affect the
community's homogeneous makeup. In Valtierra, California voters by initiative
amended the state constitution to require that all low-rent housing projects could
be sited in a community only after the voters in that locality had approved it by
referendum.387 The constitutional initiative was a reaction to local officials'
reasoning with the passage quoted in the text accompanying note 373 supra. In City of
Eastlake, to ratchet up equally weak thinking, Justice Burger cites to Justice Black's eulogy of
direct democracy already cited. See City ofEastlake, 426 U.S. at 678 ("This procedure ensures
that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large
expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public services...."' (quoting
Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 143)).
384 Early commentary on these cases makes this point. See Bell, supra note 82, at 4;
Gunn, supra note 88, at 147-53.
3 85 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997). It further
stated: 'To hold that women [for example] ... would [be] subject to 'political structure'
scrutiny [which Hunter might require] .. is inimical to a constitutional scheme founded on
democratic self-government." Id. at 705 n.13.
3 86 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 297-
98 (6th Cir. 1997).
387 The California constitutional amendment provided:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any
manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town
or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the
same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an
election to be held for that purpose, or at any general or special election.
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attempts to build low-income housing with federal funds.388 In City of Eastlake,
the voters of a suburban community by initiative amended their charter to
provide that changes to the land use code would only be effective if approved
with a super-majority vote, 55%, in a referendum.389 The initiative was a direct
reaction to a developer attempting to site multi-family units within the
community.390 Thus, both initiatives would have a racial impact by enabling
white majorities to limit the encroachments of racial and poor minorities into
their homogeneous communities. Moreover, the Valtierra and City of Eastlake
facts reflect majority backlash to perceived encroachments by an outside group
and a political context in which "we-they" thinking had invaded the political
process.
The Court's approach to judicial review in Valtierra and City of Eastlake is
problematic for several reasons. First, it simply proves too much. The decisions
offer courts no way to distinguish between those cases in which no judicial
review is appropriate and those in which review is required. Yet, at least since
Marbury, it has been clear that the courts are supposed to play some role in
protecting against unconstitutional actions. Second, as will be seen, it is not at all
clear how the facts at issue in these two cases can reasonably be distinguished
from those at issue in cases such as Hunter and Reitman, in which the Court
found initiatives directed at housing discrimination to be unconstitutional.391
James v. Valierra, 402 U.S. 137, 139 n.2 (1971).
3 88 See IL at 139 (explaining that suits were brought by citizens of San Jose and San
Mateo County, California where housing authorities were unable to site low-income projects
because of local citizen referendums).
3 89 See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 670 (1975).
390 The Supreme Court of Ohio describes the timing of the initiative and the appellant's
land use permit application for rezoning of the multi-family project as follows:
On May 18, 1971, appellant made application to the Planning Commission for rezoning.
While appellant's application was pending, initiative petitions were circulated, and a
proposal requiring voter approval of all land use changes placed on the ballot. On
November 2, 1971, Section 3, Article VIII of the Eastlake charter was adopted.
Forest City Enter., Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 324 N.E.2d 740,742 n.1 (Ohio 1975).
391 These cases have historically been problematic for analysts. See Bell, supra note 82,
at 4 (stating that 'judicial obsequiousness in housing referendum cases where the result does
not overtly and invidiously burden racial minorities is not justified"); Gunn, supra note 88, at
147-53 (concluding that both Valtierra and City of Eastlake radically contract racial minority's
substantive due process and equal protection rights); Frank Michelman, Political Markets and
Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy,
53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-1978) (reconciling these cases by explaining that the Court uses two
distinct models of legitimacy--economic and public choice); Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular
Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91
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C. Multiple Justifications for Judicial Review ofDirect Democracy
The counter to this position is that courts have a legitimate role in exercising
judicial review over initiatives and referendums. This Part will discuss six
distinct approaches.
1. Ensuring a Neutral Process
John Ely's392 theory of judicial review focuses on judges respecting the
views of democratic processes. 'rocess" theory emphasizes that courts
reinforce democratic processes by ensuring that deliberation is free of prejudice
and is deliberative. 393
Hunter and Seattle School District No. I endorse a "neutral process"
approach. Justice Harlan, concurring in Hunter,394 states that the problem with
the anti-fair housing ordinance at issue in that case is not that it defeats "Negro
political interests," 395 but rather that it singles out for referendum one particular
category of disputes. The Akron automatic majority referendum requirement at
HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1375-76 (1978) ("Eastlake miscasts, and in the process too facilely
dismisses as a problem of delegatidn, the much neglected issue of the constitutional status of
legislation by initiative or referendum."); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the
Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637 (1980) (suggesting that direct democracy
results, such as those found in Valtierra and City of Eastlake, could be countered by structural
checks); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 S. Cr. REV. 127, 150 [hereinafter Sunstein, Public/Private] (concluding that Hunter is
"[a] category of classifications that qualify neither as facially neutral nor as facially
discriminatory [but nonetheless] ... ought not to receive... deference").
3 92 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JuDIcLAL REvIEV
(1980). This Article discusses only that aspect of Ely's theory that explains why certain
minorities may sometimes be excluded from the political process. The broader version of Ely's
process theory is more controversial. He argues that process review provides a more robust
justification for constitutional judicial review than alternative substantive views because it is
less subjective than substantive traditional justifications, and that process-based rights are the
only rights that should be recognized. See id. at 87-104.
393 Professor Ely calls process theory "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing"
because the Court ensures that the democratic process represents all members of the polity, not
just the majority. See id. at 87.
394 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
395 Harlan recognizes that racial minorities, like other political groups, must vie in the
back and forth of political battle. Not all losses in such battles are unconstitutional. "If the
Council's fair housing legislation were defeated at a referendum, Negroes would undoubtedly
lose an important political battle, but they would not thereby be denied equal protection." Id. at
394. That is, Harlan distinguishes the Akron ordinance from other kinds of cases in which there
is a political conflict and contest that would "operate to disadvantage Negro political interests.'
Id.
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issue in Hunter applied only to fair housing ordinances, providing that the city
council could not, motu propio, enact any fair housing legislation.396 Instead, in
such cases a referendum had to be submitted to the voters at a regular or general
election and any such ordinance would be effective if approved by a majority of
the voters.397 This singling out, suggests Harlan, is not grounded in "neutral"
principle,398 and for that reason interferes unconstitutionally with the legitimate
lawmaking process.399
What is it about the Akron referendum that is "non-neutral?" Harlan
employs deductive legitimate purpose analysis to make this determination. First,
he accepts, as does the majority, that "the clear purpose" of the Akron ordinance
is to "mak[e] it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to
achieve legislation that is in their interest."400 He reasons that fair housing
ordinances evoke "passionate opposition" and thus would normally fail.40 1
Because fair housing ordinances are selected out for automatic referendum
treatment, which the majority would routinely vote down, the process is not
"neutral," and, therefore, cannot further any legitimate state interest.402
Seattle School District No. 1,403 decided thirteen years after Hunter, also
relies, in part, on this "neutral process" conception.404 In Seattle School District
39 6 See id at 387.
397 See id. at 390. The city charter of Akron had been amended to provide:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the use,
sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real
property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on the
question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective.
Id. at 387 (quoting Akron City Charter § 137).
39 8 See id. at 395 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 389
(1967)).
399 See id. at 393 (stating that laws must provide a 'Just framework within which the
diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete and are not enacted with the purpose
of assisting one particular group in its struggle with its political opponents").
400 Id. at 395.
401 See id. at 395-96 ("If the prospect of fair housing legislation really arouses passionate
opposition, the voters will have the final say.").
402 See id.
403 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
404 See id. at 469-70. The Court stated: "[W]hen the State's allocation of power places
unusual burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to
overcome the 'special condition' of prejudice, the governmental action seriously 'curtail[s] the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."' Id. at
486 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
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No. 1, the Court explains that there is a constitutional violation if an initiative or
referendum "allocates governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the
racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaldng process." 405 The
Seattle initiative prevented local school boards from implementing any
geographical busing, except in cases where a court of competent jurisdiction had
adjudicated a busing remedy.40 6 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of
the Court, adopts the lower court's findings to conclude that this initiative
"beyond reasonable dispute... was enacted 'because of... adverse effects upon
busing for integration."' 40 7 The Court found that subjecting desegregative
student assignments to "unique treatment" radically restructures the political
process. 408 It stated that "our cases suggest that desegregation of the public
schools, like the Akron open housing ordinance, at bottom inures primarily to the
benefit of the minority." 409 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Seattle
initiative was non-neutral because the Washington initiative "'place[d] burdens
on the implementation of educational policies designed to deal with race on the
local level."' 410
While superficially appealing, the neutral process approach is fundamentally
flawed. As the critics of process theory have explained in other contexts,
searching for "neutral" democratic process sets up its own set of quandaries.
Professors Ackerman, Brilmayer, and Tribe describe at least three fundamental
problems with neutral process analysis.411 Their critique applies equally to
Harlan's neutral decisionmaking process criterion.
First, process scrutiny must employ substantive values to determine whether
an outcome is neutral.412 Process defects or non-neutral results are ubiquitous,
405 Id. at 470. The Court explained that "it is enough that minorities may consider busing
for integration to be 'legislation that is in their interest."' Id. at 474 (quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
40 6 See id. at 462 (citing Initiative 350).
407 Id. at 471 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979)).
40 8 See id. at 466.
4 0 9 Id. at 472.
4 10 Id. at 469 (quoting Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710,719 (W.D.N.Y. 1970)).
411 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724
(1985) (explaining the "Free-Rider" problem associated with analysis); Lea Brilmayer,
Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1307-08
(1986) (explaining that discriminatory rules, like neutral rules, can be the product of an
acceptable process); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980) (suggesting ambiguity in the
definition of minority).
4 12 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724
(1985) (explaining the "Free-Rider" problem associated with analysis); Brilmayer, supra note
411, at 1308 (indicating that process theory "disguise[s] a dislike for discriminatory rules by
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and any competent litigator can construct an argument that certain outcomes are
non-neutral. Any majority-minority initiative has the potential to be viewed as
having non-neutral process results. Because majorities are in a position of
dominance, they will not only always triumph; they will be in a position to
restructure the process to ensure that their win is a permanent one. How are we to
distinguish the inevitable passion of politics from the unconstitutional
majoritarian tyranny of a minority? Whenever a court makes a determination that
the result of an initiative is not neutral, it is because the initiative result favors an
outcome that, because of the court's pre-existing value choices, the court deems
to be "racial" or "motivated by animus.' 413
Second, a process may be "neutral" and still result in outcomes that are
substantively undesirable. 414 Participation in a "neutral" democratic process does
not guarantee to judges, or minorities, that "strong passions" did not continue to
influence the substance of a rule. If the court limits its scrutiny to instances where
minorities can show that their future opportunities to modify an outcome are
non-neutral, the initial wrong remains unaddressed.
Third, process analysis in the context of direct democracy must be
inferential, requiring courts to make judgments of causality: did prejudice or
improper racial impact influence an outcome?415 Legitimate purpose analysis
leaves a great deal to a judge's discretion. According to critical legal theorists,
the most significant epistemological divide between majorities and minorities are
judgments as to what constitutes sufficient causality of discriminatory intent and
impact.416 Judges reflect their social position and social knowledge when they
asserting, without proof, that such rules result from defective processes"); Tribe, supra note
411, at 1076 (arguing that process arguments ultimately rest on substantive notions of proper
conduct; which rest, in turn, on a theory of enumerated rights, at best, suggested by
constitutional text).
413 This is the key question posed by critics of process theory. See Brilmayer, supra note
411, at 1307 (stating that democratic processes do not fail when majorities win; rather in terms
of democratic values "the democratic process work[s]"); Tribe, supra note 411, at 1073
("[H]ow are we supposed to distinguish such 'prejudice' from principled, if 'wrong,'
disapproval"?).
4 14 See Brilmayer, supra note 411, at 1308 (arguing that if there is a history of racial
discrimination, then neutral rules should be scrutinized contrary to the inference of Carolene);
see also id. at 1309 ("If the interests of blacks are effectively ignored, either before they were
granted access to the process or afterward, then their concerns were equally ignored when
neutral laws were passed.").
415 Cf. Tribe, supra note 411, at 1075 ("Views about the 'differentness' of groups
generally, therefore, may reflect an interacting set ofjudgments about activities or opinions or
roles, expressed... dialectically by both 'we' and 'they.' If so, the conclusion that a legislative
classification reveals prejudicial stereotypes must, at bottom, spring from a disagreement with
the judgments that lie behind the stereotype.... ").
4 16 See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
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make this determination. However, purpose review can easily mask a judge
inserting unexplained social judgments about discriminatory causality.
These limitations of the neutral process approach are illustrated by
comparing the Court's decision in Washington v. Seattle School District No. I to
its subsequent decision in Crawford v. Board of Education,41 7 upholding
California's anti-busing measure as constitutional. The California state
constitutional initiative at issue in Crawford limited state court-ordered busing
"to remedy a specific violation ... of the Equal Protection Clause... permitted
under federal decisional law."418 Under the California initiative, neither state
school officials nor state courts could utilize busing as a means of reaching racial
integration, unless they could meet federal court standards for imposing a racial
integration remedy under Brown and its progeny.419 In attempting to distinguish
Seattle School District No. 1, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, first relies
on the lower court's findings to conclude that the California initiative has no
racial impact. 420 Because the proposition received overwhelming support from
members of all races and, on its face, the initiative did not state a discriminatory
objective, the Court explains that it need not question the lower court's
findings. 421 Second, because there are supposedly no significant racial impacts,
the Court does not find a political process distortion, as existed in Hunter.422 The
segregation remedy has not been singled out in the political process for "peculiar
and disadvantageous" treatment.423 Moreover, the Court finds that minorities
and minority parents still have recourse in federal courts if they could prove, as
Antidiscrimination Law. A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1052-57 (1978) (explaining that discrimination can be "approached from the perspective
of either its victim or its perpetrator"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 348-49 (1987)
(describing several "scenarios that demonstrate the possible process-distorting effects of
unconscious racism on governmental decision"); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1199-1211 (1995) (analyzing the
information processing system to suggest that stereotypes resulting in discrimination arise from
unintentional categorization that is part of cognitive functioning).
417 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
4 18 Id. at 532 n.6 (quoting Proposition I).
419 See id. at 535-36.
420 See id. at 545.
421 See id.
422 See id. at 539-41.
423 See id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.




required by federal constitutional law, intentional segregation. 424 Finally, the
opinion implies that there can be no racial impact because integration of schools
has benefits to both majorities and minorities. 425
It is difficult to reconcile these opinions. 426 The clearest inference is that this
was a sharply divided Court. However, more to the point, these cases
demonstrate that determinations of neutrality are circular. Whether a challenged
initiative has a "racial impact" is the single substantive factual determination that
determines the outcome in these cases. The Court may claim that it is making
"neutral" process inferential determinations, but these determinations start from
the initial judgment of whether the impact on the process is "racial" in nature. If
the initiative has no racial impact, its effect on the decisionmaking process is
"neutral"; on the other hand, the decisionmaking process is not neutral when
there is racial impact.
In short, circular reasoning does not offer any principled guidance as to how
to solve the direct democracy conundrum. Justice Harlan's neutral process
solution does not solve the problem because the Court fails to identify what
makes some initiatives "racial."
2. Prohibiting Discriminatory Intent
Washington v. Davis427 and its progeny require that challengers to legislative
enactments under the Equal Protection Clause must demonstrate discriminatory
intent. Although the Court has never expressly adopted a standard of review for
democratic initiatives that focuses on a search for illegal discriminatory intent,
language in several of its decisions might be read to support such an analysis. For
example, in Ruiz v. Hull428 the sponsors of the Arizona English-only
424 See id. at 541-42, 544.
425 See id. at 544 ('The benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially neutral."); see
also id. at 542 n.27 (taking issue with petitioners' contention that the initiative was not neutral).
But see id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (placing Crawford in the context of California direct
democracy actions resisting mandatory integration of housing and public schools).
426 These cases have been much criticized. See sources cited supra note 391.
427 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (finding no discriminatory intent when an employment
screening test impacted disproportionately on African-American applicants); see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (finding no discrimination in prosecutors'
seeking death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants as compared to 32% of
cases involving white defendants); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268-70 (1977) (finding no discriminatory intent in land use decisions that
systematically excluded African Americans from a white suburban community); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973) (requiring segregative intent in spite of
widespread pattern of segregation affecting both Mexican Americans and African Americans).
428 957 P.2d 984, 989 (Ariz. 1998). The Arizona Court, while rejecting the initiative,
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Amendment explicitly argued that the challengers of the initiative needed to
show discriminatory intent in order to prevail.
At first glance, the Court's pre- Washington v. Davis decisions in Hunter and
Reitman might seem to support this interpretation. In Hunter, the Court found the
Akron ordinance to be racially discriminatory and unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause on two bases: First that the ordinance was racially
discriminatory,429 and second that the automatic referendum requirement
imposed an unequal structural political process burden on racial minorities. 430 In
Reitman, the Court adopts the lower court's findings of racially discriminatory
intent.431 However, upon closer analysis it becomes clear that this language
merely reflects a legal conclusion arrived at through other analyses. In Hunter,
the Court holds that there is racial discrimination, but this is after the Court
concludes that the initiative has a racial impact.432 In Reitman, the Court relies
on the California Supreme Court's determination that the "intent" of the
constitutional amendment initiative was to authorize and further racial
discrimination in the private market.433 This is an impact. Thus, the finding of
"intent" is inferential and hinges on the Court's conclusion that the initiatives
have a prohibited impact on a protected racial class.
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Crawford, both decided
after Washington v. Davis, deal more directly with the discriminatory intent
issue. In both Seattle School District No. 1434 and Crawford,4 35 the Court
steered clear of an intent analysis, instead stating its confidence in the good faith of the voters
of Arizona:
By this opinion, we do not imply that the intent of those urging passage of the
Amendment or of those who voted for it stemmed from linguistic chauvinism or from any
other repressive or discriminatory intent Rather we assume, without deciding, that the
drafters of the initiative urged passage of the Amendment to further social harmony in our
state by having English as a common language among its citizens.
Id. at 991.
4 29 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) ("We hold that § 137 discriminates
against minorities . . ..
4 30 See infra Part IV.C.5.a.
431 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967) (finding that section 26 was
intended to authorize, and does authorize, 'racial discrimination in the housing markef '.
4 32 See supra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
433 See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381 ('The California Supreme Court believes that the
section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations. We have
been presented with no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be
overturned.").
434 458 U.S. 457,484-85 (1982).
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describes discriminatory intent as an additional ground for establishing that the
initiative is unconstitutional. Both cases elect to forego an analysis of whether
the motivations of the voters in each initiative were discriminatory. In Seattle
School District No. 1, the Court cites with approval the District Court's finding
that "it was impossible to determine whether the supporters of Initiative 350
'subjectively [had] a racially discriminatory intent or purpose."'' 436 Similarly, in
Crawford, the Court cites with approval the lower court's finding that any "claim
of discriminatory intent on the part of millions of voters [is] 'pure
speculation.' 437
Romer v. Evans concludes that Amendment 2 is "born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected"438 and thus might be cited by some as a case
supporting intent review. However, this is not a finding that the people of
Colorado are motivated by irrational prejudice, as Justice Scalia's dissent
implies.439 Rather, the Court concluded that there were no permissible
motivations under constitutional norms.440
The purpose of discriminatory intent under Washington v. Davis and its
progeny is to ground discrimination for which there is a constitutional remedy in
only those kinds of discriminatory actions for which causality, culpability, and
responsibility can be more firmly established.441 Applying such an analysis to
democratic initiatives is flawed for at least three reasons. First, such an analysis
does not address the problems posed by direct democracy. Part ImI.C concluded
that reducing voters' motivations to one single reason, or inferring a one-
dimensional attitude from the plethora of mixed and conflicting motives that
majority-minority initiatives stir, is a gross oversimplification of social reality
and simply subject to measurable contestation. There are no single, simple
answers. In addition, as Jane Schacter has argued, constructing the intent of
435 458 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1982) ('In addition... when a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated
only if a discriminatory purpose can be shovn.").
436 458 U.S. at 465 n.9.
437 458 U.S. at 543. The Court concludes that there is no factual or legal basis for it to
"impugn the motives of the State's electorate." Id. at 545. Among the factors that the Court
cites are: (1) that the initiative received overvhelming support from the voters, (2) that
minorities as well voted for the initiative, and (3) that purpose analysis did not reveal a
discriminatory objective. See id
438 517 U.S. 620,634 (1996).
439 See id. at 645--46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 40 See infra notes 528-38 and accompanying text.
441 See Lawrence, supra note 416, at 324; Freeman, supra note 416, at 1055-60. I do not
endorse the propriety of intent analysis as applied to legislative enactments, but only suggest
that the application to initiatives is even more questionable.
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millions of voters is difficult and indeterminate, and courts are well-advised to
shy away from subjective analysis.442
Second, intent analysis would not play an educative function as applied to
direct democracy measures. Voters are not actors with executive responsibility,
and they do not necessarily vote as if they were. By contrast, school district
officials do have executive responsibility, and when they are found to have
segregative discriminatory intent, a beneficial purpose may be accomplished.443
Once intent is adjudicated, the decisionmaker has the responsibility to fix the
problem, and the adjudication stands on the administrative record as a reminder
of errors once committed.
Third, in a constitutional democracy, courts must maintain an appropriate
balance between the people, who determine the values of the constitution, and
the judicial branch, which interprets these values. Judges maintain their
legitimacy as democratic actors through the use of public reason and affirm not
only constitutional values, but also democratic values. To require judges to
search for discriminatory intent among the majority would necessarily "chill"
judges from reviewing actions taken by the voters. The Ruiz v. Hull court
understood this implicit challenge and expressed its confidence in the good faith
of the people of Arizona, while at the same time invalidating the English-only
amendment.444 This was more than a rhetorical exercise in persuasive flattery.
Reason becomes fragile in the heat of majority-minority politics.4 45 Exploding
reason as a communicative device by accusing voters of being irrational or
prejudiced leaves bare too much and encourages greater contentiousness in an
already contentious area.
3. Proscribing defacto Racial Classifications
Yet another doctrinal approach is to determine whether the initiative or
referendum constitutes a de facto racial classification.446 Language in Hunter,
Reitman, and Seattle School District No. 1 would seem to support such an
analysis. Hunter found that requiring a majority-approved referendum to enact
fair housing ordinances, which on its face did not set forth a racial classification,
had a clear racial impact and, under suspect class analysis, could not overcome
44 2 See Schacter, Direct Democracy and Intent, supra note 30.
443 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
444 See supra note 428; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.
Supp. 755, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding Proposition 187 preempted by federal law, but
acknowledging general frustration of Californians with immigration policy).
445 Some would doubt whether reason exists in the electoral context.
446 This is how Professor Sunstein reconciled these cases. See Sunstein, PublidPtivate,
supra note 391, at 150-64.
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the compelling state interest scrutiny.44 7 In Reitman, the Court upset a
constitutional initiative that repealed state-enacted fair housing laws and then
protected property rights to "sell, lease or rent... to [any] such person or persons
as [a property owner], in his absolute discretion, chooses."448 In Seattle School
District No. 1, the Court found that Initiative 350, which restricted the ability of
local school boards to require any student to attend any school other than the
neighborhood school, constituted a de facto racial classification.449
The key finding in these cases is whether an initiative, which on its face is
neutral, can be said to create a de facto racial classification. If the Court so finds,
then it need not look for any motivation analysis 4 50 The outcome then is pre-
ordained-the Court's review is "strict" in theory, but fatal in fact4 51
The analyses in these cases of this key factual finding are conclusory. To
illustrate this, let us reconsider the issue of how the Court determined that the
initiatives at issue in Hunter and Reitman created de facto racial classifications,
whereas those at issue in City of Eastlake and Valtierra did not. Both sets have
racial impact, both involve charged racial politics, and both are part of a dynamic
in which one group, the majority, wishes to exclude the "other," racial minorities
and the poor. Both sets are justified by an ideology of property rights. Upon
reflection, however, and upon comparing the analyses in Hunter and Reitman to
City of Eastlake and Valtierra, the reasoning justifying de facto classification
analysis is circular and conclusory.
In Hunter, the Court stated that a racial classification existed because of the
repeal of the fair housing ordinance and because the majority automatic
referendum process to enact fair housing legislation "places special burdens on
racial minorities." 452 However, the analysis is tautological: "[T]he law on its face
treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that
the law's impact falls on the minority."453 Thus, the Court states that because the
Akron ordinance deals with housing discrimination "the reality" is that it is a
447 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
the "clear purpose" of the Akron city ordinance is to impact racial minorities).
448 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US. 369, 371 (1986) (quoting Proposition 14).
449 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1981) (discussing
Initiative 350); see also id. at 485.
4 50 See id. at 485 ("We have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into
motivation... 'A racial classification ... is presumptively invalid...."' (quoting Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,272 (1979))).
451 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972).
452 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
4 5 3 Id.
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discriminatory classification. 454 The same kind of conclusory analysis is at work
in Reitman. The Court states that California's property rights initiative "was
intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing
marke" 455 without more.
Hunter's weak reasoning on this key finding leaves the back door open for
subsequent tautological and circular reasoning going the other way. In Valtierra,
Justice Black, a vigorous dissenter in both Hunter456 and Reitman,457 writes the
opinion for the Court. Valtierra is not like Hunter, he explains, because Valtierra
is not a racial classification case.458 Hunter is a racial classification case because
the Akron housing ordinance deals with "racial housing matters." 459 Because
Valtierra does not, it is therefore neutral.4 60 This is a syllogism and does not
explain the Court's conclusion as to why Hunter's initiative is a racial
classification and Valtierra's is not. Justice Black ratchets up this weak reasoning
by extolling the virtues of direct democracy lawmaking.461 Yet, Hunter was also
the result of direct democracy.
Similarly, City of Eastlake fails adequately to distinguish Hunter and
Reitman. Instead, in City of Eastlake, the Court categorizes a homogeneous
suburb's enactment of a mandatory, super-majority, automatic-referendum
mechanism for changes in zoning laws that would allow multiple-unit dwellings
to be a generic referendum having no racial impact.462 The Court does not
acknowledge that a super-majority referendum for low-cost housing makes it
less likely that such projects will be sited in a homogeneous affluent community.
Instead, the Court affirms what we already know: that this initiative is neutral on
454 See id.
455 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1966).
456 393 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Here, I think the Court needs to control itself,
and not, as it is doing, encroach on a State's powers to repeal its old laws when it decides to do
so.").
457 387 U.S. at 395 (Black 3., joining Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Reitman is
"constitutionally unsound" and overly broad).
458 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1970) ('The Court held that the
amendment created a classification based upon race because it required that laws dealing with
racial housing matters could take effect only if they survived a mandatory referendum while
other housing ordinances took effect without any such special election.").
4 5 9 Id.
460 See id. at 141 ('The Article requires referendum approval for any low-rent public
housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority. And the
record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact
aimed at a racial minority.').
461 See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
462 See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1975).
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its face, and delves no further.463 To bolster this weak thinking, Justice Burger
cites to Justice Black's eulogy of direct democracy cited above and affirms that
the "people of Eastlake" properly have such lawmaking power.4 4
In the end, as Professors Sunstein 465 and Michelman 466 explain, the only
principled explanation we are left with is that Hunter and Reitman are sui generis
cases because they involve an impact and a right-racial discrimination in
housing. Therefore, referendums and initiatives that grant to majority individuals
the direct power to deny a minority individual housing for whatever reason,
including an arbitrary reason, may be seen as laws that will directly sanction
racial discrimination4 67 On the other hand, racial impacts are less clear and
direct in Valtierra and City of Eastlake because land use decisions can be
motivated by both rational economic decisionmaking, such as the desire to
protect property values,468 and social values, such as the desire to maintain
community cohesion4 69 In these contexts, motivations are plural and mixed, and
4 63 See id. at 677-79.
464 See id. at 679; see also supra note 383.
465 See Sunstein, PubliaPrivate, supra note 391, at 149-50 (calling Hunter a quasi-racial
classification case).
466 See generally Michelman, supra note 391 (describing Hunter and Reitman as
following a political social model and Valtierra and City of Eastlake as implicitly electing an
economic model).
467 This point is made clearly by Reitman, which indirectly validates the Shelley k.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947), thinking that a state action can "encourage" discrimination. Cf
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 369, 373 n.4 (1967) ('The trial court ... placed major reliance
on Shelley ... ."). Relying on Shelley v. Kraemer, the California Supreme Court had argued
that to let such a constitutional initiative stand would involve the state's sanction of private
racial discrimination and would sanction and encourage racial discrimination in housing. See
id. at 377 ('Those practicing racial discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal
choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority, free from censure... ."); id. at
381 ('The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State.... [T]he section
[in this case] will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations.").
The Court also finds state officials would become participants in "racial discrimination in the
housing market," because Proposition 14 would make the proscription of fair housing laws part
of the California constitution. See id.; see also id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring) (analyzing
Proposition 14 as a "sophisticated discrimination whereby the people of California harness the
energies of private groups to do indirectly what they cannot under [Shelley]").
4 68 An earlier Ninth Circuit case, Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), involving facts similar to Valtierra, draws this distinction
clearly. See id. at 295.
4 69 Communities are by definition homogeneous, bringing together people of like values,
ways of thinking, and life styles. See generally James W. Torke, What Price Belonging: An
Essay on Groups, Community and the Constitution, 24 IND. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1990) (arguing
that these benefits of community may only be possible in the context of smaller, naturally
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racially discriminatory motivations may still exist, but they are less clear. Thus,
even though Valtierra and City of Eastlake both have strong racial impact, they
do not reach the level for the Court to find a constitutional wrong.
Although this explanation ties together the loose ends that these cases create,
this explanation does not build a coherent doctrine.470 Courts must be able to
articulate principled reasons as to why in some cases they will honor the political
outcome, even when it is exclusionary and has a racial impact, while in others it
will veto minority exclusion. Without explanation as to its choice, the Court's
opinions lack legitimacy and guidance.
4. Traditional Three-Tiered Review
Under the familiar class-category approach,471 measures addressed to
protected classes merit strict scrutiny, while most categorizations are only
subjected to "rational basis" review.472 Gender requires intermediate review.473
Where strict scrutiny is applied it is very powerful, dooming most
categorizations to which it is applied.474 However, only groups that are "discrete
occurring communities).
470 Some commentators have found Valtierra's reasoning wrong and unprincipled. See,
e.g., Bell, supra note 82, at 4 ("[J]udicial obsequiousness is not justified .... [TJhe poor may
be permitted a measure of bitter confusion ... ).
471 The recent gender cases, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and the most recent initiative case,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), can be understood as arguing for a new approach that
blends the hard edges of tiered review. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 76-79 (1996) (suggesting that
the Court is moving increasingly towards blended scrutiny). This blending concept was first
floated in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing, and Government Interests, in PUBLIC
VALUES IN CoNsTImoNAL LAW 241-66 (Stephen Gottlieb ed. 1993) (analyzing tiered review
and balancing approaches).
472 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
473 Gender is the prime example. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). For more recent cases, see Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (holding that gender classification cases "must carry the burden of
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' that the classification serves "'important
govemmental objectives"' (citations omitted)); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523-24
(applying Hogan's intermediate review standard to place on the state the burden of showing
"exceedingly persuasive justification" that gender classifications served a legitimate state
purpose).
474 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (stating strict
scrutiny for racial classifications is not always "fatal," but requiring state action to satisfy the
"narrow tailoring" test); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-34 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
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and insular," that historically have been treated unequally, that have an
immutable characteristic, or that are politically powerless merit the Court's strict
scrutiny.475 Strict scrutiny is to be applied to race,476 national origin,477 and
alienage classifications. 478 However, the Court has been reluctant to expand
these categories. 479
Although the early initiatives and referendums targeted racial minorities,
which is the paradigmatic protected class, the current wave of
ideological/cultural initiatives and referendums impact groups that have not
typically been found to be protected classes: cultural and language minorities,
gay men and lesbians, and illegal immigrants. 480 The Court has never expressly
ruled on the question of whether, because of the tie to racial/ethnic status,
language minorities are a suspect class, and it did decline to make such a ruling
in Hernndez v. New York 48 1 With respect to homosexuality, the Court,
dissenting) ("[R]acial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis... and because
classifications based on race are potentially so harmful ... [courts must require] any such
classification to be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate"); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944).
4 75 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.");
see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (setting forth the
relevant characteristics of class "suspectness" and rejecting poverty as such classification).
4 76 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
4 77 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (requiring strict scrutiny of national origin
classifications, but finding that national security concerns overrode national origin
discrimination concerns).
4 78 See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
47 9 See City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,435 (1985) (stating
that mental disability is not a suspect class); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (finding
that illegal aliens are not a suspect class); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (determining
that illegitimate status is not a suspect class); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976)
(finding that gender is not a suspect class); cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1970)
(stating that low income status is not a suspect class).
480 See supra Part mII.B.2.
481 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991). In Herndndez, the Court declined to extend Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to prohibit peremptory challenges of Latinos who spoke and
understood Spanish. See Herndndez, 500 U.S. at 352. The Court acknowledged that Spanish-
speaking ability was correlated with belonging to a Latino community. See id. at 370.
Moreover, the Court found that the Herndndez holding might decrease the number of Latino
jurors. See id. at 363. Nonetheless, the Court declined to connect Spanish-speaking ability to
ethnicity and, thus, found that the facts and circumstances before it did not warrant a finding
that the prosecutor had intended to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. See id. at 371-72. For
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similarly, has not explicitly ruled whether gay men and lesbians should be
deemed "discrete and insular" and thus merit protected class status. The
argument for protected status was put forward in Bowers v. Hardwick,482 but the
Court neither adopted nor rejected it.4 83 Nor did Romer v. Evans,484 the most
recent Supreme Court case on initiatives, reach this issue. Although the Court's
"rational basis" review was more engaged and led it to invalidate Colorado's
Amendment 2, this analysis was not triggered by the status of gay men and
lesbians as a protected class.485 Finally, the Court explicitly ruled in Plyler v.
Doe486 that illegal immigrant status did not constitute a suspect class. Thus, if
scholarly critiques of the Court's analysis, see Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the
Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1997) (arguing that adopting
English-only rules in the workplace constitutes a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination on
the basis of national origin); Juan F. Perea, Hemasndez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and
the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1992) (criticizing equal protection doctrine's
inability to address language differences); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The
Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761 (arguing that
Herndndez was wrongly decided).
482 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986).
483 Instead, Hardwick stands for the proposition that legislation selectively applied to gay
men, such as the criminal sodomy statute at issue, merits deferential rational basis review. See
id. at 196.
484 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
485 Rather, as will be discussed, the Court engaged in what it described as rational basis
minimal scrutiny review to determine whether the state could establish a legitimate purpose.
See id. at 631. Although the purpose review was triggered by judicial concem as to why this
"unpopular" group had been selected for "unprecedented" disfavored treatment, the Court did
not go so far as to find homosexuals to be a suspect class. See id. at 631-34; infra Part IV.C.6;
infra Part V.B.I.a. Commentators have provided various explanations as to the standard of
review applied in Romer v. Evans. See Akhil Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer'
Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203, 203 (1996) (arguing that the Attainder Clause clarifies and
illuminates Romer because this clause protects groups from public stigmatization through the
use of law); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 329-34 (1997) (arguing that Romer is an example of illegitimate purpose scrutiny
"[dependent] on the constitutional provision at issue," and that in Romer what was illegitimate
was that the motivation behind Amendment 2 was to "creat[e] classes among citizens"); Daniel
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 257, 264 (1996)
(explaining that the Court's invocation of minimal scrutiny was an accurate description of the
level of review, and that what was unique was that in Romer the majority "single[d] out a
group for pariah status"); Sunstein, supra note 471, at 76-79 (connecting Romer with
Cleburne).
486 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). The Court reasoned that because this group had voluntarily
acquired such a status, and because it was rational for the government to discriminate against
persons who violated U.S. borders, illegal immigrants were not insular and discrete as required
to establish protected class status. See id. at 223. Plyler held, nonetheless, that because a child
of an illegal immigrant is not 'responsible for his birth and penalizing the... child is an
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tiered analysis were employed to democratic initiatives and referendums, courts
would typically apply the rational basis test, as the Sixth Circuit did in Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.4 8 7 (anti-gay civil rights), or, at best,
intermediate scrutiny review, as the federal district court did in Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson48 8 (Proposition 209). If rational basis review is
applied, the challenged initiative is likely to be upheld.
Even more important, the suspect class analysis is too narrow because it is
based on static group concepts. 489 If the concern is to discourage careless use of
stereotypes and state actions that implicitly stigmatize or expressly discriminate,
then a characteristic-based class approach of equal protection doctrine is
appropriate.490 Yet, the majority-minority conflict cases are not about a state
actor's legitimization and reinforcement of social discriminatory norms. Rather,
majority-minority direct democracy conflicts raise another set of concems-that
the democratic process has gone too far in marginalizing, excluding, or "venting"
prejudice against a minority. Protected class analysis is not well suited to
addressing this set of concerns.
In addition, the protected class analysis is overly broad when applied to
direct democracy measures. The problem of over-inclusion lies in the difficulty
of distinguishing those electoral losses for a protected class that should raise a
constitutional concern from those losses that are inevitably part of pluralist
politics. Under the mathematics of "majority wins" democracy, minorities will
be the losing parties in every electoral contest where the initiative is framed so
that the interests of minorities and majorities are pitted against each other. In
cases where the losing minority is a protected class, if the Court were to apply
ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent,"' states may not bar children of
illegal immigrants from enrollment in local public schools. Id. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
487 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying deferential review), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
365 (1998).
488 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (applying intermediate review because
affirmative action programs cover gender).
489 Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that anonymous and diffuse groups merit
greater scrutiny than "discrete and insular" groups, the test which the Court applies to
determine which groups merit protected class review. See Ackerman, supra note 411.
Ackerman argues that anonymous and diffuse groups are less able to be an identifiable and
cohesive political cohort that can parlay their minority numbers into meaningful participation
in the give and take of plural politics. See id. at 722-3 1. As an example, gay men and lesbians
are anonymous in that many would stay "in the closet" as a rational response to dominant
societal norms that stigmatize homosexuals and sanction certain types of discrimination. Gay
men and lesbians are not insular because they largely co-exist in majority communities, albeit
anonymously.
490 See supra notes 474-79 and accompanying text.
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"fatal in fact," strict scrutiny review, courts could use their judicial authority to
enable minorities to win through judicial edicts every result that they had been
unable to achieve in the political process.491
Such a result would be damaging to the democratic process and would also
jeopardize the legitimacy of any minority "win." As the Court stated in the Civil
Rights Cases, "there must be some stage in the progress of [a former slave's]
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special
favorite of the laws."492 The Court misapprehended the depth and entrenchment
of racial ideologies and erroneously construed "mere [private] discriminations"
as inconsequential to race relations.493 However, the Court was correct in
pronouncing that the legitimacy of the concept of co-equal citizenship requires
that the judiciary be able to articulate a clear constitutional principle that justifies
judicial intervention on behalf of minorities. The democratic process is
structured to respect majorities' victories, and wholesale invalidation of the
democratic process would be an over broad interpretation, as well as an
unsustainable result.494 In direct democracy politics, minorities should not "win"
in courts what electoral politics would dictate that they lose-unless there is a
violation of a constitutional principle.
5. Protecting Fundamental Rights
Constitutional common law has carved out certain "fundamental rights"
based on the Court's deductive reasoning of what rights are required by the
nation's traditions and the foundational principles of a democratic polity.495
Recognized fundamental rights include the right of privacy,4 96 procreation,4 97
491 For example, if a protected group voted to keep stores open 24 hours a day, and if the
majority opposed such a measure, the courts would have to reverse the vote to provide the
protected group with what they wanted.
492 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
493 See id. at 25.
494 See Brilmayer, supra note 411, at 1307 (stating that democratic processes do not fail
when majorities win; rather, in terms of democratic values, "the democratic process work[s]');
Tribe, supra note 411, at 1073 (arguing that process theory must determine "[w]hich are
instead to be deemed appropriate losers in the ongoing struggle for political acceptance and
ascendancy").
49 5 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (describing fundamental
rights as those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed"); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (defining fundamental rights as those liberties "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
4 96 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,483-86 (1965).
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and family association. 498 Where fundamental rights are impinged, courts must
conduct a "strict scrutiny" of the measure that is impinging those rights.499 The
Court generally construes fundamental rights narrowly.500
Fundamental rights analysis has been prominent in several of the modem
cases dealing with majority-minority initiatives. Specifically, several courts have
addressed the question of whether Hunter establishes a "fundamental right" to
equal political access that requires strict judicial review. Also, the Arizona
Supreme Court recently has examined English-only measures using a
"fundamental right" to choice of language derived from the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause.
a. Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process
In Hunter, the Court stated that the political process, when modified by a
majority-enacted referendum or initiative, cannot place special burdens on
minority groups:
Like the law requiring specification of candidates' race on the ballot [such an
impermissible initiative] places special burden on racial minorities .... This is
no more permissible than denying them the vote on an equal basis with
others.... [A referendum or initiative] may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation on its behalf than it may
dilute any person's vote .... 501
The Court echoed this approach in Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1, stating that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when "the political process
or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious
legislation-and only such legislation-is singled out for particular and
disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly 'rests on distinctions
based on race."' 502
497 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,452-55 (1972).
49 8 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
49 9 See supra notes 495-98.
500 See Bowers v. Haidwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("Nor are we inclined to take a
more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights. ..
501 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391, 393 (1969) (citing Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960)).
502 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1981) (citations omitted); see also id. at 480 n.23 (responding to
Justice Powell's dissent, the Court states that the reason the Seattle initiative is found
inconstitutional is because of "the comparative burden it imposes on minority participation in
he political process-that is, the racial nature of the way in which it structures the process of
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Romer I and Romer H,50 3 the Colorado Supreme Court decisions
invalidating that state's anti-gay civil rights initiatives504 interpreted Hunter and
Seattle School District No. 1 to establish a "fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process" whenever direct democracy legislation attempts
to "fenc[e] out" an identifiable class of persons5 05 Romer I located the right of
participation in the Hunter Court's citations of vote dilution cases and in Justice
Harlan's neutral process principle.50 6 Romer H, in addition, articulated that this
right is implicit in the right to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, a right that the Framers intended would apply to all states under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.507 This right to assemble and petition was
said to be impinged by Amendment 2 because the terms of the constitutional
amendment would effectively deny gay men and lesbians the right to participate
in the political process to petition the legislature and local bodies for redress
from discrimination.508 The Colorado Supreme Court then applied strict scrutiny
to Amendment 2 and invalidated it.509 The U.S. Supreme Court, without
ratifying the Colorado Court's Romer I and I fundamental rights-compelling
decisionmaking").
503 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (Romer II); Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en bane) (Romer 1); see also Equality Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1238-41 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding
fundamental right in the political process), rev'd, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997). See generally
Daniel J. Garfield, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-
only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690 (1995) (arguing for aright to an undistorted political
process).
504 Amendment 2 provided as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, reprinted in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,624 (1996).
505 See Romer , 854 P.2d at 1282.
506 See id. at 1278-82; Garfield, supra note 503, at 723 (concluding from analysis of
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), that"the
Equal Protection Clause promotes an equal political process and equal citizenship").
507 See Romer II, 882 P.2d at 1354.
509 See id; see also Romer I, 854 P.2d at 1279-80.
509 SeeRomer, 854 P.2d at 1282-84.
[Vol. 60:399
99INITIAVTIES AND REFERENDUMS
interest analysis, incorporated into its decision the idea that majorities may not
restructure democratic processes to disadvantage an unpopular group.510
b. Fundamental Right to Choice ofLanguage
The Arizona Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit (in a decision rendered
moot by the U.S. Supreme Court) have each used fundamental rights analysis to
invalidate the same Arizona English-only constitutional initiative. Both courts
drew from the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause to establish a
fundamental right to choice of language in communicating with government. The
Ninth Circuit's Yfiguez v. Arizonans for Official English51 1 interpreted
Arizona's English-only amendment to proscribe communications between public
employees in languages other than English, even with non-English and non-
proficient English speakers, as well as to limit the manner in which elected
officials could communicate with their constituents. 512 It found that, although
states have a legitimate purpose in promoting civic cohesiveness through the use
of English, the First Amendment restricts how far a state can go, and held that
the benefits claimed did not outweigh the burdens imposed on the First
Amendment.513 The Ninth Circuit also found a "close and meaningful proxy,"
5 10 See infra Part V.B. The Supreme Court found that the Amendment 2 legislation
imparted to gay men and lesbians a class status that is disadvantageous because Amendment 2
changes the content of gay men's and lesbians' "ordinary civic life in a free society." Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). If Amendment 2 stands, to obtain anti-discrimination
legislation, they would have to "enlist[ ] the citizenry of Colorado" to enjoy what others can
take for granted, anti-discrimination safeguards, because it would require a state-wide
constitutional amendment. See id at 630.
511 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated on remand, Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). The Supreme Court determined that Yfliguez
could not satisfy the case in controversy requirement because she had resigned during the
course of the litigation. Therefore, the case had become moot. See id. at 1058.
5 12 See Yiiiguez, 69 F.3d at 932 (interpreting the language of the Amendment that made
its mandate applicable to 'the legislative, executive, and judicial branches' of both state and
local govemment, and to 'all govemment officials and employees during the performance of
government business.' §§ l(3)(a)(i), (ii), & (iv).').
5 13 See id. at 944-47. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied extensively on
two cases, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
284 (1927). Meyer is a case that some would interpret broadly to protect language rights,
because it contains language regarding the fundamental language differences and the
importance of diversity. See, e.g., BILL PIATr, ONLY ENGLISH? 37-42 (1990). Mr. Meyer, a
German language parochial school teacher in Nebraska, was convicted under a 1919 statute
that prohibited the teaching of any curriculum in any language other than English to children
beyond the eighth grade. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-98. The Court held that the statute
violated individual due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated that "[t]he
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which could potentially "mask discrimination" and "nativist sentiment," between
the overbreadth of the amendment and those who would be mostly affected-
national origin groups, particularly Latinos. 514
Similarly, in spring of 1998, after the Supreme Court had remanded the
Yfiguez litigation to state courts, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled in Ruiz v.
Hull5 15  that the Arizona English-only constitutional amendment was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. Like
the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona Court found a core First Amendment right in
citizens' ability to receive essential information from Arizona government
officials516 and, more generally, a fundamental "First Amendment right to
petition [the government] for redress of grievances. 517 Applying strict scrutiny
analysis, Ruiz held that the English-only constitutional amendment violated the
First Amendment because it was overbroad and could not meet the compelling
state interest test.518 The Arizona Court also found an equal protection violation
because Meyer establishes a "fundamental, individual right of choice of
language."519
protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to
those born with English on the tongue." Id. at 401. The Court also found that the state had
overreached in prohibiting instruction in languages other than English.
Tokushige invalidated under the Due Process Clause 1925 regulations imposed by Hawaii
territorial administrators on the foreign language schools in which virtually all of the Korean,
Chinese, and Japanese children were enrolled. See Tokushige, 273 U.S. at 290-91. The stated
purpose of the regulations was to ensure that the "Americanism of the pupils may be
promoted." Id. at 293. The regulations imposed an annual permitting fee of $1 per pupil,
required that foreign schools submit records showing students' names and addresses, and
required teachers to be "satisfied that the applicant... is possessed of the ideals of
democracy... and knows how to read, write and speak the English language." Id.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that these cases show that the State interest in promoting the
learning of English through English-only laws is a weak justification that cannot "outweigh the
burdens imposed on First Amendment rights." Yfiiguez, 69 F.3d at 945.
514 Yfliguez, 69 F.3d at 947-48 & n.33 (noting similarity of English-only with Meyer's
legislation targeting German Americans).
515 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998).
5 16 See id. at 996-97.
517 Id. at 997. Based on a broad construction of citizenship rights to access government,
the Court found that the right to "free discussion of government affairs" included the right to
communicate in the public sphere in a language other than English. See id. Although Ruiz v.
Hull invalidated the Arizona English-only amendment on First Amendment and equal
protection grounds, it declined to interpret Meyer as broadly as had the Ninth Circuit. See id. at
1001 n.13.
5 18 See id. at 999.
5 19 Id. at 1001. The amendment "violates ... guarantees of equal protection because it
impinges upon both the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process and the
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c. Critique ofFundamental Rights Approach
The fundamental rights approach applied above is appealing in many ways,
and yet it is also troubling for two important reasons. First, courts' identification
of certain rights as "fundamental" inherently seems subject to question. Why
these rights? What is their pedigree? Why these rights and not other rights?
Because it is often unclear why the courts choose to recognize certain rights as
fundamental, it is easy to fear the slippery slope. If these rights are declared as
fundamental, what may follow?
Second, the fundamental rights approach requires use of a strict standard of
review. Yet, as is well recognized, very few measures can ever survive strict
review. Such a standard of review may prove too strong when applied to
measures that have been enacted by a popular majority. Attempting to use such a
standard may undercut our faith in the democratic system or in courts' ability to
regulate this system.
Third, as Professor Kathleen Sullivan has noted, fundamental rights analysis
channels constitutional discourse into a narrow course, justifying and building
these ephemeral constitutional rights.520 When courts engage in such
"fundamental rights" analysis, they do not address the main problem in these
cases; the majority is using a democratic process to channel conflictive majority-
minority issues that are both social and political and then using their numerical
and political dominance to resolve them their way. These cases become
enmeshed in building fundamental rights that appear to be of universal
application, when in fact they arise only because there is a majority-minority
dynamic at play in a democratic process.
Finally, fundamental rights analysis is infinitely subject to judicial
manipulation, a result which, as stated previously, jeopardizes courts' legitimacy
in this highly controversial area. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,521 illustrates the
problematic nature of the fundamental rights approach. In 1991, the city of
Cincinnati enacted a broad employment anti-discrimination city charter
amendment that would have barred discrimination against gay men and lesbians,
as well as by marital status, national origin, Appalachian regional ancestry, and
persons with HIV and other handicaps. 522 By referendum, the people of
Cincinnati repealed the equal opportunity ordinance and provided that "no
special class status may be granted based upon sexual orientation, conduct or
right to petition the government for redress." Id. at 1002.
520 See Sullivan, supra note 471, at 241-66.
521 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1990).
522 See id. at 292.
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relationships.'5 23 The district court had struck down the referendum on the
ground that Hunter and Seattle School District No. 1 established a fundamental
right to political access. 524 The Sixth Circuit, even after the Supreme Court's
Romer decision, declined to use a findamental rights analysis, or any mode of
heightened analysis, to evaluate the anti-gay rights initiative.5 25 This doctrinal
finding was key, and, consequently, the Sixth Circuit easily distinguished Romer
and concluded that no significant right had been trammeled.526 Such a facile
distinction, given the Cincinnati measure's very strong similarities with
Amendment 2, gives the appearance that the court was simply hostile to gay men
and lesbians.527
Part V.B will propose an analytical approach that blends the fundamental
rights approaches described in this Part and Romer's approach that follows.
Some of the critiques I have raised here will be addressed by the analytical
framework proposed. However, whenever fundamental rights analysis is used,
there are key issues that will nonetheless remain, as will be explained.
6. Romer: Prohibiting Creation of Unequal Citizenship Status
Romer v. Evans,528 the most recent Supreme Court case on majority-
minority initiatives, is puzzling in many respects. The clearest thing about the
decision is its bottom line: striking Colorado's anti-gay rights Amendment 2.529
One other thing is clear: the Court does not base its decision on any of the
analyses discussed earlier in this section. In fact, the Court fails even to cite any
of these predecessor decisions. Although the Court applies a form of heightened
review, the Court did not base its decision on a finding that gay men and lesbians
523 Id. at 291 (quoting Issue 3, which was enacted with 62% of the ballots cast).
524 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 430-32 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The district court, later to be reversed by the Sixth Circuit, held
that the right to participate equally in the political process is a fundamental right protected by
the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
525 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, 128 F.3d at 294.
526 See infra notes 541-46 and accompanying text.
527 Another interpretation is that the circuit court appeared confused as to how to interpret
Romer v. Evans. Interestingly, in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari review, Justices
Ginsberg, Souter, and Breyer noted that Supreme Court review would be premature given the
unsettled state of case law. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365,366 (1998).
528 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
529 See id. at 621. For the text of Amendment 2, see supra note 504. As has been
discussed, this Amendment would have proscribed any local ordinances that would bar
discrimination against gay men and lesbians.
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are a suspect class. 530
The Court in Romer purports to employ minimal scrutiny review.531
However, the approach that is taken is clearly not the perfunctory scrutiny that
rational basis classifications receive in other contexts.532 Rather, the Court
applies a very close purpose review triggered by judicial concern as to why this
"unpopular 533 group had been selected for "unprecedented 534 disfavored
treatment. 535 Pursuant to this review, the Court concluded that Amendment 2
served no legitimate state purpose and that, absent such a purpose, the
"inevitable inference [is] that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected." 536 '[A] bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group"' cannot be supported by "conventional" review
requiring a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.537 Such a
measure further violates the Equal Protection Clause, which forbids "class
530 See supra notes 484-85 and accompanying text.
531 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 ("[W]e will uphold the legislative classification so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end .... Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies,
even this conventional inquiry." (citation omitted)).
5 32 Commentators have provided various explanations as to whether the standard of
review applied in Romer v. Evans was actually the minimal scrutiny that the Court claims to
have applied. See supra note 485.
533 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
534 Id. at 633.
535 The Court underscores its concern with the unequal treatment afforded to gay men
and lesbians by opening the opinion with a quote from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson: "[T]he Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."' Id. at 623
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The Court
constructs Amendment 2 as potentially imposing far-reaching, "unprecedented disadvantage"
on gay men and lesbians in three significant ways: (1) Amendment 2 singles out gay men and
lesbians as a "solitary class" because it prevents them from petitioning their local government
and state legislature for legislation barring discrimination, see id. at 627, even though such
local ordinances have proven critical in the protection of gay rights; (2) Amendment 2 imposes
an absolute legal disability on gay men and lesbians, see id. at 629-30, because it "withdr[ew]
from homosexuals, but not others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination." Id. at 627; see also id. at 631 (Amendment 2 does not permit gay men and
lesbians "safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint."); (3) Amendment 2 is
over-broad; it imposes excessive administrative burdens in making decisions because in all
decisionmaking administrators must determine whether "homosexuality is an arbitrary and thus
forbidden basis for decision." Id at 630. The Court also found that Amendment 2 reached
policies as well as legislation. Administrative decisions, such as a police department's decision
to crack down on physical gay bashing, could be subject to the proscription of the Amendment.
See id
536 Id. at 634.




Although Romer v. Evans is well decided, it leaves too much unstated.539
Why the careful purpose scrutiny review, and what is the significance of the
Court's recurring construction of gay men and lesbians as a "class"? The Court
strains to construct Amendment 2 as remarkable and unique. But the text of
Amendment 2 is not unique; it mirrors the close to forty anti-gay civil rights
initiatives and referendums that other communities have enacted. Nor is the
majority backlash occasioned by the Denver and Boulder anti-discrimination
ordinances unique to Colorado voters. Furthermore, the Court fails to make sense
of the important prior case law-Hunter, Reitman, Seattle School District No.
1-never citing any of these cases for doctrinal purposes. Neither does the Court
attempt to reconcile Bowers v. Hardwick's very deferential review of Georgia's
sodomy statute with the close scrutiny that the Court applies in Romer.540 The
Court failed to clarify the most bare doctrinal outlines of how courts should
resolve in the future similar initiatives and referendums that embody majority-
minority conflicts.
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Romer v. Evans in Equality Foundation
of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati54 1 again illustrates the
importance of the Court having failed to articulate why gay men and lesbians in
the context of Amendment 2 received a more careful judicial review. As
discussed above, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, neither
Romer v. Evans nor the court's own construction of the Cincinnati referendum
required that the court subject the referendum to any form of heightened
scrutiny.542 The Sixth Circuit distinguished Romer v. Evans relatively easily.
538 See id. at 635.
539 The result in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati is
not an application of Professor Sunstein's "leaving things undecided" thesis. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 382; Sunstein, Public/Private, supra note 391. Revoking anti-discrimination
protections for, at best, "unpopular," and, at worst, sometimes hated, minorities is not "leaving
things undecided." Rather, the court has failed to perform a basic judicial function in a pluralist
democracy, ensuring that majoritarian actions do not diminish minorities' minimum safeguards
and rights under constitutional law. See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note
17, at 230-31.
540 Compare Marc A. Fajer, Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and the Meaning of
Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 2 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 208 (1996), available at
(visited Mar. 8, 1999) <http://www.sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw> (arguing that Bowers did not
apply in Romer because, contrary to Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, Romer dealt with a
denial on the basis of status of basic civil rights accorded members of the polity), with Thomas
C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 373 (1997) (arguing that
Romer overrules Bowers v. Hardwick because these cases are inconsistent).
541 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
542 See id. at 293 (noting that no suspect class status or fundamental right was involved).
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First, the Cincinnati ordinance was not as far reaching because it limited itself to
proscribing "special class status" for gay men and lesbians. This meant,
according to the circuit court, that only gay men and lesbians could not be
included as beneficiaries of affirmative action programs.543 As to the more
problematic repeal of anti-discrimination protections, the Court observed that
anti-discrimination protection for homosexuals was a "special privilege,"
contrary to the Romer Court's observation that access to appeal for anti-
discrimination legislation was a basic democratic process avenue that all
minority groups should enjoy. Moreover, the circuit court stated that Romer's
rational basis review standard made "public discrimination... permissible... as
long as such official discrimination is rationally related to some valid public
interest."544 The stated public interest was "to preserve community values and
character,545 the very same purpose that the proponents of Amendment 2 had
set forth. 46 In short, because the Supreme Court in Romer failed to adequately
set out the basis for its decision, the Sixth Circuit was able to reach a contrary
result on virtually identical facts. Much more is needed if courts are to be able to
deal with the fractious political issues posed by majority-minority initiatives and
referendums.
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE JUDICIAL APPROACH
The essential idea is that deliberative democracy... require[s] that reasons
[given for public decisions, such as voting] be consistent with citizens' mutual
recognition as equals .... While the conditions of a constitutional democracy
tend to force groups to advocate more compromising and reasonable views if
they are to be influential, the mix of views and reasons in a vote in which
citizens lack awareness of such guidelines may easily lead to injustice, even
though the outcome of the procedure is legitimate .... It is part of the citizens'
sense of themselves, not only collectively but also individually, to recognize
political authority as deriving from them and that they are responsible for what it
543 See id. at 296.
544 Id. at 297 n.8. It is telling that the Sixth Circuit deals with the most problematic aspect
of the referendum in a footnote. See id.
545 Id. at 297. I do not wish to appear to be dismissive of the culturally conservative
majority's concern that greater tolerance of gay men and lesbians in the public domain could
compromise conservative cultural values. My criticism is that the circuit court treated these
very important issues at a very superficial level.
546 This is clear in the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (Romer I1), which forms part of the record. The Colorado
Supreme Court addresses the contentions of petitioners that Amendment 2 promotes family




does in their names .... [O]ur considered judgments ... such as the condemned
institutions of slavery and serfdom, religious persecution, the subjection of the
working classes, the oppression of women... stand in the background as
substantive checks showing the illusory character of any allegedly purely
procedural ideas of legitimacy and political justice.
John Rawls 547
The case has been made in Part II that direct democracy is an important and
vital vehicle of political expression. It acts as a check on legislatures and
representatives that may have become too entrenched and disconnected from
those who they are supposed to represent. Direct democracy is also a vehicle by
which the electorate can send messages to their representatives stating that the
way that they are conducting the business of government does not meet with the
voters' approval.548 Sometimes, for better or worse, direct democracy broaches
subjects that have been taboo with representatives.5 49 Lastly, direct democracy is
viewed by the people of major Western states as being a vital institution of their
civic expression.550 For these reasons, the institution of direct democracy has a
place in democratic lawmaking.
Nonetheless, direct democracy has an underside that has always been
troubling. Politics, by its nature, is often heated, controversial, and contested.
Part II has shown how direct democracy can evoke intergroup strife, feelings of
resentment, anxiety over social change, and even prejudice in its rawest form.
Sometimes these results are brought about purposefully and through the
manipulation efforts of a handful of people. When these intergroup conflicts
combine with ballot box lawmaking, direct democracy has the potential to
seriously damage a civic fabric already frayed by the ongoing political conflicts
of a polity undergoing fundamental changes. This social and political context
places a great deal of pressure on the courts. However, Part IV has shown that
the Court's approach in this very important area is inconsistent and incoherent,
thereby also leaving courts vulnerable to the charge that they are "thwarting the
will of the people."
This Part outlines an alternative coherent and principled approach, arguing
that the Court should skeptically review those direct democracy initiatives that
547 RAWLS, supra note 28, at 430-31.
548 This was said to be the reason that motivated Proposition 13. See supra notes 60-65
and accompanying text. See generally Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1347, 1350 (1985) (arguing that direct democracy is an important indirect check on
legislatures, even when not successful).
549 Both term limits and affirmative action are said to be such examples. See
IssACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 672.
550 See supra Part II.
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impinge on minorities' citizenship rights. This proposal is not entirely new.
Professor Eule has advocated a rule of skepticism based on arguments that direct
democracy does not provide the necessary structural filters and that the
deliberative process is lacking.551 Professor Bell has also argued that because
"the initiative and referendum may operate as a nonracial facade covering
distinctly discriminatory measure.... The evidence... justifies a heightened
scrutiny of ballot legislation .... -"552
Yet, as Professor Charlow observes, commentators have not yet formulated
a convincing case for why such heightened review of direct democracy is
necessary, nor how it should be conducted.5 53 After all, democratic actors within
the representative processes, like individual voters, may also fail to act
conscientiously, dispassionately, and deliberatively.5 54 The remainder of this
Part attempts to meet this challenge. Part V.A justifies why heightened review is
necessary. Part V.B then elaborates how the review should be conducted and
argues that while the results of many of the Supreme Court's decisions are
correct, the Court's analyses are more comprehensible and more consistent when
examined in terms of citizenship impact. It further suggests that some of the
Court's cases may have been incorrectly decided. Finally, Part V.C applies this
test to some of the most recent and most controversial initiatives.
A. The Equal Protection Clause and Conflicts Between Majorities and
Minorities
1. Majority-Minority Conflicts and Theories ofEqual Protection
In order to formulate a standard for reviewing direct democracy measures
under the Equal Protection Clause, one must first focus on what values this
clause is intended to protect, and what functions it is designed to serve.
551 See Eule, supra note 27, at 1558 ("[Tjhe judiciary must compensate for process
defects. It must serve as the first line of defense for minority interest; a backup is no longer
adequate. The absence of structural safeguards demands that the judge take a harder look.").
Professor Eule argues that representatives are more likely to engage in rational deliberation. See
id. at 1525-30, 1550-56. Deliberation acts as a filter because "[p]ublic debate among those of
equal status and eloquence thus ultimately leads to a realization of the common good." Id. at
1527.
552 Bell, supra note 82, at 23. Professor Gunn also advocates an "automatic heightened
level of scrutiny when lawmaking procedures deprive minority groups of fundamental
safeguards." Gunn, supra note 88, at 158.
553 See Charlow, supra note 98, at 607-08 (noting that advocates of heightened scrutiny
fail to justify %vhy those; what oversight; and why that particular oversight"); Tushnet, supra
note 98, at 373-76 (remaining unconvinced).
554 Professor Baker makes this point most cogently. See Baker, supra note 98, at 738-50.
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Commentators and courts have offered at least three alternative visions. One
approach views the Equal Protection Clause as embodying no independent
values other than a concern that lawmakers employ classifications that bear a
"rational relationship" to the stated legislative goals.555 Taken literally, such an
approach would prevent courts from performing virtually any meaningful review
of legislative or popular actions. It is easy to justify virtually any action using
such an analysis.
According to the second approach, the Equal Protection Clause is concerned
with proscribing discrimination against protected classes.556 For example,
Professor Ely's process theory557 and United States v. Carolene Products Co.'s
footnote four,558 argue for higher scrutiny wherever there is "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities."559 Professor Ely observes that lawmakers do not
always represent minorities' interests because prejudice is a lens that prevents
rational thinking and empathetic understanding.560 Ely explains that the
dynamics of prejudice can break down democratic norms because prejudice
"provides the 'majority of the whole' with that 'common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens' that Madison believed improbable in a pluralistic
society."561 Part IlI showed that a wide variety of kinds of "prejudices," from
homophobia to racial resentment, could be said to have motivated voters.
However, Professor Ackerman and others have convincingly shown this
second approach is both too narrow and too broad.562 Process theory calls upon
the judge not only to decide which groups are "discrete and insular," but also to
establish what is "prejudice," to make judgments about what kinds of prejudice
count, and to determine why such prejudice is harmful to a particular minority
555See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, [equal protection] confers no
substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties.' (footnote omitted)). See generally
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341
(1949).
5 56 The anti-discrimination principle, which constitutional scholars locate as originating
in a line of cases connecting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and ultimately Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), stands for the proposition that the Constitution proscribes discrimination based on
classifications and other decisions that depend on race. See generally Paul Brest, The Supreme
Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1976).
557 See supra notes 392-93.
558 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
559 Id.
560 See ELY, supra note 392, at 77-88.
561 Id. at 153 (quoting THE FEDERALIsTNO. 51 (James Madison)).
562 See Ackerman, supra note 411, at 713.
[Vol. 60:399
9NITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS
and the democratic process. These are substantive judgments. 563 Part III has
shown not only that social scientists are unable to make such findings without
controversy, but also that "prejudice," as understood by the experts, is pervasive
and potentially infects every aspect of democratic lawmaking. Thus, the
exception for "prejudice" can swallow up the rule that judges should defer to
democratic lawmaking. For the same sets of reasons, it is vain to attempt to
distinguish between measures using an "intent" analysis.
The third position, and the one at the core of this argument, is that the Equal
Protection Clause embodies foundational norms that safeguard the democratic
process and the values of a democratic polity.564 One adherent of this view,
Professor Sunstein, has focused on the tension between constitutional values and
the factionalism of pluralist politics. Sunstein suggests that a central function of
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses is to provide a check on the give
and take of pluralist politics because republican lawmaking requires that laws be
the product of deliberation.565 That is, both clauses embody a norm that
constrains "raw exercises of power" and "naked preferences" and requires that
laws promote, instead, some public value.5 66
563 See id. at 740 ("If Carolene somehow hoped to find a shortcut around this substantive
inquiry into constitutional values, its journey was fated to fail from the outset The difference
between the things we call 'prejudice' and the things we call 'principle' is in the end a
substantive moral difference. And if the courts are authorized to protect the victims of certain
'prejudices,' it can only be because the Constitution has placed certain normative judgments
beyond the pale of legitimacy.").
5 64 See GUN=-ER & SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 840-41 (delineating this approach); cf.
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 1-8 (arguing that the Constitution is concerned with the
politics of democracy and that voting rights, vote dilution, and citizen participation cases are
concerned with preventing the undue manipulation of democratic processes); Balkin, supra
note 341, at 2315 (describing status conflict as ongoing condition that the Equal Protection
Clause must address); Schacter, Romer and Democracy, supra note 30, at 397-405 (arguing
that equal protection is concerned with the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the
democratic sphere).
565 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985-1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences];
Sunstein, Public/Private, supra note 391.
566 See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 565, at 50-51 (what violates constitutional
norms is "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely
on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain governmental
assistance"); see also Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 565, at 1689. Sunstein explains
that equal protection and due process review ensure that legislative political outcomes are
"rational," and that the legislative process is not subverted to benefit one single faction. See
Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 565, at 49 ('The core demand of the equal protection and
due process clauses, for example, is that measures taken by legislatures or administrators must
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John Rawls provides another normative framework based on democratic
political values. For Rawls, judicial review ensures that laws, whether products
of legislatures or direct democracy, reflect the fundamental values of the
people.567 As the passage at the beginning of this Part indicates, the Court should
ensure that, in the give and take of pluralist politics, voters do not enact laws that
do not give a good account of themselves. 568 Instead, in making law through
initiatives, referendums, or the legislative process, we must observe the
foundational democratic principles of co-equality and co-participation. Rawls
defines these as among the minimum conditions that free individuals would
choose for themselves in a democratic polity with no pre-commitment to any
system of justice.569
Professor Martha Minow's "relational approach" improvises on the political
participation approach to equal protection. Minow focuses not on rights, but on
how constitutional norms construct relations between distinct groups, majorities
and minorities. She explains that majorities and minorities will hold different
comprehensive ideologies and will understand the world from fundamentally
divergent perspectives because each group will form knowledge from a different
social experience. 570 She argues that the Equal Protection Clause should focus
be 'rational' ... The rationality requirement may... be understood... as a requirement that
regulatory measures be something other than a response to political pressure."). Like Ely,
Sunstein draws richly from James Madison's Federalist No. 51. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 51
(James Madison) ("[A] republic must guard the society against the oppression of one part of
the society against the injustice of the other parts. If a majority be united by a common interest,
the rights of the minority will be insecure.").
567 Rawls explains this concept as follows:
[The Court] must be, and appear to be, interpreting the same constitution in view of what
they see as the relevant parts of the political conception and in good faith believe it can be
defended as such. The court's role as the highest judicial interpreter of the constitution
supposes that the political conceptions judges hold and their views of constitutional
essentials locate the central range of the basic freedoms in more or less the same place. In
these cases ... its decisions succeed in settling the most fundamental political questions.
RAWLS, supra note 28, at 237.
568 See supra note 547 and accompanying text.
569 As in any philosophical work, the beginning premises are key to understanding the
value judgements implicit in Rawls's model. Rawls argues that political power emanates from
free and equal citizens, who are rational and reasonable. See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 135-36.
Each citizen is due respect and equal dignity as a co-equal member of the polity. In closed
systems, political power must be exercised in a way that secures the cooperation of individuals
over generations. See id. at 137. Only if the state respects the reasonable and rational positions
of all participants can the state secure their social cooperation required for a closed system to
remain stable over the long run. See id. at 35.
570 See MINOW, supra note 28; Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-
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on building connectedness among such groups.
In my own prior work, Democracy and Inclusion, I have attempted to blend
these approaches by incorporating Rawls's constructs of co-equality and co-
participation into Minow's relational model.5 71 When a democratic polity is
made up of diverse groups, or, as defined here, multiple majorities and
minorities, agreement on fundamental issues will be inherently difficult.
Therefore, such a polity must elaborate rules for long-term co-existence that
accepts, as a given, fundamental cognitive and value differences and anticipates
ongoing conflict. As Rawls puts it, the principles of co-equality and co-
participation obligate participants to be bound by a norm, which Rawls calls
"reciprocity," 572 to constrain public discourse. This norm ensures that those who
are different and will likely disagree can continue long-term co-existence.573 In
the context of constitutional principles, these should be formulated to ensure that
no particular minority's, or majority's, way of knowing or value systems are
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). Minow describes her own work
as the "social relations approach.' She explains that the relational approach:
emphasize[s] the basic connectedness between people and the injuries that result from
social isolation and exclusion. The relational focus also assists an understanding of
difference as a function of comparisons between people... [and] rejects distinctions
drawn between people which express or confirm the distribution of power in ways that
harm the less powerful. [Its] roots ... [are] in [examining] relationships rather
than.., discrete items .... I have been most helped by the elaboration... [of] [fleminist
work [that] shows the power of connections, alongside distinctions ....
MINOW, supra note 28, at 379-80. Frank Michelman's model of civic republicanism also
contains these elements. He argues that the law should constantly seek to include "the
other.., the hitherto excluded." Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1529
(1980).
571 See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 17, at 206-32. Rawls's work
assumes a model of pluralist polity. He presupposes that participants in society will always
disagree because incompatible philosophies are the natural result of human reason. See RAWvLS,
supra note 28, at xviii; see also id. at 36 ("[D]iversity of reasonable comprehensive...
doctrines found in modem societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away;
it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy.").
572 See RAVLS, supra note 28, at 17 ("[R]eciprocity is a relation between free and equal
citizens in a well ordered society."); see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIs THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 73 (1996) ("A deliberative disagreement is one in which
citizens continue to differ about basic moral principles even though they seek a resolution that
is mutually justifiable.").
573 According to Rawls, complex pluralist societies do not necessarily reach certainty or
"truths." But if pluralist societies engage in public reason according to principles of reciprocity,
then they can reach "overlapping consensus"--reasonably compatible ideas about justice. See
RAWLS, supra note 28, at xlvii, 39-40.
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imposed on others as constitutional norms. This requires that the Court not
formulate unduly broad principles; but, at the same time, it requires that the
Court vigorously intervene and protect minority rights to ensure their ongoing
inclusion in the formulation of the polity's values.
Each of these models of democratic co-equality and co-participation offer
courts a powerful tool with which to regulate constitutional discourse. Courts are
responsible for ensuring that majority-minority conflicts will take place within a
legal discourse that ensures that each person, minority or majority, preserves a
relationship and understanding of the other's significance to the long-term
welfare of the polity as a whole.5 74 When the majority exercises raw power with
respect to a minority, the majority imposes its "truth," epistemology, or
comprehensive view on a co-equal co-participant and, thus, oppresses that
minority. 575 Long-term stability is jeopardized where a majority demonstrates
5 74 For Sunstein, minorities are political minorities, and courts must use the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses to prevent "naked" exercises of power against such groups. See
Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 565, at 46. I interpret Rawls to support the view that a
minority can be a group that has developed its own comprehensive views because its members
occupy distinct social space. This view of minorities as having a distinct epistemological
orientation is supported by feminist standpoint theory and, more generally, postmodemism's
social construction of knowledge thesis. See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra
note 17, at 187-88 ("For purposes of the inquiry of how it is that minority and majority
communities form distinct epistemological communities, the key insight is that social position
matters in what we experience, how we interpret that experience, and how we construct
knowledge .... In the aggregate and over the long run, individual minorities share a band of
social space from which they experience social life differently from majorities. It is this
experience that creates a distinct epistemology, not minority status or identity."); see also IRIS
MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLmCAL PHILOSOPHY, AND
POLICY 25 (1997) ('The collective othemess of serialized existence is thus often experienced as
constraint, felt necessities that often are experienced as given or natural. Members of the series
experience themselves as powerless to alter this material milieu, and they understand that
others in the series are equally constrained."); Pierre Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class?
On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups, 32 BERKELEY J. SOC. 1, 3 (1987)
("[R]eality is nothing other than the structure, as a set of constant relationships which are often
invisible, because they are obscured by the realities of ordinary sense-experience, and by
individuals in particular .... [W]hat exists is not 'social classes' as understood in the
realist.., but rather a social space [in which] ... the fundamental property of a space is the
reciprocal extemality of the objects it encloses."); Patricia Hill Collins, Comment on Hekman's
"Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited" Where's the Power?, 22 SIGNS
375, 378 (1997) ("[S]tandpoint theory... explain[s] relations of race and/or social
class .... Given the high degree of residential occupational segregation separating Black
and/or working-class groups from White middle-class realities, it becomes plausible to generate
arguments about working-class and/or Black culture that emerge from long-standing shared
experiences.").
575 The epistemological and philosophical position of each member is respected because
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continued lack of regard for the "other" in ways that reject the other's
fundamental sense of who they are.576
The co-equality and co-participation model is well suited to deal with the
multiple and complex ways in which prejudice impacts the democratic fabric of
the polity. If "prejudice" encompasses status conflicts, racial resentment a desire
for continued domination, discomfort with what is considered out of the norm, as
well as homophobia and nativism, then "prejudice" describes an ongoing social
dynamic. In a democratic polity made up of unequal groups, and where history,
class, and social norms construct one group as dominant and their perspective as
the norm, conflicts are a foreseeable consequence. Using such a model does not
require courts to distinguish between these types of feelings, to identify
discriminatory intent or to choose which minority groups are properly treated as
"suspect" classes. For these reasons, it is, in this author's view, the most
powerful and most useful equal protection tool for dealing with majority-
minority disputes. The next Part will examine how these norms should be
applied to direct democracy measures.
2. The Case for Skeptical Review ofDirect Democracy Measures
According to empirical evidence, as well as theory, initiatives and
referendums dramatically increase the potential that actions taken by majority
groups will jeopardize minority group members' ability to participate fully in the
life of the polity. In so doing, such direct democracy measures threaten the
cohesion and stability of the entire society. Because these "referendums on
minorities" take place within the ambit of the polity's democratic processes, the
votes become a statement by the polity of who really belongs as a co-equal co-
participant. What might be internecine tensions become an irrevocable statement
by the polity of who is a citizen and what kind of a citizen. For this reason, such
measures must be strictly scrutinized, as described in Part V.B, by the courts. 577
this is what we would expect for ourselves. Respecting the integrity of each person's deeply
held beliefs as well as '"vays of knowing" means that no participant is coerced into accepting
ways of knowing or moral frameworks. See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 49-54.
576 Rawls finds in the democratic principle of co-equality and the necessity of long-term
social cooperation a substantive obligation of sustained, mutual, public-reasoned justification.
See id. at 15-22.
577 As Cass Sunstein has explained, the level of scrutiny in equal protection law reflects a
rule of thumb judgment as to how likely the lawmaking process is to create categories that
impinge on constitutional norms. See Sunstein, Public/Private, supra note 391, at 55-56 ('The
public value justification must survive critical scrutiny designed to ensure that it is not itself a
product of existing relations of power."); see also SUNsTEIN, supra note 382, at 38 (suggesting
that constitutional norms should be formulated on the available social science evidence and not
theoretical premises that are subject to wide contestation). Professor Schacter's analysis of
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Although, as has been noted, direct democracy does not uniquely threaten
co-participation, it does heighten the risks of exclusion in at least four
fundamental and interrelated ways. First, when voters are permitted to directly
express their views on fundamental ideological issues, the majority is provided
an opportunity to express feelings that delve beneath the veneer of civility.578 In
the context of direct democracy, overtly prejudiced and nativist views are
expressed, whereas the most blatant opinions are likely to be stifled in the
representational forum. Politicians' own rhetoric also tends to become more
blunt and pointed.579 Examples of this phenomenon include Governor Pete
Wilson's repeated reference to the streaming brown hordes, Anita Bryant's
overtly homophobic comments, and the refrain that African Americans have
received undeserved special benefits. Such statements are most obvious if the
expression of prejudice continues to be acceptable and permitted, as is the case
with comments directed against illegal immigrants and gay men and lesbians.
When society has developed taboos against overt oppression, as is currently the
case with racial prejudice, the damaging statements are more subtle, but
nonetheless remain real.
Second, the nature of direct democracy, particularly combined with the
realities of modem day politics, tends to promote "we-they" thinking. Especially
in those jurisdictions with no minimal substantive screening and which provide
few checks on electoral politics and media campaigns, initiatives and
referendums permit proponents to frame the issues to set off intergroup divisions.
As John Madison famously observed, factionalist politics are more likely to
plague local lawmaking processes, while a larger representative system, like the
House of Representatives, would "restrain majorities from enacting oppressive
measures."580 Whether the breakdown is gay versus straight monolingual versus
bilingual, black versus white, or legal versus illegal, majorities are invited to
think about complex issues in ways that promote "we-they" thinking. Analyses
Romer takes a similar approach to that proposed here. See Schacter, Romer and Democracy,
supra note 30. She argues that the Court should focus on the democratic implications of
majority votes on initiatives such as the Colorado Amendment 2. See id. at 391. She also
argues that a majority vote in a contested and potentially fractious debate can be viewed as a
communal judgment that stigmatizes and excludes from the polity a targeted minority. See id.
at400-01.
578 See JUDtrH SHKLAR, ORDINARY VIcEs 45-86 (1984) (describing how various kinds of
veneers, including hypocrisy, interact in a liberal democracy to permit co-existence).
579 There are also notable counter-examples of politicians attempting to inject into the
debate more reasoned terms, as was the case with the affirmative action debate in Washington,
by Govemor Locke, and in Houston, by Mayor Bob Lanier. See Verhovek, supra note 274, at
Al (discussing Washington's Initiative 200); Verhovek, supra note 266, at A28 (discussing
Houston's affirmative action referendum).
580 THE FEDERAISTNO. 51 (James Madison).
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have shown the key role that intergroup tensions (latent racial tensions, anxieties,
and suspicions and fears) play in motivating votes. Such "we-they" framing of
issues has led to consequences that can fundamentally affect the polity, diminish
the citizenship of minorities, and compromise the state's needed neutrality in
conflicts that may be as much social as they are political.
Third, direct democracy is easily subject to manipulation through framing.
Voters do not necessarily have or take the time to study the issues in detail.
Rather, they often base their votes on summaries and incomplete information.
The anti-gay and anti-affirmative action measures were deliberately framed as
denials of special rights rather than as harmful acts. The English-only measures
have been framed as pro-melting pot, rather than as anti-minority. These
measures have succeeded in large part because of such manipulation.
Fourth and most important, cultural-ideological initiatives set up a scenario
where majorities cast votes on the minorities' very membership in the polity, and
where the minorities almost always lose. Such losses can have a severe and
detrimental effect on the minority group members' feelings as to whether they
are accepted members of the polity. Votes are deeply symbolic and are important
civic statements. Thus, while majorities may believe (and tell themselves) that
they are voting in a simple political ideological contest, and while many in the
majority may harbor no feelings of resentment or prejudice towards minorities,
those who lose interpret this vote far more dramatically. The ideological issues
presented to the voters, who vote yes or no, contain no room to allow majorities
to qualify their vote. For the predictable losers, minorities, the "political" loss is
also a civic loss. It is experienced as a rejection of self, their way of being and
knowing, and their membership in the polity.581 The majority, through a vote,
can even create "castes" as alluded to in Romer v. Evans. In this respect, the
power of the state is usurped for self-serving purposes. Yet, a polity made up of
fundamentally unlike groups, majorities and minorities, must be able to co-exist
and survive deep disagreement. This cannot happen when majorities can use the
political process, in a public and powerful way, to reject one segment of the
polity and take away from them a sense of themselves. The results are alienation
and fragmentation. They are far-reaching and deeply impacting. Initiatives and
referendums can lead to unintended, but permanent, results: the exclusion in
some significant way of minorities from the polity.
Courts, as democratic actors, have a role in structuring these civic
dialogues. 582 The relationship between majorities and minorities must remain
sufficiently open so that each can recognize that their long-term co-existence
581 See Schacter, Romer and Democracy, supra note 30, at 400-01 (arguing that Romer,
and constitutional law more generally, should be concerned with communal stigmatizing
judgments as evidenced in a direct democracy vote).
582 See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 17, at 225-32.
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depends on their ability to regard each other, no matter how different and foreign
they may seem to one another, as co-equal co-participants. 583 We can now turn
to how standards of review can be applied to advance these various norms.
Although courts cannot divine the intent of voters, heightened review can allow
courts room to construct these initiatives to better reflect permissible
purposes.584
B. How To Review Direct Democracy: Romer v. Evans Rightly
Understood
The second aspect of Charlow's challenge is to articulate how a heightened
review standard should be applied. The Court's previous jurisprudence, and
particularly Romer v. Evans,585 provides the blue print. However, the Court must
articulate the approach it has employed more clearly. In its current form, Romer
does not offer courts sufficient guidance on how to review these important
measures.
This Article argues that the Court has implicitly employed, and should
employ, a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether direct democracy
measures have violated the Equal Protection Clause by unduly infringing on
minorities' participation rights. The appropriate analysis has two major
components. First, the Court must determine whether the particular democratic
initiative or referendum severely jeopardizes minorities' participation rights.
Second, where such a harm exists, the Court should use standard strict scrutiny
analysis and allow the direct democracy measure to stand, notwithstanding the
harm it has caused, only if the measure is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest. In essence, this Article argues that the Court has implicitly identified,
and should explicitly recognize, a fundamental right to civic participation.
Some may be uncomfortable, rather understandably, with the identification
and advocacy of a new "fundamental right." As discussed earlier, the
introduction of new fundamental rights causes many to fear the onslaught of the
slippery slope.586 The Court itself has refused to adopt such nomenclature in
several direct democracy cases.587 To this valid critique, I offer three responses.
583 See id. at 217-18.
584 See Schacter, Direct Democracy and Intent, supra note 30 (advocating this approach
to interpretation of initiatives and referendums).
585 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
586 See supra Part IV.C.5.c.
587 In Romer, for example, the Court takes pains to clarify that the right to petition for
anti-discrimination legislation is not a constitutional right, but rather develops through common
law and civic activism. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 627-28 ('he common law rules ... proved
insufficient in many instances, and it was settled early that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
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First, the fundamental right that is suggested is limited. As is illustrated in Part
V.C, it will not lead to the wholesale gutting of direct democracy measures.
Second, notwithstanding its rhetoric, the Court has, in fact, sub silentio,
employed a test that is a version of this proposed "fundamental rights" analysis.
Public reason requires that the Court be frank and clear in its approach and
communicate to the polity the values that its tests and decisions further.
Attempting to shoehorn a fundamental rights analysis into rational basis
language will inevitably lead to inconsistent results and will also allow judges to
exercise too much discretion. Third, in Democracy and Inclusion, I have argued
that judges should adopt a more rigorous mode of public reason that narrows the
discretion and doctrinal manipulation of judges, yet furthers the foundational
values espoused here: meaningful inclusion of majorities and minorities in the
ongoing civic dialogue.588 As argued there, I believe that if judges were to adopt
this mode of legal analysis, decisions, which will always involve choices of
values, would better stand up to legitimacy challenges. 589 I turn now to the
details of the analysis.
1. Does the Initiative or Referendum Severely Jeopardize a Minority's
Civic Participation Rights?
a. Is the Harmed Group a "Minority"?
The Court should concern itself with protecting all "minority" groups and
not merely those groups that have or could be identified as "suspect classes."590
As both theoreticians 591 and the social science analysis of Part III.B have
give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations.").
Likewise, the right of outsiders to be integrated into mainstream community is not a
constitutional right. Valtierra and City of Eastlake establish that zoning laws and citizen
referendums can enact ordinances that are neutral on their face, but foreseeably have the effect
of placing barriers by income and race on those who can enter largely homogeneous
communities.
588 See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note 17, at 209-21.
589 See id at 206-09.
590 Under the definition of minority groups adopted, see supra note 14, all of the groups
that have been the object of anti-minority initiatives would be covered, as well as women. See
supra Part IllI; supra notes 14, 93. The dynamic that is key for the delineation of minority
groups that the Court should be concerned with is this: majorities are motivated to fence
minorities out of the civic polity because they harbor negative or hostile social identity feelings
towards them; that is, they harbor "prejudice," as broadly as documented and described in
supra Part II.B, Part III.C.1.
591 Race/ethnicity categories are now being destabilized to focus more intensely on the
dynamics ofracialization. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and
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demonstrated, many kinds of groups are subject to targeting by majorities.
Because the Court has been reluctant to interpret the phrase "suspect class"
broadly, and given political realities, it is essential that courts concern themselves
with protecting a broader grouping of minorities.592
The Court itself has already implicitly recognized the value of such an
approach, refusing to limit heightened review under the Equal Protection Clause
to protected classes. In Romer, the Court employs a review that clearly goes
beyond "rational basis," recognizing that gay men and lesbians are unpopular
and may be the target of a majority's opprobrium.593 Yet, the Court scrupulously
avoids either categorizing gay men or lesbians as a suspect class or even citing
any race cases. Similarly, in Cleburne, the Court rejects the argument that the
mentally disabled should be a suspect class, 5 9 4 but nonetheless employs more
than a rational basis review in striking the city council's refusal to grant a permit
to a group home for the mentally disabled. Its analysis identifies the mentally
disabled as a group that has been the object of "continuing antipathy or
prejudice."595 In both cases, the concern is properly for a dynamic and how that
dynamic interacts with the process of lawmaking. The Court is looking for the
intersection of a political minority and social class ideological minority (race,
culture-language, mental disability, sexual orientation) against whom the
majority might be expressing any form of prejudice, or whose different way of
being cannot co-exist with a majority's cultural ideology.
The purpose of focusing on a dynamic is to bring the courts' attention to the
reason for the classification and treatment under the law. Does this initiative
trigger within the majority a "common interest,"596 in the form of anti-minority
sentiments, to exercise its dominant power? If there is a link, then the majority is
Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL L.
REv. 2129, 2160 (1992) ("[R]ace' is not a fixed term. Instead, 'race' is a fluctuating,
decentered complex of social meanings that are formed and transformed under the constant
pressures of political struggle."); Michael Omi & Dana Y. Takagi, Situating Asian Americans
in the Political Discourse on Affirmative Action, REPRESENTATIONS, Summer 1996, at 155
(arguing for a more complex and nuanced understanding of affirmative action that is "attentive
to how distinct political positions socially construct and represent Asian Americans"); see also
Symposium, Our Private Obsession, Our Public Sin, 15 LAw & INEQ. J. 1 (1997) (containing
works discussing the complexity of race).
5 92 By contrast, courts need not concern themselves with protecting majority group
members, as their rights to participate fully in the polity are secure.
593 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 622 (1996); supra note 619.
5 94 See City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439-46 (1988).
5 95 Id. at 443. In Cleburne, city council representatives who had an eye on the sentiments
of the political majority "single[d] out the retarded for special treatment reflect[ing] the real and
undeniable differences between the retarded and others." Id. at 444.
5 96 See THE FEDERALIsT No. 51 (James Madison).
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potentially using its political power outside of constitutional norms to reinforce
and legitimize the difference, to subordinate and stigmatize the minority, and to
"fence them out" from co-equal civic participation.5 97 In Romer, when the Court
concludes that "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected,"59 8 what is meant is that the law is an expression of that majority's
power, both political and social-cultural, and that what has motivated the
majority in this case is a generalized "animus" against the affected minority. This
aspect of the Romer decision must be preserved.599
b. Have the Minority's Civic Participation Rights Been Severely
Impinged?
The analysis suggested thus far would still make for a very broad-based
analysis. If it is true that conflict is an ongoing condition of a heterogeneous
polity, there are many minorities against whom the majority might express a
desire to harm.600 Furthermore, because majorities dominate politics, as well as
social and cultural life, the opportunities to manipulate the political process to
reinforce and legitimize their social/class dominance are endless. Thus, this part
of the analysis looks to whether the initiative or referendum has sufficiently
harmed minorities' civic participation rights or citizenship so as to require strict
scrutiny.
This Article proposes that courts analyze the potential impact of direct
democracy measures on minorities' civic participation rights in terms of three
elements: (i) direct political participation impact; (ii) stigmatic harm; and (iii)
civil society detriment. Where, having considered the effects in all three
categories, courts find that the initiative or referendum would have a severe and
negative impact on minorities' ability to participate in the polity, the court should
employ strict scrutiny. But, where the measure has no such severe detrimental
5 97 See generally ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 2 (arguing that the Constitution
is concerned with democratic politics: "Whose who control existing arrangements have the
capacity to shape, manipulate, and distort democratic processes... those who currently hold
power will deploy that power to try to preserve their control. Thus, democratic politics
constantly confronts the prospect of law being used to freeze existing political arrangements
into place .... ).
598 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
599 The doctrinal tool that the Court utilizes is not motive analysis. Here, calling attention
to a disfavored status does not serve the function of requiring the judge to ferret out the bad
motives or to "prove" prejudice. As already argued, such a doctrinal approach is inadvisable
because it hinges on detecting prejudice in its "bewildering variety" and creates an
administerability nightmare. See supra Part IV.C.2. It also misinterprets what is at stake.
600 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47.
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impact, it poses no problem under this analysis. Of necessity, this test requires
that courts make substantive value judgments, as do all constitutional tests
inevitably. However, it is asserted that courts have already been using such an
analysis. By more explicitly examining potential impact in terms of these three
aspects, courts can make their decisions both more coherent and also more just.
i. Political Participation
Some initiatives and referendums directly impact minorities' opportunity to
participate politically in the polity. These are the measures that most overtly
impinge on minorities' feeling that they are welcome members of the polity.
These measures will also tend to stigmatize minorities and lead to their being
deprived of civic benefits. Such measures must be viewed with the greatest
skepticism.
Colorado's anti-gay rights Amendment 2, for example, directly precluded
gay men and lesbians from using the legislative process to secure anti-
discrimination legislation. As the Court emphasized in striking the provision,
unlike any other group, homosexuals would have to obtain a constitutional
amendment in order to secure such a protective law.601 The Court states its
concern clearly: "A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 602
Similarly, the measure challenged in Hunter603 directly proscribed racial
minorities from securing beneficial housing legislation. In striking the measure,
the Court stated that laws may "no more disadvantage any particular group by
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
601 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. The Court explains:
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint. They can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the
citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the State's view, by
trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability. This is so no matter how local or
discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the injury.
Id. The Court also makes this point by highlighting that gay men and lesbians were not seeking
"special rights" but privileges and protections enjoyed by the majority. See id. at 631; see also
supra note 135 (Colorado Supreme Court addressing same issue).
602 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. Earlier in the opinion, the Court states: "Yet Amendment 2,
in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provisions. It prohibits all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the
named class... ." Id. at 624.
603 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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person's vote."604 It is significant, and not coincidental, that the Court cites to
voting rights decisions in support of its decisions in both Hunter and Romer.60 5
Nor is it coincidental that the other two major decisions in which the Court
has struck direct democracy measures also blocked minority access to the
political process. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,606 the Court
struck an initiative that proscribed school boards from ordering busing. In
Reitman v. Mulkey,607 although the Court did not emphasize the point, the
stricken initiative prevented any state subdivision or agency from prohibiting
housing discrimination. In Seattle School District No. 1 and Reitman, the
majority made its victory fairly permanent, emblazoning a political-ideological
win into the state constitution and thus, placing out of bounds local forums where
an unpopular cause might some day have an opportunity to prevail.
Some measures may directly target minorities' political participation without
explicitly changing the voting process. English-only measures may have such an
impact. Where an English-only law is interpreted to require people to
communicate directly with their government only in English, such a provision
will directly impede a language minority group's ability to participate in the
polity or to influence governmental decisions, as the Arizona Court found in Ruiz
v. Hull.60 8
604 Id. at 393; see also idt at 390 (emphasizing that "[t]he Akron charter obviously made
it substantially more difficult to secure enactment of ordinances subject to § 137"). Professor
Karlan's analysis underscores this point See Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five not so Easy
Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289, 297 (1997). Cleburne, although not a direct
democracy case, can also be seen as a decision that emphasizes the need to examine with great
care any measure that restricts a minority group's access to the political process. In that case,
the Court recognized that the city council's alteration of the normal permitting process with
respect to establishing a home for the mentally disabled was particularly onerous. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 ("May the city require the permit for this facility when other care
and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely permitted?").
605 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393; see also the voting rights cases
supra notes 501,506.
606 458 U.S. 457, 462, 467-70 (citing Hunter and explaining that it is a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause to structure the political process to burden a particular minority
group).
607 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The decision instead ruled the measure unconstitutional
primarily because it placed the state's seal of approval on private discriminatory acts. See id. at
378-79; see also supra note 467.
608 See supra Part IV.C.5.b (discussing Ruiz v. Hull and use of languages other than
English in communicating with state actors).
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Ii. Stigmatic Harm
Referendums and initiatives may also harm minorities with respect to their
civil participation rights, albeit somewhat less directly, to the extent that they
stigmatize 609 those minority group members. Minorities who have been
stigmatized may not literally be precluded from participating in the polity.
However, stigmatization may indirectly have a negative effect on minority
participation in two ways. First, stigma may alienate minority group members,
causing them to feel as if it is no longer worth participating in the polity. As the
Court famously recognized in Brown v. Board of Education,610 the mere act of
separating out members of one group may itself cause serious harm. When laws
are used to create a legal class out of an unpopular group, the law becomes part
of the majority's expression of hostility toward the minority group, making the
harm that much more emphatic. Second, the stigmatization of minority groups
through state laws may reinforce and encourage the majority to regard those
members as non-equals, and even inferior to themselves.611 The harm is not just
corruption of the democratic process; it is also the loss of minorities' continued
meaningful participation in the polity.
The case of stigmatization is most clear where the referendum or initiative
expressly selects out for special disfavored treatment an unpopular group, not a
protected class, as is the case of gay men and lesbians. In these cases, the
decisions have focused on the concept of stigmatization, although they have not
necessarily used the word. In Romer, for example, the Court is clearly very
troubled by the way Amendment 2 singles out and thereby stigmatizes gay men
and lesbians. It makes the point repeatedly, stating for example, "Amendment 2,
however, in making a general announcement that gay men and lesbians shall not
have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate,
continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications
that may be claimed for it.' '612 The Court emphasizes, as well, that the
Amendment "identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
609 1 hesitate to use this term because it has become a fluid and undefined term of art. A
future task may be to further develop what this concept means in the various contexts in which
constitutional law applies it.
610 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ('CTo separate [children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and mind in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
611 See MiNow, supra note 28, at 113 ("Does the act of naming or labeling cut off or
deny relationships of mutual respect?"); Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion, supra note
17, at 217-18 (arguing that the Court must ensure that the social identity of minorities is not so
subordinated that co-equal co-participative dialogue cannot occur in the democratic polity).
612 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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across the board." 613 It states elsewhere that Amendment 2 "classifies
homosexuals... to make them unequal to everyone else" and creates a class that
is "a stranger to its laws."614 That is, the Court is concerned not only about the
immediate political impact of the law on homosexuals, but also about the
stigmatization effect of singling out gay men and lesbians for detrimental
treatment.6 15 It is not coincidental that the Court both opens 616 and ends6 17 the
Romer opinion with language and concepts that explicitly recall Plessy v.
Ferguson, in which racial majorities used their political power to legitimize
inequality of the crassest kind by enacting Jim Crow laws.
In other cases, the initiative or referendum is neutral on its face. There the
court must make a determination whether the law is designed to impact on and
treat a disfavored minority in a manner that might be stigmatic. These cases,
such as Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle School District No. 1, are more difficult. As
discussed in the prior Part, for the most part the Court's analysis as to why these
have a racial impact, or are a "de facto racial classification," makes such a
connection in a conclusory fashion.618 However, once the connection is made,
these cases address the stigma issue.619 Reitman v. Mulkey makes the case
clearly by focusing substantially on the fact that the adoption of the initiative
would not only allow private discrimination, but would, in effect, place the
state's imprimatur on private discriminatory acts.620 In the Court's view, the
613 Id. at 633.
6 14 Id. at 635; see also id. at 633 ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an
apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect." (quoting United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980)).
615 This is Professor Schacter's argument as well. See Schacter, Romer and Democracy,
supra note 30, at 400-01.
6 16 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 ("One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished
this Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' Unheeded
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the
rights ofpersons are at stake?) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
6 17 See id. at 635 ("Colorado cannot... so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws").
6 18 See supra notes 400-02, 406-10, 450-55 and accompanying text (circular reasoning
in Hunter's, Seattle's, and Reitman's racial impact analysis).
619 They do so in conclusory fashion by taking as a fact that anti-housing and anti-busing
initiatives deeply impact racial minorities. See supra notes 397-98, 447 and accompanying
text
620 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 377 (1967) ('Those practicing racial
discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They could now invoke
express constitutional authority, free from censure or interference of any kind from official
sources."); see also id. at 378-79 ("[lIhe provision would involve the State in private racial
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state involvement was significant and unconstitutional not only because it would
make the discrimination difficult to challenge, but also because it would
encourage other acts of discrimination: "Section 26 was intended to authorize,
and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The right to
discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State. The California
Supreme Court believes that the section will significantly encourage and involve
the State in private discrimination."621 By officially allowing private actors to
discriminate on the basis of race, the amendment would clarify and emphasize
that African Americans are non-privileged and lesser members of society.
By focusing on stigma, the Court must articulate what it is about the
initiative or referendum that leads the Court to conclude that there is a
connection between the challenged act and a minority group. The relationship
must be close to rise to the level of stigma. In the case of fair housing and busing
initiatives, the Court could look at how the controversy of the campaign played
out, what the proponents said, and, in modem day contexts, what images the
media campaign communicated to majorities.622 Did these seek to stigmatize?
Second, the Court focuses on impacts: Does the initiative or referendum impact
on an important aspect of the minority's citizenship and interests within the
polity and separate them out and legitimize stigmatic treatment by majorities?
This inquiry does not locate "bad motives" but asks whether the initiative is
being framed as a we-they schism that underscores that the purpose of the
"neutral" initiative is to "fence" out a minority. Thus, this proposed stigma
inquiry is more workable and more readily identifiable than improper intent.62 3
Nonetheless, it remains a difficult inquiry because the Court must be able to
convincingly make that link.
This analysis makes more sense of the Court's distinctions between the
initiatives considered in Valtierra and City of Eastlake, which were upheld, and
those struck down in Hunter and Reitman.624 As discussed earlier, although all
of the initiatives had a negative impact on minorities, the Court chose to strike
only the set that it viewed as more blatantly and directly discriminatory-the
anti-fair housing and the anti-busing measures.625 Those that had more indirect
discriminations to an unconstitutional degree.").
621 Id. at 381.
622 See supra Part llI.C.2.
623 Both Romer and Cleburne focus in part on whether the laws in question were enacted
to express what Romer calls "animus" and Cleburne calls "irrational prejudice." See Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439-46 (1988); see also supra notes 429-33 (discussing Reitman's and Hunter's findings of
racial discriminatory intent as indicative of the Court having found racial wrongs).
624 See supra Part IV.C.2, Part IV.C.3.
62 5 See supra text and notes at p. 491.
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effects, Valtierra and City of Eastlake, were upheld. Thus, to the extent that
stigma itself is a harm, a result that provides constitutional remedies for cases
where there is a more direct link may be more satisfactory in terms of the values
championed by this proposed test.626 A referendum that is overtly and blatantly
harmful to a minority group will have an even greater negative impact on the
minority group members' political participation than will a referendum with a
similar impact, but more subtle in its linkage to stigmatization.627
ifi. Civil Society Detriment
The third factor courts should consider in deciding whether an initiative or
referendum unduly burdens a minority group's civil participation rights is how
that measure impacts upon minority group members' day-to-day participation in
civil society. Of the three, this is by far the most open-ended factor. It covers
potential impacts on the lives of minority group members, including, for
example, impacts on economic welfare, speech, and physical or psychological
well-being. According to the theory of equal protection set out in this Article, the
impacts in these areas are relevant not because minority group members have
entitlement to certain minimum benefits. Rather, inflicting harsh civil society
detriments on minorities can limit, or be a proxy for, minorities' ability to
participate in the polity.
In several of the direct democracy cases, the Court has looked at whether the
challenged measure would adversely impact minorities with respect to their
benefits as a participant in civic society. The Romer decision, in particular,
emphasizes that Amendment 2 "identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them protection across the board." 628 The Court strikes the measure, in
part, because the majority "imposes a special disability upon those persons
alone," and takes away "protections taken for granted by most people either
626 Under this test, Valtierra and City of Eastlake could be closer cases and would come
out differently if the Court had found that the measures would harm minority's participation
rights. Arguably, a measure need not be blatant to have a negative stigmatizing impact. To the
extent that members of the community saw the purportedly neutral zoning measures as geared
toward minority group members, a stigmatizing impact that is exclusionary might occur. The
question, then, would have been for the Court to determine whether there is a close enough
relation between the stigmata of physical and membership exclusion and the affected group's
participation.
627 What militates in favor of an approach that requires more directness in the linkage
between a majority enacted referendum or initiative and stigmata is that this would largely
reflect the current constitutional approach to racial discrimination in equal protection cases.
Moreover, a more direct link also makes the Court's remedial action easier to justify to the
majority and threatens less the Court's anti-majoritarian hubris.
628 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also id at 634.
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because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society."629 Amendment 2 takes away
from gay men and lesbians safeguards and protections against the kinds of
discriminations that affect livelihood (discrimination on the job) and that can also
be publicly humiliating (being denied service or entry for being a
homosexual). 630 That is, the majority acted unconstitutionally because it used its
dominant position in the political process to deprive minority group members of
certain minimum components of civic life while keeping such benefits for
themselves.
In Hunter, as well, the Court emphasizes that the majority's action would be
harmful to the minority in terms of its day-to-day civic life. Specifically, the
majority was taking away from minorities the right not to be discriminated
against by race in housing transactions. Prior case law, including Reitman and
Shelley v. Kraemer, had established why this kind of discrimination is harmful to
minorities. Cleburne, while not a direct democracy case, reflects a concern that
imposing a special permit requirement that excludes mentally disabled persons
from sharing as co-equals would lead to the "exclusion and isolation in a
community" of an already highly stigmatized group.631
The relationship between the first two factors-exclusion from participation
and stigma-and diminished political participation is much more direct than is
the link between depriving a minority group civic benefits and diminished
political participation. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court has proved
reluctant to strike those direct democracy measures which, while causing some
deprivation of civic benefits, do not, at least on their face, decrease minority
participation in the polity. Valtierra and City of Eastlake are such cases. By
passing the zoning legislation at issue in those cases, the majority deprived a
minority group of a significant economic and associative benefit. Yet, such
losses may not have been sufficiently severe to cause the minority group
members to be alienated from the polity; nor would the loss have necessarily
encouraged majority group members to exclude the minority from political
participation.
629 Id. at 634. Professor Karlan notes that this language tracks Hunter's admonition that
majorities cannot create electoral obstacles and "place special burdens on minorities ... [when]
the majority needs no protection against [such] discrimination." Karlan, supra note 604, at 298.
630 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (describing the Boulder and Denver ordinances).
631 This is Professor Minow's social relations analysis of Cleburne. See MINOW, supra
note 28, at 114-20.
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2. Can the Initiative Withstand Strict Scrutiny?
Where, having considered each of the three factors outlined above, a court
concludes that an initiative or referendum would severely and detrimentally
impact a minority group's participation in the polity, a court must use a strict
scrutiny analysis to determine whether the measure should be stricken.632 If the
supporters of the measure can show that the measure is necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest, then it should be upheld, notwithstanding its
negative impact. But where, as will generally be the case, the strict scrutiny test
cannot be met, the measure must be stricken.
Some will likely object that this test is too strict and that the public should be
given more leave to legislate through the initiative process. However, such strict
review is necessary to protect the participation rights of all members of the
polity. More importantly, this is the test which the Court has-in fact, but not in
words-employed.
3. Application ofAnalysis to Previously Decided Cases
The results achieved in the Court's direct democracy decisions, which
initially appeared to be a doctrinal jumble, actually cohere when analyzed under
the test that has been set forth above. Colorado's Amendment 2, struck by the
Court in Romer, caused harm in all three areas by denying gay men and lesbians
access to the political process, stigmatizing them, and also denying them civic
benefits in multiple areas.633 Similarly, the anti-fair housing measure that the
Court struck in Hunter denied racial minorities access to the political process,
stigmatized those groups by legitimizing private discrimination, and also caused
economic harm to the minorities by allowing their exclusion from certain
neighborhoods. 634 Reitman's anti-fair housing measure denied minorities access
632 The strict scrutiny advocated here is that which the Court has generally employed in
reviewing measures that impinge on fundamental rights or intentionally harm members of a
suspect class. See supra notes 474, 476-78.
633 See supra notes 598-99, 612-17 and accompanying text.
634 The Court found that the Akron City ordinance was barred by the Equal Protection
Clause because it selected out a law that had racial impact (fair housing) to impose a "special
burden on racial minorities." Reitman v. Mulkey, 393 U.S. 369, 391 (1967). By imposing an
automatic referendum requirement only with respect to fair housing laws, majorities had
structured the political process to advantage their position and their views. Because they would
continue to be a political majority, the automatic referendum process enabled majorities to
manipulate and control the local democratic process and thus ensure that racial ordering in
private housing would continue as per the majorities' cultural-ideological views, which
imposed on racial minorities an inferior citizenship and status. This is what the Hunter Court
meant when it stated that "majorit[ies] need no protection against discrimination and if [they]
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to the political process by blocking state subdivisions and agencies from
prohibiting housing discrimination and also stigmatizing the minorities and
causing a serious economic detriment.635 Finally, the anti-busing measure struck
by the Court in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1636 deprived a
minority group of access to the process by preventing local school boards from
using busing to counteract racial imbalances. In so denying minorities' access,
the anti-busing measure also had a stigmatizing impact,637 and it further led to
minorities being denied educational benefits.638
By contrast, in those decisions where it refused to strike democratic
initiatives and referendums, the Court used the three factors to justify its results.
Although we may not necessarily agree with the way the Court conducted its
analyses, at least its decisions become more comprehensible. The Court
explained its refusal to strike the anti-busing measure at issue in Crawford v. Los
Angeles Board of Education639 by emphasizing that the measure did not impede
minorities' political access to school boards, but rather merely restricted courts'
ability to provide certain relief. That is, it found the measure did not overtly
restrict political access.640 Furthermore, the Court effectively found the anti-
busing provision was not stigmatizing, in that it neither overtly nor indirectly was
geared to harm minorities.641 Finally, the measure purportedly denied minorities
no significant benefit in that it did not deprive them of access to the Brown
remedy.
The Court's two decisions affirming zoning measures enacted through direct
did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than that." Id.; see also Karlan, supra note
604, at 298-99 (making a similar point).
635 In Reitman, the Court relies on the California Supreme Court's determination that the
intent of the constitutional amendment initiative was to authorize racial discrimination in the
private market. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376 ("[T]he court assessed the ultimate
impact... and concluded that the section would encourage and significantly involve the State
in private racial discrimination ... ."). It also relied on the lower court's conclusion that state
action should not endorse such discrimination already barred by Shelley v. Kraemer. See id. at
381 ('The California Supreme Court believes that the section will significantly encourage and
involve the State in private discriminations. We have been presented with no persuasive
considerations indicating that these judgments should be overturned.").
636 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) (striking provision because "it uses the racial nature of an
issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes substantial and
unique burdens on racial minorities").
637 See id. at 471 (noting undoubted racial nature of measure).
638 See id. at 472 (observing that desegregation of the public schools "inures primarily to
the benefit of the minority").
639 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
640 See id. at 536 n.12 (distinguishing Seattle SchoolDistrict No. 1).
641 See id. at 537-38 (distinguishing Hunter).
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democracy, City of Eastlake and Valtierra, both suggest that the measures were
acceptable because they did not deprive minorities of access to the political
process,642 did not stigmatize minorities, 643 and did not cause a significant
economic or other detriment to a cognizable minority.644
C. Application to Current Controversies
We are now in a position to apply the analysis and theory that this Article
has developed to some of the important current controversies. Of course, with
limited space and without complete evidence, this Part will only sketch out the
framework of these analyses.
1. Anti-Gay Civil Rights: Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati
In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,645
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Romer, the Sixth Circuit upheld
a Cincinnati referendum that repealed that city's equal opportunity ordinance and
provided that "no special class status may be granted based upon sexual
orientation, conduct or relationships."646 Applying the analysis advocated here,
the decision is wrong. The measure directly denied a minority group, gay men
and lesbians, access to the political process by making it more difficult to secure
legislation proscribing .anti-gay discrimination than to obtain any other
legislation.647 In denying such access the measure also stigmatized gay men and
642 See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1975) (finding
no deprivation of political access because the people may choose to legislate through direct
democracy); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1970) (stating that the present measure,
unlike the referendum at issue in Hunter, did not deny minorities access to the governmental
process).
643 See Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141 (rejecting proposition that measure targets racial
minority). City of Eastlake does not even consider whether the measure would have a
stigmatizing impact on minorities.
644 Valtierra concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show adverse impact on racial
minorities. See id, at 141. Neither Valtierra nor City of Eastlake even considered whether the
measures at issue would have an adverse economic impact on non-racial minorities.
645 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
646 Id. at 291 (quoting Issue 3, which was enacted by 62% of the ballots cast).
647 The mere fact that, as the Sixth Circuit emphasized, gay men and lesbians would not
need to convince voters statewide but only those within the city of the validity of their cause
does not ameliorate the severe damage caused by such a measure. The ordinance explicitly and
directly denies gay men and lesbians access to the political process that majorities enjoy.
Moreover, depending on the voters, it may be more difficult to win a city election than to win a
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lesbians, which the Romer Court expressed by using Plessy v. Ferguson to allude
to creation of a separate caste-like group.648 In addition, by legitimizing anti-gay
discrimination, the measure will potentially have a serious detrimental impact on
the daily lives of gay men and lesbians. Given all of these impacts, a strict
scrutiny analysis must be employed. As the Supreme Court found in Evans v.
Romer,649 it is difficult to find a rational basis, much less a compelling
governmental interest, to support such a measure.
2. English-Only. Ruiz v. Hull
In Ruiz v. Hull,650 the Arizona Supreme Court struck down Arizona's
English-only state constitutional amendment. This case was rightly decided for
the following reasons.
The first part of the test we have developed is rather easily met. The English-
only initiative allowed the monocultural and monolingual majority to vote on the
content of minorities' citizenship in a way that would affect only these
minorities. In this case, minorities were those persons who were either bilingual
or non-English speakers. What is at play here is that a dominant Anglo-American
ideology, which holds that to be a member of the polity one must be an English
speaker, is being imposed on all members of the polity. Its effect is to exclude
non-English speakers, most immediately, and to reject symbolically, and burden
in practice, those who are multicultural and bilingual from the polity.
The argument could also be made that this minority group is a racialized
class in Arizona, given that state's past racial history.651 This analysis is not
necessary to the test outlined here. Nor should it be, because even performing
such an analysis would exacerbate underlying tensions. Thus, it is significant and
commendable that the Ruiz v. Hull Court does not do any racial intent analysis
and does not address this dispute as if it were a race issue.
The more difficult inquiry is whether the enactment of the English-only
provision deprived the minority of participation rights in the polity. Unlike many
of the initiatives, Arizona's constitutional amendment did not overtly prevent a
minority group from obtaining access to the political process. The question of
whether the English-only amendment should be seen as blocking political access,
therefore, depends on the extent to which taking away the ability of cultural and
language minority members to express themselves in their own language in the
public sphere creates a separate class that undermines basic citizenship rights.
statewide election.
648 See supra notes 601-02, 612-17 and accompanying text.
649 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
650 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998).
651 See supra note 169.
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Looking at political access, stigma, and civic rights, the answer would seem to be
"yes."
As the Arizona Supreme Court found, the measure denies the affected
minority group members the opportunity to provide information to, and receive
information from, their government. Although placing its analysis under the First
Amendment, rather than the Equal Protection Clause, the court nonetheless
provides essentially the same reasoning that has been offered here, emphasizing
that both limited and non-English speakers would be deprived of their right to
participate in the political process:
By denying persons who are limited in English proficiency, or entirely lacking
in it, the right to participate equally in the political process, the Amendment
violates the constitutional right to participate in and have access to government,
a right which is one of the "fundamental principle[s] of representative
government in this country.' 652
In terms of stigma, the effect of the ordinance is also apparent. By singling
out a particular group and proscribing them from speaking in their chosen
language, the measure implies that speaking in any language other than English
is inappropriate. Perhaps those who do not speak English are de facto non-
citizens; or implicit in their inability to speak English is disloyalty; perhaps they
are unintelligent; perhaps they are conspiring against or talking about the Anglo
majority. Whatever the rationale, non-English speakers have clearly been cast in
a negative light that fences them out from civic life.
In addition, the Amendment will certainly have a negative impact on the
day-to-day life of many Arizonans. First and most directly, the measure will
prevent such persons from expressing themselves in their chosen language,
thereby denying such minority group members the opportunity to enjoy
unimpeded free expression. 653 Second, the stark and bitter reality is that some
persons who are not fluent in English will find themselves gravely disadvantaged
when they attempt to deal with the government in terms of a vast array of
benefits and burdens. Licenses, welfare, medical benefits, schooling, and other
benefits will all be less accessible.654
Finally, the English-only amendment is not necessary to serve a compelling
state interest. As the Arizona Supreme Court found, even assuming that the
statute's goal of promoting English as a common language is "compelling," such
652 Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 997 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964)).
653 See id. (making same point).
654 The Yfiguez lower court litigation makes this point directly. See Yfiiguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated on remand,
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); see also supra note 153.
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a goal "does not require a general prohibition on non-English usage. English can
be promoted without prohibiting the use of other languages by state and local
governments. ' 655
3. Bilingual Education: Valeria G. v. Wilson
California's recently enacted anti-bilingual education measure, Proposition
227, appears to violate the Equal Protection Clause. This measure, currently
being challenged in Valeria G. v. Wilson,656 "amends the California Education
Code to change the system under which students who are limited in English
proficiency are educated in California's public schools."657 In particular, it
replaces a system of bilingual education whereby students may continue to
receive instruction in various academic subjects such as math and science in their
"primary" or "home" language with a curriculum that provides English
immersion for a period not normally to exceed one year.658 However, and most
significantly, the measure not only changes the Education Code but also limits
language minority's political access to further influence this important debate.
Section 335 provides that the provisions of the new Act may be amended only
"upon approval by the electorate or by a statute to further the act's purpose
passed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature and signed by the
Governor."65 9
As with the English-only measure, Proposition 227 affects a "minority"
group as defined in this Article. Thus, the parts that follow will address whether
this measure impinges on citizenship and whether it would pass strict scrutiny
review.
With respect to the first factor for assessing citizenship impact, limiting
access to the political process, Proposition 227 is quite problematic. The Act
explicitly provides for amendment only by winning a future statewide
referendum or by securing votes of two-thirds of the legislature. Although
rejecting the motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court noted:
"Proposition 227 goes further than most legislation which has reached the
courts .... 660 By requiring those who seek to restore bilingual education to
655 Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 1001; see also YfMiguez, 69 F.3d at 944-47 (analyzing same issue
using Meyer and Tokushige); supra note 513.
656 12 F. Supp.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (refusing to grant motion for preliminary
injunction barring implementation of Proposition 227).
657 Id. at 1012.
658 See id.
659 See id. at 1014 (quoting Proposition 227, § 335).
6 60 Id. at 1024. Citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 706-08 (9th Cir. 1997), the district court rejected plaintiffs' argument,
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jump political hurdles that would not normally apply, the Act directly blocks the
minority group's access to the political system. As the Court has found in Romer,
Hunter, and Seattle School District No. 1, such measures are highly suspect
because they "lock in" a majority win.
Turning to stigma, the argument is somewhat closer. Many might argue that
the Act does not stigmatize anyone but merely imposes one particular
educational policy rather than another.661 If the measure were limited to revising
educational policy, this argument would be powerful. However, like the English-
only measure discussed above, Proposition 227 stigmatizes language minorities
by the very imposition of Section 335, blocking political access. In addition, like
the Supreme Court's decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska6 62 and Farrington v.
Tokushige,663 this policy purports to be regulatory and further American unity.
Meyer and Tokushige could be interpreted to require scrutiny of language
regulations where the Court finds that the majority is attempting to mandate
assimilation by unduly coercive and stigmatic methods.664 These regulations
imply that only by coercing assimilation can such minorities be trusted to
become American citizens.
Finally, the question of whether Proposition 227 detrimentally affects the
affected minority group's civic life depends on the interpretation of educational
evidence. Opponents of the measure have argued that the new Act is
educationally unsound and have provided expert testimony showing that the
elimination of bilingual education will deny minority students access to large
parts of the substantive curriculum. 665 If true, the measure could ultimately affect
political access by tracking such minorities into low-paying, dead-end jobs,
thereby alienating them from the polity. However, those advocating Proposition
227 have presented their own expert testimony showing that the immersion
which cited Hunter, that the denial of political access amounted to a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp.2d at 1024. The district court also sought to
minimize the burden on political access, suggesting that those unhappy with the educational
policy could petition their local school boards or even the state school board for exceptions to
the Act. See id. at 1025.
661 The district court emphasized, in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction, that
it could not "discern from the face of Proposition 227 any hidden agenda of racial or national
origin discrimination against any group." Valeria G., 12 F. Supp.2d at 1014.
662 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
663 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
664 This interpretation of these cases was put forward by the Ninth Circuit. See Yfiiguez
v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 944-47 (9th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes
512-14 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit's decision is only persuasive authority
because it was rendered moot by the Supreme Court. See Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
6 65 See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp.2d at 1019.
1999]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
approach is sound and, instead, that bilingual education itself is a curriculum that
tracks language minorities, in particular Latinos, into a less rigorous substantive
curriculum that leads to their underachievement. 666 In fact, it can be argued that
mainstreaming minorities into regular classes is essential to allow them to obtain
a good education and become fully participating members of the polity. This
dispute cannot be resolved in the abstract, but only by close examination of the
evidence.
Assuming that the evidence shows that Proposition 227 seriously and
adversely impacts a language minority's political participation, then a court
should perform a strict scrutiny review. In defense of this Act, the state would
contend that it has a compelling educational and financial interest in sharply
curtailing bilingual education and streamlining educational methods. Here, too,
the success of such an argument would depend upon the availability and strength
of empirical data and testimony regarding educational policy and alternative
options. The state would be unable to meet the tough strict scrutiny test if, as
suggested, Meyer and Tokushige are interpreted to grant language minorities who
are singled out for stigmatizing and unequal treatment greater civic protection.
4. filegal Immigration: LULAC v. Wilson
As discussed in Part llI.B.2.d, California's Proposition 187 aimed to prevent
those persons lacking proper citizenship or residency status from obtaining
public social services or from enrolling their children in public school. The
measure also required public officials and schoolteachers to report individuals
suspected of lacking proper citizenship or residency documentation. A federal
district court has already largely invalidated the Proposition on the grounds that
federal law preempted it.667 This Part will examine whether the measure could
also have been invalidated under the proposed analysis.668
As will be shown, the analysis raises but does not answer some challenging
questions relating to whether persons who, by definition, are not officially
members of the polity, have any kind of right to participate in that polity.
Certainly it can be argued that because such persons by law have no right to
participate in the political process of this country, any measure that impedes their
participation is legitimate. Such an argument can only be defeated by showing
6 66 See id.
6 67 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson (LULAC), Nos. 94-7569 MRP,
94-7652 MRP, 94-7570 MRP, 95-0187 MRP, 94-7571 MRP, 1998 WL 141325 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 1998); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995). Currently, this case has been referred to mediation. See supra note 223.
668 Plaintiffs only challenged the measure on preemption grounds. See LULAC, 908 F.
Supp. at 764.
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that persons who have no legitimate status are nonetheless in some broader sense
members of the polity; that because such persons may in the future gain
legitimate status, it is wrong to currently impede their participation; or that the
measure directed to those lacking status will have spillover effects and impede
the participation of those who are members of the polity.669
Proposition 187 clearly had an adverse effect on a minority group. Although
the Supreme Court, in Plyler v. Doe, 670 refused to find that aliens are a "suspect
class," it did conclude that they are persons entitled to protection under the Equal
Protection Clause.671
Proposition 187 did not explicitly limit any minority's access to the political
process. Moreover, even if it did limit access, perhaps such a limit would not be
problematic as applied to persons who are neither citizens nor legal residents.
This issue again revolves around resolving membership in the polity.
The question of stigma is also interesting. It seems clear that the Act does
stigmatize illegal immigrants both by denying them benefits that are provided to
others and also by requiring officials to report the presence of persons who seem
to lack legal status. By such differential treatment and by mandating such
reporting, Proposition 187 requires public officials and teachers to engage in
"we-they" thinking. It also reinforces the sentiment that illegal immigrants'
presence within the geographical polity is wrong and that they should be
separated out from the rightful members of the polity. Moreover, the very public
differential treatment of these minorities, which research has shown are among
the most disliked persons in our society,672 seems to invite stigmatic treatment.
The reporting requirement is particularly troubling because in order to discern
who might be "illegal" such officials would have to look for indicia of
difference. This encourages highlighting physical differences, as well as racial
thinking. However, all these questions turn on whether, as noted above, it is
legitimate to stigmatize those who are not officially members of the polity but
who share the polity's geographic space.
Third, it is clear that Proposition 187 was designed to have a devastating
669 Plyler v. Doe founded its conclusion that undocumented children are nonetheless
entitled to education on several of these arguments. See, eg., 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1981)
(stating that many non-citizen children will remain in the country permanently, that some will
become citizens, and that non-citizens may sometimes play important and even leadership roles
in the community); see also supra Part II.B.2.d.v; supra note 256 (describing the important
spillover effects Proposition 187 may have on persons who are citizens or legal residents but
who may physically resemble those who are suspected of being here illegally).
670 457 U.S. at 223.
671 See iad at 210-12 (concluding that denial of public education to undocumented
children had no rational basis and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause).
672 See supra note 148 and accompanying text (reporting on political science research).
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impact on the civic life of illegal immigrants by denying them a broad array of
governmental benefits and education, and also by subjecting them to heightened
investigation. Certainly such a measure would discourage illegal immigrants
from participating actively in the polity. However, the question remains whether
or not it is wrong to impose such a burden on persons who have no legitimate
status in the polity.
Finally, if Proposition 187 were found to impermissibly burden participation
rights, a court would have to determine whether the government's arguably
compelling interest in limiting resources to legitimate citizens and residents
could be accomplished in a less burdensome manner.
Thus, the proposed analysis must propose many difficult questions that are
unsettled in our jurisprudence. It is not surprising that the district court elected to
enjoin Proposition 187 on better established doctrinal grounds-federal
preemption.673
5. Affirmative Action: Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson
California's so-called Civil Rights Initiative, also known as Proposition 209,
is deceptively simple.674 In relevant part, it states:
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin
in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.6
75
Although a district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining
implementation of the Proposition on equal protection grounds, 676 the Ninth
Circuit subsequently reversed the grant of the injunction and held that the
provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.677
It seems relatively clear that Proposition 209 is geared to affect minority
673 See supra note 667 and accompanying text.
674 Commnentator Girardeau Spann has called Proposition 209 "alluring and seductive."
See Spann, supra note 263, at 187.
675 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a).
676 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
677 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). A recent Superior Court decision has determined that California's
legislatively enacted set-aside minority contract programs and affirmative action programs
mandated for community college districts do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because
they are "nonpreferential outreach and recruitment" and do not discriminate against majority




groups. All would agree that its impact, although couched in neutral terms, will
be to sharply curtail affirmnative action intended by its authors to benefit various
groups defined by race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.678 The Ninth
Circuit questioned whether Proposition 209 affects minorities, observing that,
counted together, women and minorities make up a majority of the electorate,679
but ultimately the panel accepted the district court's finding that Proposition 209
burdens members of insular minority groups.680
The somewhat more difficult question is whether Proposition 209 impinges
on the affected minority's political participation. Opponents of the measure
argued that it explicitly restructured the political process in a non-neutral manner,
erecting "unique political hurdles only for those seeking legislation intended to
benefit women and minorities-who must now obtain a constitutional
amendment-while allowing those seeking preferential legislation on any other
ground unimpeded access to the political process at all levels. '681 The district
court accepted this argument, concluding that, by requiring affirmative action
advocates to either secure passage of a pro-affirmative action constitutional
amendment or obtain two-thirds approval of both legislative houses, the
Proposition would put such advocates to great expense and effort, thereby
effectively precluding them from petitioning local and state policymakers.
682
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, found no improper burdening of the political
process, suggesting that the state should have the power to generally bar racial
discrimination or preferences at the highest level,683 that in any event the
measure did not deny a right to equal treatment,684 and that states are generally
free to decide which level of government should make various decisions.685
67 8 See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1493 (quoting official description of
measure explaining purpose of eliminating affirmative action favoring women and minorities).
67 9 See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 704 ("Can a statewide ballot initiative
deny equal protection to members of a group that constitutes a majority of the electorate that
enacted it?"); see also id. at 705 n.13 (stating that women, as a majority of the population,
likely are not entitled to protection under the Hunter line of cases).
680 See id. at 704. This is the correct interpretation of "minorities" under the proposed test
because the concern of the analysis is with dynamics of prejudice and stigmatization that are
superimposed on democratic processes. Such dynamics exist because a minority group has, for
historical and social reasons, a subordinate social identity. See supra note 14 (defining
minorities as a group that, for social identity purposes, is subordinate to the majority and which
numerically could be greater in numbers than majorities).
681 Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1489 (characterizing plaintiffs' argument).
682 See id. at 1498-1510 (emphasizing that the measure is unconstitutional because it
impermissibly restructures political process in anon-neutral manner).
6 83 See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 706.
684 See id. at 707.
685 See id. at 708.
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However, the Ninth Circuit seems to miss the main thrust of the Hunter/Romer
line of cases, which is that a majority cannot unfairly and unequally burden
minorities' access to the political process.686
With regard to stigma, the effects of Proposition 209 are less obvious. On its
face, the measure does not stigmatize minorities. In fact, its supporters would
argue that one of the purposes of the measure is to eliminate the stigma
supposedly created when affirmative action programs permit people to say that
minorities did not get where they are based on merit.687 On the other hand, the
argument could be made that Proposition 209 elects and institutes a political as
well as epistemological position that discredits racial minorities' strongly held
viewpoint that to be able to compete on meritocratic principles affirmative action
is needed to overcome barriers to access imposed by whites' unconscious
discrimination. 688 However, this latter counterpoint may prove too much and
passes the line between what is political and subject to legitimate debate, as
opposed to what discredits minorities' beliefs and is therefore "stigmatizing." It
could well be argued that "stigma" should require a stronger social effect than
one that reflects a different epistemological vision.689 The better argument is one
already set forth-that Proposition 209, in requiring amendment to the state
constitution to change this pro-majority outcome, implies that the minorities
cannot be trusted to play by the normal rules. Moreover, majorities have used
their ability to effect an electoral "win" to freeze out future debate on such an
important and critical issue to minorities and the polity as a whole.690
686 See id. at 711 (Schroeder, Pregerson, Norris & Tashima, JJ., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc) ('CThe Supreme Court has squarely held that a state violates the
Constitution when it attempts to put legislative remedies which benefit minorities at a remote
level of government beyond the ordinary legislative process.").
687 Cf Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995) ("[Wjhenever the
government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection.").
6 88 See discussion supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text.
6 89 In Democracy and Inclusion, I argue that it is inappropriate for courts to choose
between differing epistemological visions of social phenomenon, such as discrimination, which
is at the core of the affirmative action debate between majorities and minorities. I argue that
Adarand is a wrongly reasoned case because it chooses, albeit implicitly, a vision of
discrimination based on a white majority perspective. See Lazos Vargas, Democracy and
Inclusion, supra note 17, at 252-64. Therefore, I do not favor a conceptualization of
stigmatization that shoehoms into that concept racial minorities' perspective of racial
discrimination.
690 The California Ballot Pamphlet contained partisan arguments both supporting and
opposing Proposition 209. One of the arguments in favor of the Proposition puts the point
baldly: "A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to prohibit
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Finally, Proposition 209 will potentially have a powerful impact on many
aspects of civil life. As the district court's decision outlines, it eliminates
affirmative action in such areas as government contracting, employment, and
education.691 Although the Ninth Circuit characterized the loss of such a
preference as "inscrutable," in that there is no constitutional right to preferential
treatment solely on the basis of race or gender,692 such a position is open to
debate. Certainly those persons who are now denied access to contracts,
employment, or school will suffer a real civic and economic loss. From their
position, affirmative action is not a "preference" but a counteraction to
discriminatory barriers to access. 693
If Proposition 209 were found to seriously and adversely impact minorities'
political participation, it could be upheld only if the measure was necessary to
serve a compelling government interest. The district court found that the measure
did not even survive intermediate scrutiny, stating that, assuming for argument's
sake that the state is justified in ending discrimination, it has not offered any
justification for reordering the political process to the detriment of minorities'
interest.694 In truth, it is quite hard to imagine when such justification might
exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
Majority-minority conflict is the issue of our day. This issue is magnified
when initiatives and referendums allow majorities to vote directly on minorities'
democratic citizenship. Courts must employ equal protection concepts to fulfill
their responsibility in a democratic polity-to structure disagreements so that
majorities and minorities will continue to co-exist in ways that do not violate our
constitutional values. The test proposed here not only protects minorities' rights,
but also better articulates what courts are doing in their analyses and why certain
discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights movement. Instead of equality,
governments imposed quotas, preferences, and set-asides." Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
691 See id.
692 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,704 (9th Cir. 1997).
693 The Sacramento Superior Court makes this specific finding in the context of
California's set-aside minority contract programs and affirmative action programs mandated
for community college districts. See Wilson v. Nussbaum, No. 96CS01082, slip op. at 18-20
(Sup. Ct. Sacramento, Nov. 30, 1998). See generally McGinley, supra note 278 (arguing that
affirmative action is a remedy for ongoing transactional unconscious discrimination against
minorities).
694 See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1509 (concluding, also, that the
measure is "hopelessly overbroad" to the extent that the government's goal is to avoid liability
with regard to affirmative action programs that have not been tested in court).
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majority actions are particularly threatening to democratic values.
Some might critique this test as overly harsh. The application of this test
would strike down most of the controversial measures that have been examined.
Some might argue that this is another results-oriented test, striking down those
initiatives with which I might not agree. The response is that the main reason
these recent initiatives fail is that they are extreme. Most of these initiatives
restructure state constitutions and place into these charter documents the
majority's "win" on highly controversial social, cultural, and political issues.
These are issues over which majorities and minorities not only differ, but, in
reviewing a thirty year span of data, one can also recognize that over time
majorities' positions have shifted in favor of the affected minority. Arguably,
majorities' more accepting attitudes were influenced by minorities' civic
activism. To lock in a majority win stifles the civic activism that leads to better
co-existence. Moreover, measures that exclude and "fence out" minorities from
civic life in meaningful ways create and encourage separation that reinforces
stigmatic attitudes. Thus, these negative results are not so much a reflection of
the test, but of the radical nature of the measures that are currently gaining access
to the ballot box and gaining approval.
It is possible for majorities and minorities to co-exist We can overcome the
complicated and complex dynamics that social scientists tell us govern social
relations between unlikes. However, modem politics and political competition
encourage excesses. That is why courts must provide needed restraint, remind us
of our ideals and values, and require that, as public citizens, we enact only those
laws that reflect a true measure of ourselves.
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Appendix A: Summary of Results: Majority-Minority Referendums and
Initiatives, 1960-1998
Appen- Years Topic Total Initiatives Anti- Electoral




B 1963- Fair Housing 9 8 89%
1968
C 1960- Busing to 7 6 86%
1979 Address School
Segregation
D 1977- Gay Men and 48 40 83%
1998 Lesbian Civil
Rights
E 1980- English 9 9 100%
1998 Language/
Bilingualism
F 1986- AIDS 5 2 40%
1989
G 1994 Benefits for 1 1 100%
Illegal
Immigrants
H 1996- Affirmative 3 2 67%
1998 Action
Total 82 68 83%
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Appendix B: Fair Housing and Public Accommodations
1 See Howard D. Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing
Referenda, 64 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 124, 125-26 (1970).
2 See Jack L. Walker, Fair Housing in Michigan, in THE POLMCS OF FAIR-HOUSING
LEGISLATION: STATE AND LOCAL CASE STUDIES 353, 373 (Lynn W. Eley & Thomas W.
Casstevens eds., 1968).
3 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that Proposition 14 violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
4 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1968) (holding that ordinance violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
5 See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1970.
6 See Lynn W. Eley, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF FAIR-HOUSING LEGISLATION, supra
note 2, at 1, 8.
7 See Walker, supra note 2, at 378.
8 See Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968) (refiising to enjoin referendum).
Year Location Initiative Result
1963 Berkeley, Proposed Open Housing Ordinance. 1  Failed
CA
1964 Detroit, MI Amendment "i"to city charter provided for Passed
homeowners' "Bill of Rights" guaranteeing (137,671 to
right of Association and "right... from 114,743 votes)
interference.., to give special privileges." 2
1964 California Proposition 14-repeal offairhousing Passed
legislation, whereby no state entity could (65.3%-
deny the ability ofpersons to decline to lease, 33.7%).
rent, or sell property.3  Subsequently
overturned
1964 Akron, OH Repeal by referendum of city fair housing Passed.
ordinance 4  Subsequently
overturned
Toledo, OH Proposed Fair Housing Ordinance.5  Failed (27/,.
65%)
Springfield, Repeal of Fair Housing Ordinance.6  Passed
OH
Jackson, MI Repeal of Fair Housing Ordinance.7  Passed (5,826
to 2,886 votes)
1968 Maryland State legislature's enactment of fair housing Passed
laws is subjected to repeal by referendum. 8
Washington State legislature's enacted fair housing Failed
legislation is subjected to repeal by
referendum.
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Appendix C: Anti-Busing
1 See Many Local Proposals are Decided by Voters, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1960, at A1.
2 See id
3 Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P2d 605, 611 (1975) (quoting
Proposition 21).
4 See Austin Ranney, The United States of America, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PRAC1TCE AND THEORY 67,80 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
5 See Helen Dewar, Ballot-Box Issues: Gay Rights to Dueling, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1978,
at Al.
6 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1981) (holding that the
initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause).
7 See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
Year Location Initiative Result
1960 Arkansas Proposition authorizing officials to close Failed
schools threatened with desegregation. 1
Mississippi Proposition authorizing officials to close Passed
schools threatened with desegregation.2
1972 California Proposition 21--"No public school student Passed (63/o-
shall.. be assigned.. to a particular 37%).
school" based on race.3  Subsequently
overturned
1974 Colorado Constitutional initiative prohibiting busing Passed (69%/o-
of students based on race to achieve racial 31%)
balance in public schools.
1978 Massachusetts Anti-busing--to prohibit race as criterion Passed
for school assignment.5
Washington Initiative 350---No school board... shall Approved.
directly or indirectly require any student to Subsequently
attend a school other than the school which overturned
is geographically nearest" 6
1979 California Proposition'T'--state constitutional Passed by
amendment limited state court ordered 66% vote.
busing for desegregation purposes to those Ruled
situations in which a federal court would constitutional
employ such a remedy to correct a
Fourteenth Amendment violation.7
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Appendix D: Gay Men and Lesbian Civil Rights
Year Location Initiative/Referendum Result
1977 Dade Repealed Dade County Ordinance No. 77- Passed (2 tol
County, FL 4, which prohibited discrimination based margin,
upon "affectional or sexual preference." 1  202,314-89,562
votes)
1978 California Proposition 6--school employees can be Failed (135-37)
brought on charges if they "advocate,
impose or encourage" homosexual sex
acts.
2
Dade Attempted repeal of Dade County Failed (58/o-
County, FL Ordinance No. 77-4, which prohibited 42%)
discrimination because of sexual
orientation
Wichita, KS Repealed City Ordinance No. 35-242, Failed
which prohibited discrimination against
homosexuals.4
St Paul, MN City ordinance prohibiting discrimination Passed
because of sexual orientation was repealed. (54,096 to
The second portion of the repeal dealt with 31,694 votes)
a change in the law allowing religious
private schools to use church membership
as a prerequisite to admission to their
schools.5
Eugene, OR Referendum to repeal law prohibiting Passed
discrimination against gays.6  I
1 See D. Jason Berggren, Responding to the Spirit of Stonewall: Righteous Referendums,
Ecumenism and the Anti-Gay Rights Politics of the Christian Right (1995) (unpublished MA.
thesis, Florida State University) (on file with Florida State University Library).
2 See JOHN M. ALLSWANG, CALiFORNIA INrATIvS AND REFERENDUMS, 1912-1990, at
1-20 (1991).
3 See Berggren, supra note 1.
4 See Wichita Repeals Homosexual Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1978, at Al.
5 See Nathanial Sheppard, Jr., Law on Homosexuals Repealed in St. Paul, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1978, at Al.6 See Grae Lichtenstein, Laws Aiding Homosexuals Facing Oposition Around Nation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1978, at Al; Wallace Turner, Voters in Eugene, Ore., Repeal Ordinance




7 See RANDY SHLTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET 154-58 (1982).
8 See Philip Hagar, San Jose Area Voters Reject 2 Gay Rights Ordinances, LA. TIMES,
June 5, 1980, at 1.
9 See Sum Rubenstein, Court Kills Anti-Gay Rights Measure, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Nov. 13, 1992, at Al, available in 1992 WL 7364909.
10 See Maralee Schwartz, Pocketbook Big Factor With Voters, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
1989, at A44; Victor F. Zonana, Gay Agenda Takes Beating-Even in San Francisco, LA.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1989, available in 1989 WL 2224620.
11 See Schwartz, supra note 10; Zonana, supra note 10.
1 2 See Hagar, supra note 8.
Seattle, WA Repeal of city ordinance banning Passed
discrimination against gay men and
lesbians.7
1980 Davis, CA Initiative requiring the city council to adopt Failed (nearly 2
gay rights ordinance after hearing to to 1 margin)
determine specific provisions.
8
San Jose, City ordinance seeking to prohibit Failed
CA discrimination against gay men and lesbians (109,238-
in employment and housing. 35,957 votes)
1988 Oregon Measure 8-requiring state/local Passed (57%-
governments and school board districts to 43%)
discourage homosexuality by providing that Slruck down:
state officials "cannot forbid the taking of Merrick v.
any personnel action against any state Board of
employee based on the sexual orientation of Higher Educ.,
such employee."9  841 P.2d 646
(Or. Ct App.
1992).
1989 Irvine, CA Initiative denying gay men and lesbians Passed (53o/6,
protection under city's anti-discrimination 47%)
law-removes language protecting gay men
and lesbians in the local human rights law.10
San Initiative to extend employee benefits to Failed (50.5%
Francisco, "domestic partners" of city employees. In 49.5%)
CA addition, non-city employees would be
allowed to register their relationship. 11
Santa Clara, County ordinance seeking to prohibit Failed
CA discrimination against gay men and lesbians (244,095-




13 See Tacoma Repeals Gay-Rights Measure, SEATrLE TMES, Nov. 8, 1989, at B5,
available in 1989 WL 2954320.
14 See Kevin Roderick & Victor Zonana, 3 Bay Area Gays Win Elections; Domestic
Partners Law Approved, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, available in 1990 WL 2311500.
15 See Robert T. Nelson, Domestic Partner Laws Survive Challenge, SEATrLE TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1990, at B7, available in 1990 WL 3177848.
16 See id
17 See LA. Chung, SF. Apartment Vacancy Control Proposition Defeated, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Nov. 6, 1991, at A5, available in 1991 WL 4218108.
18 See NationalResults at a Glance, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, at A31.
Tacoma, Proposition 2-to repeal ordinance enacted Passed
WA only 6 months prior, which prohibits (51%-49%)
discrimination of gay men and lesbians in
employment, financial transactions, housing,
and public accommodations. 13
1990 San Proposition K-a revised version of 1989's Passed
Francisco, 'Domestic Partners Law," which allows gay (540-/o46%)
CA couples to register their relationship with
City Hall. However, the provisions in the
1989 version affording unmarried couples
the same sick leave and funeral benefits as
married couples were not included in this
version.14
Seattle, WA Initiative 35-repeal of "Domestic Partners" Failed (55/o--
and "Family Leave" ordinances, which 45%)
allow city employees to use their sick leave
to care for a spouse, child, or live-in
partner.15
Tacoma, The issue in the city's 1989 Proposition 2 Failed
WA was revisited-ordinance seeking to ban (more than 2 to
discrimination against gay men and lesbians. 1 ratio against
The language in this proposition was very it)
similar to the repealed ordinance.
16
1991 San Proposition K-repeal of "Domestic Partner Failed
Francisco Law" enacted in 1990, which allows
unmarried couples, including gay couples, to
register their relationship with City Hall.17





19 See Evans v. Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
20 See Bettina Boxall, Oregon Measure Condemning Homosexuals is Trailing, LA.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at A20, available in 1992 WL 2843638; Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit
Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1992, at B 1, available in
1992 WL 2077314.
2 1 See Kathleen Monje, Springfield Vote Win Heartens OCA Head, PORTLAND
OREGONiAN, May 21, 1992, at G8, available in 1992 WL 6832744.
22 See id
23 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 1997).
1992 Colorado Initiative 2--prohibits all legislative, Passed
executive or judicial action at any level of (53-/,47%)
state or local government that is intended to Struck down:
protect gay men and lesbians from Evans v.
discrimination. 19  Romer, 517
U.S. 620
(1996).
7 Oregon Measure 9-initiative to amend the state Failed (430/,
constitution to reflect that homosexuality is 57%)
"abnormal, wrong, and perverse" and would
prohibit enactment of any law protecting gay
men and lesbians from discrimination by
any state or local government 20
Corvalis, Initiative prohibiting the city government Passed (nearly
OR from "recognizing or promoting 2 to 1 margin)
homosexuality." 2 1
Springfield, Initiative to amend city charter prohibiting Passed
OR the recognition/promotion of (5,693-4,540
homosexuality.2 2  unofficial vote)
Cincinnati, To amend city charter to prohibit the Passed (610-
OH municipality from granting "special 39%)
privileges" to gay men and lesbians and to
repeal recently enacted anti-discrimination
protection. 23
Anti-gay rights measures were attempted in
numerous localities in Oregon in 1993.
These measures were mainly backed by the
Oregon Citizens Alliance. The remaining
entries are Oregon cities and counties that





















Junction Passed (63 1-










OR3 1  3,748 vote)
24 See Charles E. Beggs, Oregon Group Begins Court Fight of Ban on Anti-Gay-Rights
Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at B3, available in 1993 WL 6012032; How They Voted,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 25, 1993, at Cl.
2 5 See Sura Rubenstein, Anti-Gay Rights Measures Win Handily, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Sept. 22, 1993, at C1, available in 1993 WL 11689870.
2 6 See How They Voted, supra note 24.
27 See Rubenstein, supra note 25.
2 8 See id
2 9 See Beggs, supra note 24; How They Voted, supra note 24.
30 SeeAnti-Gay Rights Vote Illegal, SEATrE TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at B2, available in
1993 WL 6018552; Kathleen Monje, Anti-Gay Rights Initiative Won by 1 Vote, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, July 23, 1993, at C2, available in 1993 WL 6925824; Sura Rubenstein, OCA
Prevails in Marion County, Three Cities, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 23, 1994, at Al,
available in 1994 WL 44520125.




32 See How They Voted, supra note 24.
33 William McCall, Ore. Anti-Gay Measures Pass, SEATLE TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at B8,




37 See Oregon Cities AdoptAnti-Gay Rights Measures, supra note 31.
38 See McCall, supra note 33; Rubenstein, supra note 25.
3 9 See Mourning in America, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 1994; Susan Drumheller,
Alliance not Ready to Give Up Anti-Gay Fight, THE SPOKEsMAN-REv., Nov. 13, 1994, at Bi,
available in 1994 WL 4513257.
40 See Sum Rubenstein & Tom Bates, Campaign 94 Voter's Guide, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Nov. 6, 1994, at P8, available in 1994 WL 4856645.
Klamath, Passed (66-/o-









OR3 6  45%)
Oregon Passed (2,308-





1994 Idaho Initiative proscribing discrimination Failed
protection based on sexual orientation and
limiting school materials._9
Oregon Measure 13-amend state constitution to Failed
exclude sexual orientation from protected
class status and limiting school and library
materials 4 0
Austin, IX Repealed extension of insurance benefits to Passed (62%-
domestic partners. 38%)
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Appendix D continued
4 1 See Jon Glass & Phil Long, Gainesville Takes Gay Rights Law Off the Books, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 9,1994, at 21A.
42 See 1995-Glancing Back at the Year's Major Stories, PORTAND PRESS HERALD, Dec.
31, 1995, at 5A, available in 1995 WL 14383715.
4 3 See State of Washington, Office of the Secretary of State, Initiative to the People (1997)
<http://www.secstate.wa.gov/initslpeople97.hlm>; Kathy Mulady, City Weighs Necessity of
Gay Rights Ordinance Sexual Orientation Not Included in Anti-Discrimination Law, THE
SPOKESMAN-REV., Aug. 2, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 13423805.
44 See Alaska Division of Elections, Election Summary Report, State of Alaska 1998
General Election (last updated Dec. 1, 1998) <http:/www.gov.state.ak.us/Itgov/elect98/results.
htrn>.
45 See Maine Elections Division, Department of the Secretary of State, Referendum
Election Results-February 10, 1998 (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http-//www.state.me.us/sos/cec/
elec/Ret98feb.htn>; see also Frank Fisher, Gay-rights Activists Outspent Their.... THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL SERV., Feb. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7386946; Portland Joins
Line to Gay Rights Ordinance, PORTLAND NEWS HERALD, Apr. 3, 1998, at 1.
46 See Hawaii Office of Elections, 1998 General Election Results, Statewide Summary
Report (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http:/www.hawaii.gov/elections/reslt98/general/98swgen5.
htn>; see also Bruce Dunford, Those Nho Don't Want a Constitutional Amendment on...,
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., July 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7433494.
Alachua Repealed county anti-discrimination Passed
Co., FL ordinance covering sexual orientation.4 1
1995 Maine Referendum limiting antidiscrimination Failed (53%o-
protections to classes that exclude sexual 47%)
orientation. 4 2
1997 Washington Initiative 677-bans discriminationbased Failed (60°%o-
on sexual orientation in the workplace 4 3  40%)
1998 Alaska Measure 2--constitutional amendment Passed (68%-
limiting marriage to persons of the opposite 32%)
sex.44
Maine Repeal of law that would ban discrimination Passed (51%-
based on sexual orientation enacted by state 49%)
legislature_4 5
Hawaii Constitutional amendment allowing state Passed (69%-




INTIA TIVES AND REFERENDUMS
Appendix E: English-Only and Bilingual Education
I Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 80-128 (1980).
2 Kathryn A. Woolard, Sentences in the Language Prison: The Rhetorical
Structuring of an American Language Policy Debate, 16 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 268 (1989).
3 See JOHN M. ALLSWANG, CALIFORNIA INMATrWS AND REMrENDUMS, 1912-1990, at
1-20(1991).
4 See id
5 See FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 9 (1988); see also Yfliguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
69 F.3d 920 (1995) (en banc), vacated on remand, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); Ruiz v. Hall, 957 P.2d 989 (Ariz. 1989). The Arizona Court, while
rejecting the initiative, steered clear of an intent analysis, instead stating its confidence in the
good faith of the voters of Arizona. See id
6 See Digest of Initiatives and Referenda of Colorado (last updated Dec. 4, 1998)
<http://www.co.us/govdir/ leg-dir/lcsstaff/research/CONSTNL'htm>"
7 See Memorandum of the Florida Secretary of State to the Florida Constitutional Revision
Commission (1998) (on file with the author).
Year Location Initiative Result
1980 Dade Ordinance proscribing use of English Passed (2 to 1
County, FL language in any city activity.1  margin)
1983 San Proposition "0"2 Passed
Francisco,
CA
1984 California Proposition 38-Govemor must request Passed
U.S. President and U.S. Attorney General
that voting materials be in English only.3
1986 California Proposition 63--declaring English Passed
"Official Language" and empowering
legislature to enforce 4
1988 Arizona Constitutional amendment declaring Passed (51%--
English official language and proscribing 49%)
use of languages other than English by
state employees and officials. 5
Colorado Constitutional amendment declaring Passed
English official language and empowering (829,617-
legislature to enforce.6  527,053 votes)
Florida Constitutional amendment declaring Passed
English official language and empowering
legislature to enforce.7
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Appendix E continued
8 See Alaska Division of Elections, Election Summary Report (last updated Dec. 1, 1998)
<http://www.gov. state.ak.usfltgov/elect98/results. htm>.
9 See California Secretary of State, Primary98-State Ballot Measures (visited Apr. 20,
1999) <http://Primary98. ss.ca.gov/Retums/propt>.
1998 Alaska Government required to use English.8  Passed (69V/o-
31%)
California Proposition 227-requires all public school Passed (61%-
instruction to be conducted in English.9 39%)
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]NITIA TIVES AND REFERENDUMS
Appendix F: AIDS
I See Cass Peterson, The Initiatives; 2 States Vote to Curb Taxes; Measures to Set Up
Lotteries Headfor Approval, WASH. PoST, Nov 5,1986, atA33.
2 See JOHN M. ALLSWANG, CALUFORNLA INrnATIV AND REFERENDUMS, 1912-1990, at
157, 161,166 (1991).
Year Location Initiative Result
1986 California To prohibit AIDS victims from working as Failed (29%-
teachers or in food-related jobs. Further, it 71%)
would subject them to possible quarantine.1
1988 California 3 Measures2
Measure 69-would subject AIDS victims 69: Failed
to quarantine. (29/,-71%)
Measure 96-testing for certain sex 96: Passed
offenders or persons who have assaulted (68%--32%)
peace officers or medical personnel.
Measure 102--required health providers to 102: Failed
report the names of persons who tested (34%--66%)
positive for AIDS.
1989 Concord, CA Repealed ordinance adopted by city Passed (56%-
council barring discrimination against 44%)
AIDS victims (by referendum).
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Appendix G: Benefits for Illegal Immigrants
I See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, Nos. 94-7569 MRP, 94-7652 MRP,
94-7570 MRP, 95-0187 MRP, 94-7571 MRP, 1998 WL 141325 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1998)
(holding that federal law largely preempted Proposition 187), appeal docketed, No. 98-55671
(9th Cir. Apr. 21, 1998).
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1NITIA TIVESAND REFERENDUMS
Appendix H: Affirative Action
1 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev'd
122 F. 3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
2 See Harris County Clerk's Office, Final Official Cumulative Results for the November 4,
1997 Election (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.co.harris.tx.us/cclerk/elect/ HISTORY/
110497/FrameSetl.htrrl>; see also Same Howe Verhovek, Houston to Vote on Repeal of
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TaMs, May 4, 1998, at A16.
3 See Washington Secretary of State, Results in the 1998 Washington State General
Election, Summary Report (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/
gen98.htm>; Sam Howe Verhovek, From Same Sex Marriages to Gambling, Voters Speak,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, atBI, BIO.
Year Location Initiative Result
1996 California Proposition 209-bans preferences or Passed (54°/o-
discrimination on account of race, gender, 46%)
and national origin.)
1997 Houston, TX Proposition A-city ordinance banning Failed (55%-
affinmative action "preferences" in 45%)
municipal programs.2
1998 Washington Initiative 200--same as "CCRI." 3  Passed (58./o-
I 1_ 42%)
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